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Introduction 
After the distress hit the financial system in 2008, at the London Summit in 
April 2009, the G20 leaders all agreed that the current system in the whole 
world is vulnerable. Globally appropriate steps shall be taken to overcome 
the discrepancies. The biggest concern related to the regulatory framework 
was that it was incapable of preventing imbalances and spillover of distress 
among entities or even countries. As a result, over the past decade, structural 
changes were applied in the financial system. Recent regulatory initiatives 
aim to enforce the system by proposing more substantial prudential 
requirements and improved protection rules. 
Besides implementing new regulatory frameworks, a market infrastructure 
has gained high importance in the financial world. Over the last years, this 
area became the dominant institution in the “non-banking” field. The central 
clearing, performed by central counterparty clearing houses (hereinafter 
CCP), is a crucial feature of global derivatives markets. The G20 leaders 
recognized the benefits in risk management offered by CCPs, so they agreed 
in 2009 that standardized over-the-counter (hereinafter OTC) derivative 
transactions should be centrally cleared (G20 2009). The aforementioned 
prudential requirements were for CCPs themselves also established to 
strengthen their resilience to promote systematic stability. Global standards 
not just for the resilience but for the recovery of CCPs have been 
implemented and continuously adjusted and improved since the crisis. 
Coeuré (2017, p. 97.) presents the high attention authorities put into 
strengthening central clearing activities’ global safeguards. The primary role 
played the approval of the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market 
Infrastructures in 2012, a complementary CPMI-IOSCO report on the 
recovery of financial market infrastructures in 2014. The Financial Stability 
Board also gave guidance in 2014. 
In 2015 further comprehensive work plan on central counterparties was put 
in force targeting resilience, recovery, resolution, and clearing 
interdependencies. Additional CPMI-IOSCO (2017) requirements were 
published in 2017, 2019, and 2020 as well. The latest issue for consideration 
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was regarding the default management auctions (CPMI-IOSCO, 2020). For 
resolution planning, guidance has been set out by FSB (2014) and FSB 
(2017), and a framework developed for supervisory stress testing specifically 
for CCPs (CPMI-IOSCO (2018)). 
As mentioned, this regulatory “redesigning” is a global plan in progress. 
Every financial institution around the world is subject to the newly approved 
frameworks. Guidelines present in the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) are rules to be 
applied for institutions operating in the United States of America. At the same 
time, European entities are subject to the Basel Committee’s proposal, knows 
as Basel III, applicable for banking institutions, for regulatory reform, and 
the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). Asian entities are 
regulated too by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). There are 
CCPs established outside the European Union, which applied for recognition 
of EMIR. Among these CCPs are listed several Asian institutions as well.1  
Authorities and regulators emphasize the importance of transparency, and 
they also cast CCPs as “pillars of the new global financial architecture” 
(Paisley, 2017).  
To measure the resilience of these kinds of new infrastructures, among others, 
regulators call for the application of stress tests. The quality of management 
and the stability of the financial system are also the subject of several tests. 
A particular element of CCP’s daily function is the default waterfall 
guarantee system. The quantification of clearing member contribution is 
based on, among others, on results of stress tests. While calibrating the stress 
test method to determine the proper contributions for the clearing members 
must consider two points of view: the default waterfall shall be prudent 
enough, so, in case of extreme distress, a CCP could survive. On the other 
hand, if the clearing service becomes too expensive, market participants will 
be burdened to join the system. This would have an adverse effect, so the 
primary goal of clear OTC trades through CCPs making markets transparent 




Before the sub-prime crisis of 2007-2009, only about 25 percent of OTC 
transactions were cleared through a central partner (Hull, 2018).  The 
regulatory response to the crisis aims to enhance the stability and 
transparency of the financial system. The Dodd-Frank Act adopted by the US 
Congress and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 
stipulates that a regulated CCP will regulate a standardized OTC deal 
between all significant players. These markets have become more regulated, 
and OTC trades have become subject to central clearing. In 2009 only one-
third of interest rate derivatives and one-tenth of credit default swaps were 
cleared through CCPs, while in 2019, these ratios increased to almost four-
fifths and 50%, respectively (Aramonte and Huang, 2019). As of the first half 
of 2020, about $388 trillion notional amount of interest rate derivatives were 
cleared by CCPs, with a gross market value of about $6 trillion (BIS, 2020). 
This research aims to give an overview of the regulatory framework proposed 
by the relevant authorities and to identify the most suitable default waterfall 
design that suits the profile of the CCP, but it avoids distorting the 
competition on the market among clearing members. The study connects with 
authorities’ steps mentioned earlier and contributes to the existing literature 
in two ways. Firstly, the proposed model for defining the optimal level of 
default fund contribution by calibrating the applied stress tests will give a 
practical overview of the default waterfall’s optimal calibration. The trading 
incentives concerning the amount of capital a CCP is willing to contribute to 
the default waterfall based on a proposed model are also essential for the 
study. On the other hand, regulatory constraints on this topic are emphasized, 
giving examples of how inadequate or highly regulated environments can 
harm the system and its participants.  
Therefore, the research question focuses on the design of the default waterfall 
in two cases: How does the default fund contribution of the clearing 
members take shape if the CCP manages its default fund separately, 
merged on the spot and derivatives market. The amount of CCP capital in 
the system plays an important role, so its size can define the system’s 
riskiness, but it can also alter incentives. This reasons why the other question 
of the study is related to it: What should be the size of the CCP’s 
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contribution in order to avoid using the non-defaulting member’s default 
fund contribution? What should be the size of the CCP’s capital just to 
have a default waterfall that covers the losses of the defaulting member 
without triggering the recovery plan? 
The document is structured as follows: In the first chapter, I introduce the 
reader to the world of central clearing by defining its function in the economy. 
The chapter first familiarizes historical aspects of central clearing and the 
significance of multilateral netting. Lingering further on history, in this 
chapter, I present the default and near-fail events related to central 
counterparties, followed by the detailing of CCPs’ risks. CCPs are often 
confused with banks, but I analyze both institutions’ balance sheet structure 
and risk profile in the second chapter to prove how different they are. The 
third chapter focuses on the development of the regulatory background 
concerning the European and US frameworks. Chapter IV. contains the 
analysis of the default waterfall’s three layers: margins, default fund 
contributions, and the CCP’s capital contributions. The relevant regulatory 
background is described in this chapter, along with literature overviews. The 
second layer detailing contains the importance of stress testing. From a 
theoretical point of view, I dedicate one last chapter to introduce the 
possibilities CCPs and authorities have to avoid a dramatic failure of the 
infrastructure if the default waterfall is proven to be inadequate. The 
document’s final chapter contains the proposed methodology and baseline 
research model, unfolding a Monte Carlo simulation that analyzes the amount 
of capital a CCP has to risk when providing clearing and settlement services 
on the market while operating different guarantee systems setups. I used a 
theoretical model to show how credit risk is altered depending on the four 
guarantee system setups. Finally, I analyze the results to show what benefits 
and dangers the four operations have from the viewpoint of the CCP’s own 
capital. This question is also crucial from the regulators’ point of view since 
the more vulnerable a CCP is, the larger the systematic risk. The limits of the 
model and a sensitivity test is also presented. 
During my doctoral studies, I was a member of a research group, supported 
by EFOP-3.6.3.-VEKOP-16-2017-00007 számú “Tehetségből fiatal kutató” 
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– A kutatói életpályát támogató tevékenységek. (“Talented young researcher” 
– Supporting activities of researcher career). The work of the group was 
flourishing, and the model we built is incorporated into my research. A part 
of the theoretical model results were part of an MSc thesis of one of the 
research group members. The co-authors’ statement is annexed to the thesis.  
Some elements of a study prepared with Csilla Szanyi and Kata Váradi are 




I. CCP’s function in the economy 
The presence of the CCPs in the financial markets is undeniable. Many 
researchers pointed out the benefits these infrastructures provide, 
nevertheless, learning the path that led to the growing importance of CCP is 
indispensable.  
Before entering into the detail of the CCP analysis, it is crucial to clear the 
notions of CCPs and clearinghouses.  
1.1. Clearinghouses vs. central counterparties 
The primary role of clearinghouses and central counterparties is the clearing 
and the settlement of trades. The first significant difference is that a 
clearinghouse operates on exchange markets, while CCPs can operate on 
exchange and OTC markets. Regarding the risk-overtaking mechanism, the 
CCP takes over the counterparty risk during trading, so there is a novation 
process by becoming the seller to every buyer and every seller, while a 
clearinghouse usually does not do this. So in the case of OTC CCPs, the two 
trading parties are no longer exposed to each other but only to the CCP, 
providing insurance against bilateral default risk (Biais et al., 2016). The 
netting of the transactions is different since a CCP always nets transactions, 
while clearinghouses do not necessarily. Another striking dissimilarity relates 
to the fact that in OTC CCPs, the trades are not necessarily cleared daily 
(Berlinger et al., 2016b). Overall, every CCP has the activity of a 
clearinghouse, while not every clearinghouse can be regarded as a CCP 
(DNB, 2013). However, this difference is in the clearing activity is 
continuously eroding and disappearing (Berlinger et al., 2016b). 
With my supervisor, Kata Váradi, Ph. D., we analyzed the difference between 
clearinghouses and central counterparty by analyzing their risk management 
efficiency on a margin level. We used EMIR and DFA regulations’ 
requirements when developing the models. We used futures margin as the 
margin calculated by clearinghouses only in exchange trading, and CCP margin 
calculated by the CCPs and can be used in the markets it clears (both exchange- 
and OTC trading). In both cases, the trader becomes a member of the system, and it 
16 
will be a clearing member having an obligation to pay margins imposed by the entity. 
Our results show that calculating the margin balance with the futures 
margining or the CCP margining can lead to a much different margin account 
balance, although the initial margin requirements were calculated the same 
way. The simulation was run 1 000 times. The main result was that from an 
everyday liquidity management point of view regarding cash flow 
movements and overmargining, the futures margining is better from the 
clearing members’ perspective. Moreover, also from a procyclicality aspect, 
the futures margining proved to be better. Nevertheless, the overall results 
show that the CCP margin was better from the model adequacy perspective. 
Namely, it performed much better on the backtest, so from a prudency 
perspective, it is superior. Therefore, the significant difference appears on an 
operational level, while both institutions’ goal is the same. 
1.2. A brief history of central clearing 
In the following, I will present the history of central counterparties by 
pointing out the major turning points in their evolution, increasing resilience, 
and importance.  
1.2.1. Cheque clearing 
Cheque clearing was one of the first forms of clearing services. This service 
is defined as “movement of a check from the bank in which it was deposited 
to the bank on which it was drawn, and the movement of its face amount in 
the opposite direction.” (Business dictionary, 2021). This is a so-called 
clearing cycle, and its purpose is to net the credit and debit accounts with the 
same pre-agreed amount. If there were insufficient funds in the account at the 
time the cheque arrived, it was being rejected and returned to the issuing 
bank. The payee in the transaction was the person to whom the cheque was 
drawn. This allowed the owner to the issuing bank, present the cheque, and 
receive the payment. Before payment, the drawer’s bank would examine the 
check’s basic requirements regarding the administrative criteria like 
signature, dates, and any other details as requested. The payee was 
empowered to deposit the cheque with their bank, which helped it to be 
introduced to the responsible bank for installment (Lloyd, 1899). 
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Cheques became popular in England in the 1600s, but until around 1770, this 
“clearing” was performed personally by clerks. London originated the 
clearinghouse. London private banker clerks formed this very initial clearing 
activity. The primary purpose of these meetings was to save themselves the 
trouble and time of going to each bank, so they got into the habit of meeting 
in a room to settle their mutual claims. The French merchants had a similar 
practice. They gathered to balance their debts, pay the differences, and make 
their bills payable at the great annual fair at Lyons. They visited all other 
banks to exchange cheques until they settled with each other (Lloyd, 1899; 
Nevin and Davis, 1970). In 1832 Charles Babbage described how the 
Clearing House operated (Babbage, 1832). In the 19th century, the first 
organization for clearing cheques was the “Bankers’ Clearing House.” 
Lubbock’s Bank founded it on the famous Lombard Street, needing only a 
single room for the clearing activity. Clerks from London banks met each day 
to exchange checks and settle accounts.  
After every cheque was collected, each clerk of the debtor bank paid in cash 
to the Inspector of the Clearing House, the amount one bank owed to other 
banks. Lastly, when the debtor clerks had paid the Inspector, each clerk for 
the banks that were owed money collected the amount they were entitled. The 
end-of-day balance was zero, as the debtor banks’ amount of cash must have 
equaled the creditor banks’ total money. At the end of the day, the netting 
amount was zero. If the received and the distributed amount did not match, 
the paper trail of documents helped to identify the numerical errors, so those 
could be found and corrected as soon as possible (Matthew, 1921). 
The growing volume of checks required more efficient sorting methods to be 
developed. As the automation of cheque processing improved, electronic 
payment systems excluded the need for paper-based tools.  
1.2.2. Financial clearing history 
As automation improved, the latter part of the 19th century was characterized 
by the innovative processes implemented in financial exchanges. This 
improvement meant that commodities futures markets and stock exchanges 
began to use clearinghouses.  
18 
In Europe, London was, and nowadays, it is still one of the most important 
financial centers. Not surprisingly, as late as 1899, the London Stock 
Exchange was the first and the only stock exchange in Europe using a 
clearinghouse at the time (Lloyd, 1899).  
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the most crucial in the United 
States of America, but the Philadelphia Stock Exchange was the first to use a 
clearing system. Founded in 1790, it played an influential role in America’s 
financial and economic development, facilitating the accurate settlement of 
securities transactions, including buy-sell activities and deliveries (Guarino, 
2015). 
Brown et al. (2008) and Bernstein et al. (2019) give a historical overview of 
the clearing activity focusing on the United States’ markets. They highlight 
the Consolidated Stock Exchange (CSE) as the most significant exchange that 
competed head-to-head with the Big Board2. It traded many NYSE-listed 
securities, and as noted by Brown et al. averaged more than a 50 market 
percent share during the 1890s starting from 1886. The NYSE netted its stock 
transactions through a clearinghouse only from May of 1892. (Bernstein et 
al., 2019). At this point, the risk-mutualization of trading and highly 
sophisticated guarantee funds were not implemented yet. The primary goal 
was to facilitated multi-lateral netting across all members by centralizing 
clearing. The New York Coffee Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange started using  clearing houses to settle their transactions from the 
second decade of the 20th century, despite being considered significant stock 
exchanges. The New York Coffee Exchange began using clearing houses in 
1914. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange started providing clearing services 
later in 1919 (Labuszewski et al., 2010). 
Bernstein et al. (2019) examined the benefits of establishing the NYSE 
compared to the CSE. Their findings show the benefits introduced by the 
clearing, highlighting the reduced annualized volatility of returns by 90-
 
2 The Big Board is an auction market where brokers and specialists buy and sell securities for 
people by matching the highest bidding price with the lowest selling price. One of the most 
distinguishing characteristics of the Big Board is -- unlike the Nasdaq or other electronic 
exchanges, it has an actual trading floor at 11 Wall Street in New York. 
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173bps and increased asset values. Before clearing, “shocks to overnight 
lending rates reduced the value of stocks on the NYSE, relative to identical 
stocks on the CSE, but this was no longer true after the establishment of the 
clearing.” (Bernstein et al., 2019, p. 719) They also point out that a decrease 
in contagion risk drives at least half of the average reduction in counterparty 
risk. They indicate that clearing can significantly improve market stability 
and value to decrease network contagion and counterparty risk. 
The benefits of central clearing are undeniable. It can significantly improve 
market stability and increase asset values by reducing network contagion and 
counterparty risk. 
1.2.3. CCPs in the modern era 
The main idea of CCPs is that trading through a CCP, a bilateral OTC 
derivative trade between two counterparties, is replaced by two symmetric 
transactions between the CCP and each counterparty. Cont (2010), Iyer and 
Peydro (2011) point out an essential function and benefit of these market 
infrastructures, namely preventing adverse effects and spillover of a 
defaulting counterparty. Compared to bilateral trading, where the default of 
one entity can spread throughout the system leading to a chain of contagious 
defaults, by multilateral netting among market participants, there is higher 
transparency, risk-sharing among members of the clearinghouse is achieved. 
Also, there is no need for duplicative monitoring, and mitigation of 
counterparty risk is managed through the CCP as members of the system are 
insulated from each other’s default, reducing friction in commitments (Nosal, 
2011).  
It is undeniable, and we have already determined that the prime role of the 
central clearing counterparty is to manage risk achieving this by various 
techniques to manage the exposures taken by not just its clearing members 
but also the non-clearing members too. 
Central counterparties were not in the spotlight as they are nowadays. The 
turning point in their importance was on the 14th of September 2008. This 
day was significant in current history as well. The day before Lehman 
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Brothers declared bankruptcy, they tried to limit the damage and the losses 
of other financial institutions resulting from its default by working to net 
counterparty risk in their bilateral over-the-counter contracts. Lehman 
Brothers Holdings in 2012 reported that their global OTC derivatives position 
at the time was estimated at $35 trillion in notional. If this would not be 
enough, the company also was included being a counterparty in over 900,000 
derivatives transactions, amounting to a total of $24 billion in counterparty 
liabilities. The company had 209 registered subsidiaries in 21 different 
countries, so Lehman’s bankruptcy and financial debugging were among the 
most significant and most complicated cases in history. Creditors filed about 
$1.2 trillion of claims against the Lehman estate (Fleming and Sarkar, 2015; 
Bernstein et al., 2019). 
Unfortunately, their move of clearing to reduce damages “was described by 
market participants as “a bust,” with very little successful netting before 
Lehman’s bankruptcy filing” (Bernstein et al., 2019). The consequences are 
already known: counterparty risk has increased dramatically, leading to 
contagion and financial instability among global financial market 
participants. The uncertainty amplified counterparty risk. This uncertainty’s 
essential indicators were the dramatic increase in the credit default swap-
bond basis and covered interest rate parity deviations. (Bernstein et al., 2019). 
The collapse of one of the “too-big-to-fail” institutions and the never seen 
spillover it caused raised concerns about the stability of the whole financial 
system, and it also pointed out the need for a more robust counterparty risk 
management. 
Before Lehman’s collapse, market participants relied on bilateral agreements 
and ad-hoc margin requirements among them. Moreover, the regulatory 
background in OTC derivatives did not require traders to move their activities 
and use multilateral netting through a centralized clearinghouse. With the 
lack of a central counterparty and, therefore, the lack of proper risk 
management, traders were exposed to increased counterparty risk through 
contagion, since if one trader defaults, he can set off a domino effect leading 
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to additional defaults among market participants, but also amplify the 
spillover effect to other segments of the markets or even other countries. 
The most significant benefit of multilateral netting is the gross notional 
exposure reduction. Cecchetti et al. (2009) estimate that the exposure can be 
reduced even by 90 percent. Policymakers use the Lehman’s bankruptcy as a 
piece of evidence to show the need to enhance the transparency of the OTC 
traded transactions, pointing out the ex-post netting benefits. The primary 
goal is to reduce the counterparty risk arising from contagion and to avoid the 
domino effect induced by a market participant unable to meet its 
requirements.  
1.2.4. Bilateral trading versus multilateral netting 
The end-to-end analysis of trade has three significant levels to be considered: 
the platform where the trade is initiated, the actual clearing of the transaction, 
and of course, the settlement of assets. The process is presented on an existing 
example through the capital market infrastructure of the Hungarian market 
for trades cleared by the Hungarian CCP, KELER CCP: 
 
Figure 1: Capital Market Infrastructure in Hungary 
Source: KELER CCP (2021) 
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The deal is made on a trading platform - in this case, the Budapest Stock 
Exchange or the Multilateral Trading System (MTS platform)3 – This is the 
first level where market participants buy or sell assets. KELER CCP performs 
the clearing, KELER CSD – the central securities depository – performs 
settlement of assets. Nevertheless, the cash side settlement of the trade can 
be performed by the central securities depository, not only by the central bank 
but also by the CSD with banking-type ancillary services. Béres (2018) points 
out the undeniable positive effect of CCPs. He analyzes both central 
securities depositories and central counterparties, and he highlights that the 
two infrastructures can determine the efficiency of the financial and capital 
markets by having an indirect effect on the performance of the whole 
economy. 
CCP clearing concentrates on trade management, position management, 
collateral and risk management, and delivery management. There are two 
forms of CCP inclusions: first, the CCP becomes the original buyer and 
seller’s counterparty. Second, the CCP is a facilitator, in which case the 
original buyer and seller remain legal counterparties to each other. The CCP 
will validate and match the delivery instructions, the result of which is 
forwarded to settlement. The clearing is performed first by the CCP, then the 
CSD’s turn is to perform the settlement. It is also possible for CCPs to be 
involved in the activity of clearing and in the settlement.  
The process when the CCP imposes itself a “central” party between traders 
and, therefore, “becoming a buyer to the seller, and a seller to the buyer” is 
called novation (CPSS, 2004). The CCP will provide insurance against the 
bilateral default risk for the two parties. They are no longer exposed to each 
other but only to the CCP (Biais et al., 2016). Although Lopez and 
Saeidinezhad (2017) have shown the risks in the growing importance of 
CCPs, they point out the significant benefits CCPs shall bring. First of all, the 
CCP takes market participants’ trading exposures onto its balance sheet, 
relieving multilateral risk exposures’ counterparties. This action reduces 
 
3 MTS is an electronic fixed income trading markets trading platform suitable to conclude different 
market products - cash, repo and swaps. The MTS platform supports electronic European fixed income 
markets for issuers, primary dealers and the secondary market. 
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counterparty risks among market participants, and the multilateral netting 
gives further benefits to the members. By the process, assets are released for 
participants to use them elsewhere. The model of central clearing compared 
bilateral trading is represented below: 
 
Figure 2: Bilateral and multilateral netting 
Source: Cont, (2015, p. 366) 
When the number of market participants is numerous, central clearing leads 
to a reduction of exposures through multilateral netting across counterparties, 
thus reducing counterparty risks: 
 
Figure 3: Exposure reduction 
Source: Cont, (2015, p. 367.) 
CCPs incorporate sophisticated risk management systems that contain the 
exposures arising from trading positions from a risk management perspective. 
Transparency walks hand in hand with better price information for traders, so 
this is also an advantage that cannot be omitted. Cont and Kokholm (2015) 
applied a stylized model of OTC exposures with multiple asset classes, and 
they have compared the effects of bilateral netting across classes with those 
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of multilateral netting across counterparties. Their findings show how 
efficient CCPs are if proper model parameters are used to take into account 
the differences in riskiness across asset classes. 
Generally, margins that members provide are the primary risk management 
tools adopted by CCPs. Collateral is used to cover losses and protect both the 
clearinghouse and the market it clears from the severe movements in the 
cleared assets or commodities’ price. The change of prices in the traded assets 
can be so significant that it creates liability or obligation the member cannot 
meet, leading to default. There are two other main components of the 
financial resources the CCP can use in case of default. The default fund 
contribution and its own funds as well. Altogether, they are called the default 
waterfall. The thesis details the components of the default waterfall 
contribution in chapter IV., where all components are described and 
presented. 
1.3. Central counterparty defaults and near-fails4 
To understand why a CCP must have a resilient and transparent operation, 
we must first see what happens if proper governance lacks these two 
elements. The 2008 crisis triggered the need for a robust financial 
environment, and the under-regulated era of OTC markets has ended. This 
chapter will present the issues and the main lessons learned from the most 
feared event, namely the default of a CCP.  
We may think that the biggest fails in history come from the money markets, 
but the truth is, commodity markets were the first ones being hit by the 
breakdown of CCP. Since 1973, there were three events of this type and some 
near-fail circumstances as well (Kiff, 2014). At first, I present the three fails, 
followed by the near fails in modern history.  
 
4 A study regarding this topic was published and were used in this chapter: Friesz M., Váradi 
K. (2019), The role of central counterparties on the energy market International Journal Of 
Multidisciplinarity In Business And Science ( 1849-0581): 5 8 pp 48-56 (2019) 
https://issuu.com/tvranes/docs/ijmbs_vol_5_-_no_8_-_2019 
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1.3.1. The failure of the Caisse de Liquidation des Affaires et 
Marchandises (CLAM), Paris, 1974 
Bignon and Vuillemey (2020) analyzed the fail of the French CCP from 1974. 
The CLAM was a cocoa, coffee, and sugar futures market, being the only 
CCP on the Paris Commodity Exchange. 1970-1974 was a turbulent period 
worldwide: the oil crisis and the stock market crash were all significant events 
that set out to settle the development. In Paris, the so-called sugar crisis hit 
the markets in 1974. The sugar’s price has been multiplied by six in a one-
year timeframe, peaking from 1,300 to 8,100 FRF/ton. Meanwhile, several 
countries experienced shortages of sugar and the combination of structural 
and exceptional factors lead to expectations of a long-lasting sugar shortage 
(Bignon and Vuillemey, 2020).  
Overall, the unmet margin calls were the primary cause leading to the 
breakdown of CLAM—due to the sharp drop in sugar prices on the FX 
markets. The CCP’s mistake was that it did not increase the margin 
requirements due to the higher market volatility. The high level of 
concentration against one single trader has not managed appropriately; 
authorities should have ordered reducing such a single party’s exposure. 
Lacking transparency in the loss-allocation also aggravated the 
clearinghouse’s situation. The lack of proper risk management is pointed out 
as well. Severe discrepancies were identified as soon as sugar prices 
collapsed, and the concentration level had a substantial downward effect as 
well. It is also shown that “the interests of the CCP and those of the member 
in distress became closely aligned, which induced the CCP to delay the 
declaration of default and attempt manipulation of settlement prices.” 
(Bignon and Vuillemey, 2017, p. 37). The regulatory framework was proven 
to be inadequate to mitigate the conflicts between managers and the 
supervisor, which ultimately led to misreporting. This spilled over between 
managers and creditors (risk-shifting) as well. (Bignon and Vuillemey, 2020). 
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1.3.2. The failure of the Malaysian Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing 
House (KLCE), Kuala Lumpur, 1983 
In 1983 the Malaysian Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House was closed 
down. The reason is similar to the CLAM’s; the margin calls were not met 
after a crash in palm oil futures prices as the local CCP required. 
Concentration is present in this case as well since six large brokers had 
accumulated huge positions. The price volatility generated huge losses that 
ended with the default of the counterparties. The dedicated task force reported 
poor management and unwieldy rules leading to the fall of the four-year-old 
entity. 
The crisis flared up by a Chinese millionaire named Loo Cheng Ghee. He 
was the Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise holder for Malaysia and 
Singapore. He made the speculative move by trying and failing to corner the 
palm oil futures market by legally selling short. Before speculation began, the 
trading volume on the KLCE averaged 800 lots of palm oil per day. 
Unfortunately, contract defaults and trading suspensions triggered 
speculations too, and its aftermath paralyzed the market. Due to unexpected 
bad weather, palm oil prices grew. Despite the Palm Oil Refiners 
Associations’ warning regarding possible speculations and market 
manipulation, KLCE claimed to watch but not take action. Loo Cheng Ghee 
and his traders increased their trading activity, and although the crisis seemed 
to be outlined, it did not permit the statement of emergency powers. Rather, 
the exchange agreed to increases in good-faith deposits. After a few days, the 
first step the exchange did was to identify forced “brokers to identify non-
exchange members who held more than 100 open contracts in a month“ by 
invoking emergency regulations of limiting trading. Lee’s brokers defaulted 
as well the next day on 5,150 lots and were suspended (Robinson, 1984). 
Again, we can highlight the supervising authority’s lack of proper timing of 
involvement and delayed response to the clearinghouse’s market volatility. 
The suspension of trading was deferred also, deepening the situation. The 
connecting reports show a less transparent trade confirmation and registration 
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resulted. This sloppy management resulted in long delays in sorting out who 
owed what to whom (Kiff, 2019). 
1.3.3. The failure of the Hong Kong Futures Exchange, Hong Kong, 
1987 
In 1987, worldwide stock markets faced immense falls, followed by the crash 
at Wall Street. The collision also hit the Hong Kong stock market. The Hang 
Seng Index fell, losing 11.1% of the market capitalization. The market was 
closed for the next four days. The crisis was mainly due to the lack of 
observation in maintaining initial margins, the negative trait of the market 
system, and some lack of proper knowledge of contracts. The Clearing House 
did not respond appropriately to the fluctuating process on the market. It only 
required its clearing members to deposit their net margins instead of gross 
ones. “The protection to either its member firms or investors was way below 
the expected level. Some steps were taken; people were prohibited from short-
selling shares. People, longing index futures, could not short index 
constituent stocks in the stock market to hedge their risk. Their long positions 
in the futures market were speculative.” (Lui Ho-chung, 1992, p.11.) The 
illusions of bullish markets lead traders to speculation (Lui Ho-chung, 1992). 
The Exchange needed the government’s help asking it to provide loans for a 
bailout. 
“During a four-day market closure initiated by the stock exchange, clearing 
member performance failures were of sufficient magnitude to overwhelm the 
solvency of the guarantor of the clearing house’s trades.” ( Cox, 2015, p. 1.) 
In this case, researchers also point out the dramatic loss of confidence. The 
Hong Kong government put a resolution plan in place, this being the only 
known example in the CCP world (Cox, 2015). 
1.3.4. Near-fails of CCPs 
Near-fail defaults may seem less exciting, but these events are momentous 
events pointing out the system’s discrepancies.  
In October 1987, two entities faced near-fail events. The Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) faced 
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difficulties in collecting the margins from the market. The CME handled the 
stress event when the Continental Illinois Bank advanced the clearinghouse 
$400 million just minutes before the opening bell in order to complete all the 
$2.5 billion in principal variation margin payments. (Kiff, 2019) The primary 
lesson for CME was that they should change their policy because “clearing 
members retained too much discretion over the timely payment of margin,” 
leading to a critically small amount of time for the clearinghouse.5  
In the case of the OCC, the issue again was the high level of concentration. 
The exposure towards a large clearing member who had difficulties meeting 
its requirements in the form of margin calls was excellent. The member 
reached out to an emergency loan from its bank to avoid suspension and 
default (Kiff, 2019). 
Since the 1987 crash, there have been no significant issues among 
clearinghouses with such enormous stress to cover. Regulators and 
authorities learned from the past, and policies were adopted to avoid the 
financial system’s domino effect. Along with the regulatory side’s resilience, 
technology helped automate the payment system, so institutions are on the 
path to mitigate arising risks.  
As these significant events show, transparency and cooperation among 
parties are crucial to avoid exacerbating systemic risks that CCP fails may 
cause.  
1.3.5. CCP related market events in 2018 
It is questionable if the current system is prepared for distress. However, 
reaching back to the fails tales, there was smaller distress in 2018. 
In 2018 the electricity market was hit by distress. We can call the event a near 
fail or as a test to the current systems as well. This event is the first one 
 
5 History Of Central Counterparty Failures And Near-failures ..., 
https://www.theotcspace.com/content/history-central-counterparty-failures-and-ne (accessed August 
09, 2021). 
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since the 2008 subprime crisis, when CCPs gained an essential role in 
establishing still working and transparent markets. 
This specific event is related to the energy market. In this particular case, the 
issues are mentioned above: the member could not meet its margin 
requirements, so the member was declared in default. A Norwegian trader 
Einar Aas blew a €114m hole in the buffers. This trader earned millions of 
kroner in the previous years, but a way too risky and speculative trade ended 
this success. He bet that the spread between the Nordic and German power 
would narrow. Carbon emission allowances, the best performing commodity 
during the period, were on a tear. This event helped push up the German 
market, while at the same time, wetter weather forecasts sunk the Nordic 
next-year contract. His positions were massive compared to the liquidity on 
the market (Paulsson and Hotler, 2018). On the same day, he was declared 
defaulted for not meeting the margin requirements. 
From the Nasdaq Clearing point of view, the defaulted portfolio contained a 
large spread position between Nordic and German Power that was negatively 
impacted by extraordinary fluctuations. Aas could not meet its margin calls, 
so within 48 hours, all of the positions had been closed through an auction, 
but the losses to be covered exceeded the defaulting member’s collateral and 
default fund contribution. New capital needed to be injected, and the Nasdaq 
Clearing has decided to increase margin levels too. (Nasdaq, 2018). 
This event endorsed the CCP and its advantages (King et al. 2020). Huang 
and Takáts (2020a) analyze the event from a model risk perspective since the 
event took place during a considerably calm market environment. They also 
point out the potential causes of such an event, like considering a long enough 
look-back period for the price changes, overestimating the correlations across 
markets, or underestimating the period needed to close the failing portfolios. 
Incentives must be aligned on the skin-in-the-game level. 
1.4. Risks of CCPs 
A CCP’s primary role and purpose are to centralize counterparty risk 
management in the financial markets that operate (Pirrong, 2014). To 
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understand a CCP’s risk profile, Hughes and Manning (2015) compare it with 
banks’. In their view, the most significant financial risk of a CCP stems from 
the likelihood that the CCP can execute the replacement trades in its matched 
book at a disadvantageous price. Consequently, liquidity risk arises in the 
case of a defaulting member. The two also point out that the risk profile of 
the CCP is “conditional on the default of one or more of its participants. This 
underscores the natural interdependence between the risk profile of a CCP”. 
Banks have quite different activities; therefore, they are exposed to various 
risks, mainly their borrowers’ credit risk. Moreover, banks face liquidity risk 
as well that arises from the mismatch between their funding sources and 
assets. (Hughes and Manning (2015)). 
Researchers (including Murphy 2012; Pirrong, 2014, Hughes and Manning 
2015) identify the vulnerable points by which a CCP could trigger or amplify 
systemic risk, namely: 
 Liquidity risk creation: improper models for margin or collateral 
haircut and procyclicality calculation or even default fund 
contribution can burden the market participants by requiring 
excessive liquidity provision. In this case, the CCP can absorb 
liquidity from the market.  
 Transmission of stress: if the required amount of collateral is 
inadequate and the CCP’s pre-funded resources prove insufficient to 
cover losses of one or more clearing members, the domino effect can 
enhance.  
 Risk shifting: as netting of cleared trades frees members’ balance-
sheet capacity to take risks elsewhere. 
 Wrong-time risk: if the CCP imposes raise on the market it clears, 
due to the mutualized loss allocation, timing is crucial, as the CCP 
must avoid taking actions when members are least able to bear it. 
 Information and incentive issues: The mispricing of individual 
members’ contributions to risk can increase speculative behavior, 
triggering distress on the market. These factors are crucial factors 
affecting CCP risk but are also exogenous to the clearinghouse. The 
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volume of the trades on the market a CCP clears ultimately depends 
on its clearing members’ activity.  
Having the risk-reducing benefits of the CCPs, but also the potential risks are 
carrying through the transmission of stress, there can be potential positive 
and negative externalities on a systemic level. The positive side is that each 
trade cleared contributes to the opportunities for multilateral netting of 
exposures, thereby reducing the amount of risk to be managed relative to non-
centrally cleared ones (Duffie and Zhu 2011). Consequently, the CCPs clear 
more trades and market processes concentrate around it, increasing its 
importance and reliance as well, so a potential spillover in the system should 
be managed correctly and in time. Primarily, by multilateral netting and 
exploiting the many other benefits of the clearing activity CCPs provide 
benefits by the more trades a CCP clears, but by increasing its operation, it 
also increases the potential impact of CCP stress. The risks mentioned above 
stemming from a given CCP design can amplify because the CCP will be 
unable to accomplish its primary role and cannot absorb the shock, leading to 
its materialization or the distress, due to liquidity shortage will result in 
transmitting the damages into the broader system. King et al. (2020) argue 
that CCP liquidity requests could strain banks and other market members 
from a liquidity risk perspective, increasingly posing a threat to the system. 
Their research focus shifts from potentially disastrous consequences of a 
failure or severe disruption to the difficulty that may occur if the CCP requires 
liquidity from large banks and other market participants. While the 
counterparty risk is mitigated, liquidity risk will appear instead. In addition, 
since assets will probably be called for by a CCP on occasion when bank 
liquidity positions are under pressure, they are innately procyclical in this 
environment. 
Based on the same indicators identified by the FSB in the banking system, 
Hughes and Manning (2016) analyze the operation of CCPs and their 
influence on the network. They focus on the size, substitutability, resources, 
complexity, and scope and, nonetheless, the depth of its system-wide 
interconnections on domestic and cross-border markets.  
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Current regulatory and market requirements are leading CCPs to implement 
sophisticated practices to manage the default of one or more clearing 
members. Nevertheless, the management of non-default losses (NDLs) is also 
essential from the resilience perspective. The PFMI establishes standards for 
managing NDLs, with specific principles for legal, business, investment, 
custody, and operational risks. NDLs are not discussed in detail; however, 
this topic will be covered minimally regarding resolution and recovery 
planning. However, we shall not deny the importance of these factors, as the 
CCP’s design choices can influence the cost of clearing and members’ trading 
activities and decisions. The clearing activity and the conditions put by the 
CCP will be ultimately affected, and it will determine the balance of positive 
and negative systemic externalities that the CCP imposes on the financial 
system. A poor decision of the CCP and the design they apply may have 
severe consequences because their fundamental design can alter the loss 
allocation arrangements, and they also have the power to determine how 
stress could potentially be transmitted in the event of distress. As more and 
more trades are becoming subject to a CCP’s clearing activity, members may 
seek to reduce their dependent exposures to the CCP by restructuring their 
businesses to avoid mandatory clearing obligations or managing their trading 
activity to reduce their allocation. This change can shift the market 
participants’ behavior, which may prove systemically significant.  
The potential threats mentioned can be managed by proper risk management 
tools, and let us not forget that regulators aim to prevent the development of 
inadequate managing systems by offering a prudent and rigorous legislative 
background. The primary goal of both money and commodity markets is to 
reduce risk and enforce the financial system’s resilience by avoiding 
burdening the market participants. Central counterparties do mitigate 
counterparty risk and are prepared to withstand under “extreme but plausible 
market conditions.” However, CCPs are no panacea, as if distress hits the 
financial system, CCPs are not an exception to harsh aftermath. While CCPs 
provide protection against idiosyncratic counterparty risk and serve as 
safeguards for the system as a whole, they offer no essential protection 
against aggregate risk and may even encourage risk-shifting (Biais et al., 
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2012). Another risk arises in current circumstances, namely the default of the 
CCP itself. The default of a CCP, however, becomes a systemic risk. This 
event can trigger the collapse or weaken an industry’s or economy’s 
resilience (Duffie, 2011). Duffie (2011) claims that this event would 
dramatically affect the stability of the financial markets, as delineated in the 
previous chapter. There are further concerns regarding the systematic 
importance pointed out by Markose et al. (2012). The most prominent lesson 
learned from the global financial crisis is that the too-big-to-fail problem may 
cause headaches for everyone; CCPs also have a similar issue, the too-
interconnected-to-fail. This is similar to the other phenomena tightly related 
to the moral hazard problem. This means that in the case of distress, and if 
CCPs failed, the adverse effects would be so wide-ranging that they could 
become prime candidates to expect bailouts.  
Kubitza et al. (2021) show that not all market participants benefit from central 
clearing, and some are worse off. The loss-sharing divides the participants 
into losers and winners. They focus on the allocation of losses caused by the 
default of clearing members to survive clearing members. The loss-sharing 
effect can differ across market participants and is highly dependent on the 
derivatives market network structure, the rules of loss sharing, the 
directionality of the derivatives portfolios, and the correlation of derivatives 
prices. 
Compared to banks, the number of failed CCPs is modest. While there were 
three significant failures of clearinghouses as seen in chapter 1.3, for 
example, since 2000 in the United States, more than 500 banks have failed6. 
To overcome these issues, regulators took a closer look at the fails and near-
fails in history. Many of the past issues are now thoroughly regulated and 
supervised by competent authorities. Although many researchers welcome 
the new regulations, some are skeptical, as mentioned before. Many of them 
criticize the lack of regulatory framework, while others argue against 
overregulation. Not only the regulation of CCPs is subject to intense debates, 
 
6 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is often appointed as receiver for failed banks. Their 
database includes information on the acquiring bank (if applicable), how accounts and loans are 
affected 
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but the money market itself. (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Goodhart et al., 
1998; Acharya and Bisin, 2014; Lopez and Saeidinezhad, 2017). Acharya et 
al. (2010) show that excessive regulation has costs, but at the same time, its 
effects, causing any severe disaster, can only be observed afterward. Lopez 
and Saeidinezhad (2017) criticize the new CCP regulations because they 
evaluate the individual CCP’s resilience in isolation without considering 
potential spillovers on the rest of the financial system. They point out the shift 
of trading behavior and risk-taking willingness of the clearing members. 
Omitting this situation is way too optimistic. If the spillover effect is not 
handled in time, the expected resilience will fail, and CCPs will 
underperform. Therefore current regulatory frameworks shall implement 
further guidelines in several aspects to assure foreseeable financial stability.  
Experts advise that clearinghouses can be thought of “as a set of institutional 
arrangements that are designed to enhance contractual performance.” 
(Nosal, 2012, p. 1.). 
II. CCPs are not banks 
By analyzing the risks and the systematic importance of the CCPs, many draw 
similarities with banks. Laics may think of CCPs as banks. However, there is 
a resemblance between the two types of financial institutions; it is crucial to 
emphasize that CCPs are not banks. It is challenging even for regulators and 
policymakers to establish standards for CCP risk management, especially 
when they view them from the perspective of the bank regulatory standards. 
CCPs’ risk-taking mechanisms and their full function bear a small 
resemblance to banks. They can be called unique in the meaning that they are 
not payment systems, depositories, insurance companies or exchange 
platforms, nor trading platforms, although they have characteristics that be 
similar to insurance because of their “guarantee mechanism.” This guarantee 
mechanism is why a clearinghouse’s inclusion may lead to seeing the CCP as 
an insurer rather than a principal to cleared trades (Cox and Steigerwald, 
2017). 
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Moreover, CCPs may have an extensive network, connecting with other 
domestic or cross-border market infrastructures. Cox and Steigerwald (2017, 
p. 5.) state the following: “While both serve an intermediary function, the 
similarity ends there.”  
Cox and Steigerwald (2017) analyze the most significant differences between 
CCPs and banks and the relevance of those differences, including their 
business models and risk profiles. In particular, they highlight the differences 
in the roles that capital and collateral play in connection with CCP and bank 
risk management, as CCPs are acting as risk managers – therefore subject to 
credit and liquidity risk of clearing members default - while banks are risk-
takers. However, the mechanism of socialization of losses bears a striking 
resemblance to ex-post funding of deposit insurance, which punishes the 
surviving banks 
According to Corrigan (1983), banks are considered to be special institutions, 
but among others, Berlinger et al. (2016a) also point out the exceptional role 
of CCPs. Both institutions are deemed essential and peculiar, but we can 
agree that they are unique in very different ways.  
Due to the role the CCP plays, the implications of counterparty substitution 
are often misconstrued. Cox and Steigerwald (2017) point out how experts 
tend to see the clearinghouse as an agent of the original counterparties to 
cleared trades in the academic and policy literature, but the CCPs are the 
principal to the trades. This misconception is referred to as the “persistence 
of the bilateral.” Let us note that the bilateral relationship is irrevocably 
terminated when the trade is accepted for clearing by the CCP. The CCP is 
the central party between the actors, guaranteeing the trade’s fulfillment even 
if one of the parties fails to meet its obligations.  
Ghamami and Glasserman (2015) give an example through a pair of clearing 
members holding offsetting “long“ and “short“ interest rate futures positions. 
He assumes a hypothetical situation where the two members simultaneously 
fail to meet their obligations. In a bilateral agreement, the loss would be zero 
because their obligations would be mutual and offsetting. In case the trade is 
cleared by a clearinghouse, the original trade counterparties no longer have 
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any continuing relevance because novation terminates the mutual relationship 
between the original counterparties. The researcher also points out that the 
presented simultaneous default is rare, but these offsetting positions might 
leave the CCP without any loss.  
2.1. Balance-sheet structure 
A bank’s balance sheet contains the primary information for creditors and 
other institutions, as this is the basis of finding out about the bank’s financial 
conditions. In particular, it provides a high-level view for both creditors and 
regulators regarding the bank’s ability to meet its ongoing obligations in the 
short and long term. Moreover, it contains information about its capital status, 
the amount of capital buffer available to meet its obligation if the bank faces 
difficulties and fails. 
The CCP’s balance-sheet is inadequate and will not provide a basis for its 
resilience and capital strength analysis. The most significant factor is that 
CCPs have obligations to their clearing members so that these items will 
appear in their financial statements. It is not just clearing members, but the 
whole market cares about the ability of the CCP to meet its obligations and 
assure a smooth day-to-day operation and enforce resilience. The matchbook 
is the primary tool for a CCP that shall maintain because this ensures the 
CCP’s ability to meet its obligations to clearing members (Cox and 
Steigerwald., 2017).  
Faruqui et al. (2018) analyze the CCP-bank nexus, focusing on the two-way 
interactions between them. Along the balance sheet interlinkages and the 
structure of the CCP default waterfall, they show the nexus between them and 
highlight that the levels of stress change these interactions, even leading to a 
“destabilising feedback loop with potentially system-wide effects“ (Faruqui et 
al. (2018, p. 1)) and also highlight the endogenous build-up of risk that these 
connections may trigger.  
Along with a simple OTC derivative transaction, the changes of the balance-
sheet of two banks (from the CCP’s point of view, they are clearing members) 
and a CCP, and the mechanics of a central clearing action is represented 
below (Faruqui et al. (2018)):  
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Figure 4:Balance sheet of Banks and CCPs 
Source: Faruqui et al. (2018, p. 79.) 
 
The role of the CCP, one can see precisely how the clearinghouse becomes a 
“central“ party: it becomes a link between its clearing members.  
If we take the layers of the default waterfall step by step, they all appear in 
the balance-sheet of the CCP, but it is worth analyzing the sources 
thoroughly. The CCP requires its clearing members, in this case, the two 
banks, to post initial margins for the transaction. The initial margin appears 
as a liability for the CCP, while it is an asset from the bank’s perspective. The 
initial margin value would be repaid for clearing members at the transaction’s 
maturity only if there was no need to exhaust it due to quiet periods without 
market distress (Faruqui et al., 2018). Variation margin, the financial resource 
to minimize losses from market movements that affect the asset’s price, also 
has its place in the balance sheets (Cont, 2015). The clearing member shall 
post the variation margin that did incur a mark-to-market loss (Murphy, 
2017). The member facing the loss draws down its liquid resources, writing 
off a similar amount of capital on the liability side, while the other clearing 
member receives the variation margin amount from the CCP. This movement 
will appear in the statements of the three parties. (Faruqui et al., 2018, p. 
79.).Variation margin requirements may appear daily in order to prevent the 
build-up of exposures (Murphy, 2017). Let us not forget that every clearing 
member shall contribute to the CCP’s default fund. From an accounting point 
of view, this appears as a liability on the CCP’s balance sheet, while on the 
banks’ balance sheets will appear on the asset side. Although the cleared 
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transaction has zero market value for the CCP, the trade’s value will appear 
in the balances of all three institutions (Faruqui et al., 2018). 
The most significant difference cannot be unseen in the example mentioned 
above, namely the ratio of liquid assets. Although the banking regulatory 
background has put considerable effort into making a safer banking system, 
through maintaining a certain proportion of liquidity, CCPs are designed to 
support liquidity. CCPs do not have illiquid assets as many as a bank may 
have because banks have different services, such as less liquid loans, than the 
assets a CCP requires from its clearing members or the investments the 
regulatory requirements allow, according to Article 47 of EMIR (EMIR, 
2012). 
The presence of both institutions has an impact on each other. While CCPs 
manage counterparty credit risk through the different layers of the default 
waterfall and enhancing transparency by operating a matched book 
(Cecchetti et al., 2009, Pirrong, 2011), banks must take into account CCPs’ 
activity and its requirement that may alter their risk-taking behavior, 
therefore influencing each other in several ways.  
The movement of assets among the financial statements of the CCP and its 
clearing members is highly dependent on the positions members take, but the 
contribution requirements to the CCP’s default waterfall impose costs for its 
members. Faruqui et al. (2018) agree with Pirrong (2014), Murphy and 
Nahai-Williamson. (2014) that the size of the initial margin affects the cost 
of derivatives trading, among other things, these costs can also affect the 
clearing members’ risk-taking and decision-making processes. 
2.2. Risk profile 
Banks are risk-takers. Their risk stems from intermediating deposits and 
short-term funding against longer-term credit provision. This feature is why 
banks run mismatched books: their assets from credit provision do not match 
their liabilities to their funding sources. Risk mitigation comes from the 
appropriate capital adequacy standards, so this is how the inherent mismatch 
is required by the regulatory standards to be handled.  
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Contrary to banks, CCPs are risk managers. Through novation, they become 
a seller to the buyer and the buyer for the seller after a transaction has been 
consummated and cleared. While banks operate a mismatched book that has 
its risks mentioned before, CCPs run matched books. The risks stemming 
from having a mismatched book do not appear at a CCP. CCPs face the risk 
of the default of their clearing member (credit and counterparty risk), 
which ignites them to perform their obligation to manage the positions’ risks 
in order to prevent the domino and spillover effect on the market. However, 
temporary mismatched exposures appear due to margins and mutualized 
default resources from clearing members. Coeuré (2015) also argues that 
“CCPs are not leveraged and (…) do not actively take the risk: barring the 
default of a member or an operational incident, their net risk exposure at any 
point in time is always equal to zero.” As a conclusion and agreeing with 
Hughes and Manning (2015) and Lin and Surti (2013), both institutions face 
the risks stemming from credit, liquidity, operational and systemic risks. 
Regarding credit risks, while banks deal with long-term exposures due to 
their intermediation between short-term funding and long-term credit 
provision, CCPs face short-term exposures, mostly intra-day and overnight 
ones stemming from the member defaults.  
Liquidity risk in banks’ cases arises from intermediating between short-term 
funding and long-term credit provision, causing an issue in meeting current 
obligations by liquidating assets (Faruqui et al. (2018). CCPs manage 
liquidity issues with the help of the available financial resources offered by 
the default waterfall. To assure the resilience of CCPs, the regulator imposes 
several prudential requirements on the investment policy regarding financial 
resources enhancing liquidity. More specifically, EMIR mandates that the 
financial resources of a CCP should be invested in cash or highly liquid 
financial instruments with minimal market and credit risk.  
While systemic risk appears in both institutions having armageddon-like 
consequences, their management is entirely different if it occurs. Banks are, 
therefore differentiated by their systematic importance. Based on the 2011 
G20 Leaders’ Cannes Summit, the risks of the global financial system from 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) shall be set. Since then, 
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an integrated set of policy measures were approved and put into force. The 
endorsed specific standards aim to regulate globally and/or systematically 
important financial institutions that bear a higher risk to the system. Besides 
the methodology of identifying these institutions, the authorities’ aim to 
resolve failing finances was strengthened, and more intensive supervision 
was applied. The requirements for resolvability assessments, recovery and 
resolution, and for additional loss absorption capacity above the Basel III 
minimum (i.e., different buffers, capital requirements) were also part of the 
reform (FSB, 2011).  
In 2020, 30 G-SIFIs were identified (FSB, 2020). The total number of Credit 
Institutions in Europe only, according to Eurostat (2021), is 4,289. The 
United States government reports 4,983 in the USA for 20217. Compared to 
this, CCPs do not need identification. In the vast majority of European 
countries, the market has none or a maximum of two CCPs8. Oliver Wyman 
(2019) identifies a total of 74 CCPs globally.9 The relatively small number of 
CCPs does not mean less risk: if the CCP is not managed rigorously, in a 
theatrical scenario, a country’s whole market can crash, spilling over to other 
markets if cross-border trades are included. This explains the special attention 
of the regulators.  
Operational risks in the case of banks rely on strict policies (Articles 312 to 
324 of CRR). The definition is straightforward: “operational risk: the risk of 
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events, and includes legal risk.” Throughout the 
years, conduct and information-communication-technology risks were 
defined. A CCP’s operational risk is slightly different, especially for not 
having the services that include physical money (ATMs, cash registers) and 
interaction with the retail sector. The operational reliability and operational 
capacity are the critical aspects to be handled through formalized processes. 
 
7 https://www.fdic.gov/ 
8 The List of Central Counterparties authorised to offer services and activities in the Union 
can be accessed here: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/ccps_authorised_under_emir.pdf 
(accessed: 22 august 2021) 
9 This number may be slightly higher, as the researcher lists Global CCPs. 
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To enhance the transparency, operational and technical requirements 
associated with the communication protocols and message designs it 
implements shall be disclosed (Article 38 of EMIR, 2012). 
Occurring losses from their business activities have some meaningful 
distinctions as well. Banks must have robust capital available to absorb the 
potential losses. Information on capital adequacy is the primary source to 
analyze the viability of the institution. Contrary, CCPs’ capital is not the 
primary resource to exhaust in case of absorbing losses, although it may play 
a minor role, being part of the default waterfall through which losses are 
mutualized. It also gives minimal information about the CCP’s resilience. 
Testing the resilience of the institutions is also performed differently. Stress 
testing for CCPs is exceptionally crucial to analyze how a CCP would 
perform in extreme market conditions, focusing principally on member 
default possibility and consequences. Banking stress tests focus on capital 
resilience (ECB, 2021).  
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III. A high-level overview of the regulatory framework 
In the past 2 decades, market resilience has become one of the most important 
goals. Since 1998 the analysis of OTC markets and the trading activity was 
subject to discussion. In 1998 a study group coordinated interviews from G10 
countries on OTC deals. The report indicated that the trading practices for 
processing trades and managing counterparty risks were broadly similar in all 
the G-10 countries. The legal background analysis shod that standard legal 
agreements and confirmation templates were used for documentation. At the 
time, the increasing automation of transaction processing, from data capture 
to confirmation and settlement, was beneficial, but manual intervention was 
still a significant part of the process. In their report, they highlight that 
“netting and, to a growing extent, collateral agreements are used to mitigate 
counterparty credit risks.” (Parkinson, 1988, p. 3.) Trades settled through 
clearinghouses were infinitesimal, bilaterally settled trades were more 
specific (Parkinson, 1988). From 2001 onwards, the activity of the 
Committee of Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) has been more and more focused on market infrastructures. In 
November 2004, the CPSS and Technical Committee of IOSCO issued 15 
Recommendations for CCPs, which addressed the significant types of risk 
faced by CPSS and a methodology for assessing a CCP’s observance of each 
recommendation.  
Váradi (2018) points out that the recommendations’ publication can be linked 
to the Lamfalussy report of 1990. This report focuses on the central bank’s 
oversight activity concerning the risk-integrating nature of CCPs. As SWIFT 
(2017) stresses, the emergence of international recommendations meant a 
single set of international operational criteria that central banks sought to 
enforce through moral influence and local regulatory tools. In order to 
properly follow up and apply the recommendations, the national authorities 
and the institutions had to be involved and were responsible for the 
implementation process.  
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The current regulatory framework is not just the evolution of historical events 
but a former of best practice recommendations of the industry. The subprime 
crisis in 2007-2009 has pointed out the vulnerabilities of the financial system. 
Therefore, steps were taken to improve and to increase the resilience of the 
system. CCPs have become more and more critical, so their regulation had to 
be strengthened too. Until the 2008 financial crisis, the functioning of CCPs, 
and more specifically its regulation, was not a priority for legislators. During 
the liquidation of defaulted institutions, especially the Lehman Brothers, the 
analysis showed that transactions cleared through CCPs and the related 
exposures were closed relatively quickly due to its high-level transparency, 
having all necessary information to act effectively, i.e., having the so-called 
pricelist of the time (Bernstein et al., 2018). 
Meanwhile, OTC  transactions’ were hard to match and close, leading to 
significant international impact. Before the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR 
became into force and properly outlined, private market actors created futures 
clearinghouses to manage the credit risk associated with trading futures 
contracts. Rules were not established to prevent the buildup of losses or risky 
behavior until the termination of the contract. This could have been triggered 
by the deterioration of the participant’s creditworthiness, which could also 
make a shift in its incentives leading the participant to take higher risks while 
having limited resources. Accordingly, informal groups/clubs of traders 
developed, implementing the multilateral netting of trades among members 
who had “agreed to accept each other’s contracts as substitutes.” (Baker, 
2016, p. 17). The need for rules to manage credit risk among futures 
exchanges has increased. The rules implemented hindered defaulters from 
further trading. If concerns arose regarding the trading firm, the new policy 
allowed the review of its books and enabled it requiring to post margin for its 
deals. 
The Chicago Board of Trade established a clearinghouse in 1883 that reduced 
the costs of netting contracts and the posting of margin, but it did not have a 
guarantee function. In the USA, the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (futures 
exchange) assumed a guarantee role in 1891, along with several small 
exchanges in the country. In 1925, the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation 
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became a central counterparty. In Europe, several clearinghouses had 
assumed a guarantee function by the late 1800s. Baker (2016, p. 17) explains 
the historical delay with the “reluctance of large institutions to give up the 
competitive advantage of their credit strength.” The Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange had an internal clearinghouse. (Baker, 2016). 
3.1. Regulatory background during 2007-2009 
In January 2009, a working group was created to guide implementing these 
recommendations to CCPs that clear OTC derivative products (FSB, 2010). 
The financial crisis significantly contributed to the enhancement of 
cooperation at an international level to establish and regulate CCPs, 
particularly the positive experience related to the resolution of futures 
portfolios in the Lehman default (Bernstein et al., 2019). The G20 
(Pittsburgh, September 2009) confirmed the importance of strengthening the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), expanding the scope of 
regulation and oversight, and stricter OTC derivatives regulation. The 
primary goal was to head trades for electronic trading platforms, where 
appropriate, and by end-2012 at the latest, the transactions should be cleared 
through central counterparties, except the ones stipulated by the DFA and 
EMIR. Trade repositories got an essential function because the  OTC 
derivative contracts should be reported to them. The remaining trades that are 
not centrally cleared should be subject to higher capital requirements. (Bella 
et al. 2018; and FSB, 2017)  
3.2. CPSS-IOSCO 2012 
In 2012, the CPSS and the IOSCO issued the principles for financial market 
infrastructure in order to achieve the desired transparency and system 
resilience. (CPSS-IOSCO, 2012) The newly implemented jurisdictions have 
set the basics for CCPs, but it also brought changes to the trade repository 
activities as well. (Tompaidis, 2018) Since the regulation accommodates the 
clearing obligation for derivatives and the establishment of CCPs, the 
implementation process has been under constant monitoring. (Cox and 
Steigerwald, 2017) 
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The G20 in Pittsburgh decided in 2009 that it would be worthwhile to clear 
as many transactions, including OTC transactions, through CCPs as it could 
reduce the risk to the financial system as a whole (G20, 2009). However, this 
concentration of transaction risk necessitated the development of CCP 
regulation. The regulatory framework of the United States’ clearing activity 
was established relatively late, in 2010, the so-called Dodd-Frank Act, which 
EMIR followed in 2012, the jurisdiction applicable in the European Union 
(Nabilou and Asimakopoulos, 2020). 
3.3. The Dodd-Frank Act regulation 
It is undeniable that the EU and the US play a leading role in shaping the 
global financial systems, with more than two-thirds of all financial services 
based on transaction volume. Although the relationships between the two 
money markets are almost organic, many issues are approached in a 
fundamentally different way (Biedermann and Orosz, 2015). As already 
mentioned, the tools regulators and leaders have in their hands are correctly 
implemented prudent regulations. It was also noted before that the changes 
are made globally, but the differences in regulatory approaches in the US and 
the European Union are relatively different. While the American Dodd-Frank 
Act is a more comprehensive law, the EU regulates each sector systematically 
separately (Biedermann and Orosz, 2015).  
In July 2010, the US Congress enacted the Restoring American Financial 
Stability Act of 2010 , called the Dodd-Frank Act, as the legislative response 
to the financial crisis that implements measures adopted by the G20 at the 
international level and improved by the Financial Stability Committee and 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Sabel, 2012). In 2010 the 
Dodd-Frank law was supplemented with the Wall Street reform and 
consumer protection. The legislation aims to strengthen the United States’ 
financial stability by improving the accountability and transparency of the 
financial system and eliminating the ‘too big to fail’ system. With this step 
protecting US taxpayers by closing state rescue operations, protecting 
consumers against unfair financial service behavior was also a goal. The 
major financial reforms have also been sharply criticized: some say its 
provisions are insufficient to prevent a similar financial crisis, while others 
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say regulation is too rigid and undermines US financial companies’ 
competitiveness. Nwogugu (2015) argues that the act is inefficient and 
inadequate and has not resulted in significant economic growth. In his 
view, the transaction costs and compliance costs have increased for both 
government agencies and financial services companies.  
Simultaneously, it is not a simple task but this general norm into practice, as 
companies can continue to conduct counseling and self-proprietary trading at 
home lawfully. The Dodd-Frank Act (along with other legislation) introduced 
a “diluted” version of the Volcker Rule10: banks can only invest in high-risk 
investments up to 3 percent of their Tier 1 capital. Also, banks may not hold 
more than 3% in any private equity or hedge fund. The 3% capital threshold 
is probably not strict enough to limit banks’ risky activities and self-trading. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also introduced transparency reforms in the derivatives 
market, comprehensively regulating swaps, but the possibility of excessive 
leverage remained. Baker (2020) proposes changes in the industry by 
adopting a model that can serve as a minimum safeguard for protecting 
customer margin from fellow customer risk. 
  
 
10The Volcker rule’s primary goal is to discourage banks from taking excessive risks by 
prohibiting certain investment activities with their own accounts, and by limiting their any 
type of connection (i.e. ownership) with hedge funds and private equity funds.  
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3.4. EMIR 
The regulation for CCPs in the European Union was published in 2012. The 
regulation is called European Market Infrastructures Regulation, abbreviated 
as EMIR. Regulatory technical standards supplement the text of EMIR; these 
are the so-called “technical details.” I will devote more detail to the EMIR 
regulation, as my research is based on this framework. Knowledge of the 
regulation is therefore an essential part of the thesis.  
Váradi (2018) represented the EMIR in detail.  A total of 9 Regulatory 
Technical Standards – RTSs are supplementing the EMIR, while the 3 ITSs 
(Implementing Regulations) assist the implementation of the law. 
Additionally, they are complemented by guidelines helping the interpretation 
of the law and their application. Moreover, Q&A (questions and answers) are 
also issued regularly by ESMA.  
As mentioned before, trade repositories have also been analyzed, so EMIR 
gives significant changes in trade repositories and mandatory reporting. Of 
course, its essential role is to regulate CCP activities, leading counterparty 
risk towards them. Again, we must mention that CCPs are risk managers and 
not risk-takers. The stringent regulatory framework aims to manage the 
increased risk of the CCP to avoid default and to protect the financial system. 
EMIR requires that OTC derivatives (with certain exceptions) must be 
reported and cleared. It also introduces additional security standards for CCPs 
and trade repositories (ESMA, 2013). EMIR focuses on the post-trade 
regulation of OTC transactions but has also reviewed the pre-trade and 
trading aspects of OTC trades. (Biedermann and Orosz, 2015). The regulation 
also suggests that OTF (Organized Trading Systems) concept should also 
extend to unregulated platforms. The overall goal is to limit automated 
trading and excessive speculation in derivative commodity markets and 
strengthen consumer protection for retail investors buying financial products 
(ESMA, 2019a). 
The EU had more challenges to take during the stabilization of the regulatory 
background, since the United States system is more or less homogeneous and 
uniform, the EU had to deal with the very different interests of the 28 Member 
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States. Due to this diversity, the EU experienced a slowing down in the 
legislative processes, and it also made the outcome more fragmented 
(Biedermann and Orosz, 2015).  
In 2012, the Financial Infrastructure Recommendations were consolidated, 
and a framework for their evaluation was created –under the name Principles 
for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI). The recommendations 
contained in the PFMI were later supplemented by further recommendations 
aimed at the restoration, stability, and transparency of CCPs. The main 
difference between the two is that EMIR regulates in more detail. However, 
the PFMI Recommendations have evolved since 2012 in areas that are 
currently not fully covered by EMIR. Váradi (2018) points out why the gap 
between PFMI and EMIR has widened in recent years). 
The regulation aims to increase resilience and transparency by using tools 
designed explicitly for CCPs. Resilience is achieved by properly managing 
the default waterfall, assuring available SITG, using non-defaulting 
member’s resources when necessary. Recovery tools can be used, such as 
pre-defined cash assessments, variation margin gains haircutting, partial or 
full tear ups. The ultimate step being the resolution (EMIR, JPM report). 
Current EMIR frameworks rely on ex-ante measures that prevent or aim to 
minimize the possibility of a CCP failing. The measures consist of 
compliance provisions on capital requirements, margin and haircut standards, 
loss-sharing arrangements, investment policies applied by the CCP, liquidity 
requirements, and clearing membership standards. The requirements cover 
both micro, macro, and structural stipulations as well. It may seem extremely 
strict and unflexible, but CCPs often have their own risk management toolkit 
to customize their rulebook to manage their exposure stemming from 
counterparty risks due to its core operation, the clearing activity.  
Besides the robust safeguards of the legally mandated prudential 
requirements, EMIR’s Article 16 calls for a permanent and available initial 
capital of at least EUR 7.5 million (EMIR, 2012). Article 35 (2) of the 
technical standards supplementing EMIR mandates central counterparties to 
set the minimum level of the CCP’s skin-in-the-game at 25% of its capital 
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requirements, which shall be revised regularly every year. However, CCPs 
can decide to increase their skin-in-the-game, but this is not a proper tool to 
use for the assurance of daily operations. For instance, the skin-in-the-game 
can be divided into two by keeping the mandatory 25% as the dedicated own 
resources of the waterfall and allocating additional financial resources of the 
CCP. The Hungarian CCP applies this approach (KELER CCP, 2021.) 
CCPs operate on a matched-book basis because the changes in the value of 
entitlements of one clearing member are precisely matched by an opposite 
variation in the opposite direction in the value of its claim against another 
clearing member. This is where margins requirements appear as a crucial risk 
management tool at the micro-level. A CCP should impose margin 
requirements both on its clearing members. The regulatory text, Art. 45 (4) 
EMIR (2012) states that margins should be sufficient to cover potential 
exposures, specifically for potential losses originating from “at least 99% of 
the exposures movements over an appropriate time horizon.” The CCP is 
allowed to manage its portfolio, but it is prohibited to exhaust the margins of 
the non-defaulting clearing members to cover the losses generated by a 
defaulting member.  
The macroprudential type ex-ante regulations include the use of 
countercyclical margins. Due to the procyclical nature of the margin 
requirements, regulators emphasize regulating them properly to mitigate the 
potential risks. The primary aim of the approach is to help CCPs avoid the 
burdening of clearing members in times of distress. Overall, EMIR requires 
CCPs to include procyclicality in its margin calculation methodology to 
enforce its margining policy. The European Central Bank (ECB) also 
supports the inclusion of macroprudential intervention tools in the daily 
operations (ECB Financial Stability Review, May 2016). 
The inadequacy of margins may occur, but CCPs are required to be prepared 
for such events. Art. 43(1) of EMIR (2012) requires that the CCP ensure that 
additional sufficient prefunded financial resources cover arising losses 
exceeding the damages not covered by margin requirements. These other 
financial resources consist of the CCP’s freely available dedicated resources 
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but are only feasible to cover losses. The default fund and other financial 
resources should enable the CCP to withstand defaults under extreme but 
plausible market conditions. According to Art. 42(1) of EMIR (2012), it is 
required that these financial resources help limit the CCPs’ credit exposure 
to its clearing members. Again, EMIR does not set minimum requirements, 
but it mandates the CCP to set a minimum amount for the default funds. It is 
the focal element of the thesis, and in the latter part, I will detail its 
calculation, but now, I will only highlight its most substantial features, as the 
CCP is allowed to establish several default funds for each type of financial 
instrument that clears. Every clearing member is obligated to contribute to it 
based on risk-based and pro-rata. The resilience is ensured by the 
requirements of EMIR, stipulating that the fund must be flexible enough to 
withstand the most extensive exposures of the highest or the sum of the 
second and third largest members’ exposure (Nabilou and Asimakopoulos, 
2020). 
The CCP may also require the non-defaulting clearing members to provide 
additional funds, but this step could potentially result in the socialization of 
losses because the CCP can require this contribution to cover losses of a 
clearing member (Menkveld, 2017). 
Article 46 of EMIR (2012) requires CCPs to collateralize their exposures to 
all its clearing members fully. If the CCP establishes links with other CCPs, 
it should cover those exposures as well. The flexibility of EMIR only sets 
qualitative standards for collateral to be accepted by the CCP so that the CCP 
can decide the range of collaterals it accepts. However, the exposures should 
be covered with only highly liquid collateral with minimal credit and market 
risks and proportional to its risk profile (Art. 46(1) EMIR, 2012). The 
liquidity and credit exposures are to be assessed on a near to real-time basis. 
Article 50 (1) of EMIR (2012) also gives a tool to mitigate potential 
counterparty risk to the extent possible, so a CCP should use central bank 
money for settling its transactions or by using appropriate measures to limit 
its cash settlement risks, it can use other resources as well. Nabilou and 
Asimakopoulos (2020) consider that the need for liquidity is more relevant in 
51 
providing clearing services by non-bank CCPs, or CCPs not affiliated with 
banks. Firstly, intraday funding needs are the primary risks to ensure arising 
daily payment obligations. The second instance would be under stressed 
circumstances or during systemic events leading to liquidity problems, 
wherein a liquidity backstop from a central bank would be needed. 
Art. 47(1) of EMIR (2012) mandates that financial resources of a CCP should 
be invested in cash or highly liquid financial instruments with minimal 
market and credit risk; otherwise, it cannot be taken into account for 
dedicated own resources as part of the default waterfall. The regulator also 
prescribes in Art. 47(3) of EMIR (2012) the full protection of the financial 
instruments, more precisely the margins or default fund contributions. These 
must be deposited with operators of securities settlements systems, while 
acceptable concentration limits shall be applied to a single obligor. It is worth 
mentioning that liquidity is essential to be assured, so CCPs should have 
access to credit lines or similar arrangements to meet their liquidity needs if 
their available financial resources are not immediately available. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, concentration is a must to be taken into 
consideration, because as per Art. 44(1) EMIR (2012) only up to 25% of the 
credit line can be provided by a single clearing member, parent undertaking, 
or subsidiary of the clearing member. 
Canini (2021) formulates a constructive critique of the 2019 CCP Supervision 
Regulation. According to EMIR, the fiscal responsibility and day-to-day 
supervision CCPs are at the national level, but there are possibilities to lift 
key decisions to the national supervisors. Murphy (2020) presents new 
evidence of the distribution of risk in client portfolios and draws attention 
that clearing policy should be improved. He recommends that the mandate to 
clear should be phrased in terms of initial margin.  
Moreover, in the case of inadequate financial resources, CCPs often have a 
recovery toolkit. The loss allocation rules are also specific that aim to ensure 
that the CCP returns to a matched book. The layers and the structures of the 
default waterfall, supplemented with the stipulations the regulators expect 
CCPs to comply with, are discussed in detail in the upcoming chapters.  
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3.4.1. R&R by EMIR 
The objectives of the recovery and resolution framework aim, among others, 
to ensure the continuity of CCP core services in case of stressed conditions 
by “avoiding the use of public funds, avoiding interference with property 
rights, protecting financial stability, and enhancing public confidence in the 
financial system.” Nabilou and Asimakopoulos (2020, p. 82).While banks’ 
recovery and resolution plans prioritize the use of private funds within a 
resolution, a CCP’s recovery does not stipulate a hierarchical order among 
the listed objectives. Recovery plans are linked to the setting up of loss 
allocation mechanisms, establishing the trigger points of implementation of 
the plan if financial resources are exhausted and proven to be insufficient. An 
entity's failure would imply that the internal risk management framework has 
come apart, including policies and procedures and mandatory regulatory 
safeguards. In the case of CCPs, the contagion of default is the most 
significant risk that may trigger a whole system’s default. While in the case 
of banks, this is unlikely since the bank resolution allows banks to be resolved 
without bailing in certain liabilities that could generate contagion, but such 
liabilities could be the banks’ obligations to CCPs.  
Nabilou and Asimakopoulos (2020) point out a study that shows the concerns 
regarding interdependencies among CCPs, which may increase the 
probability of systemic failure. The study also highlights that the default of 
the CCP’s top two clearing members could result in further default due to the 
high level of interconnectedness of entities and affiliates. This reasoning also 
enforces the idea that CCPs should be prepared for disastrous events, 
reinforcing the current EU regulation that requires CCPs to have recovery 
and resolution plans. However, the regimes for these plans differ across 
jurisdictions. The fragmentation of the regulatory framework brings 
uncertainty to the treatment of a failed CCP. However, CCPs have established 
different variations of recovery and resolution measures and are already in 
place. Researchers, among others Plata (2017) and Nabilou and 
Asimakopoulos (2020), Peters and Wollny (2018), highlight that if the failure 
of a CCP is an outcome of a systemic crisis, markets being under pressure, 
bailing-in the clearing members could be harmful to financial stability, and it 
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would amend incentives. The creditworthiness of the CCP might erode. 
Authorities face a considerable challenge on when and how to implement the 
plans while preserving the different critical functions of a CCP within strict 
time limits. (Nabilou and Asimakopoulos, 2020) 
In December 2019, the EU ambassadors approved the European Council’s 
position on a proposed framework for CCPs and their authorities to prepare 
to put in place a harmonized framework for CCP recovery and resolution 
(European Council Council of the European Union, 2019). In 2020 the 
CCPRRR (Recovery and resolution of central counterparties) regulation 
entered into force, but in 2021 it was still under review. ESMA set out a 
consultation paper on the measures to be taken in the case of any member 
default, to specify the range of scenarios, and on obligation for the CCP’s 
competent authority regarding the review of the plan (ESMA, 2021b). 
3.4.2. EMIR Refit 
Since 2012, the EMIR did not change, but as with every legislation, it has 
become subject to the European Commission’s regulatory fitness and 
performance program (Refit). The review aims to remove unnecessary 
obstacles and improve regulation by amending and simplifying compliance 
costs, transparency issues (i.e., increasing reported data quality), and 
insufficient access to clearing for certain counterparties. The EMIR Refit 
entered into force on June 17, 2019, but not all provisions will apply from 
that day. (ESMA 2019b). 
Sykes and Karsten (2019) gathered the EMIR Refit changes in twelve 
summative points, explaining each point separately. EMIR Refit addresses 
(1) financial counterparty amendments, (2) the financial counterparty 
category, (3) non-financial counterparty calculation and clearing (4) 
mandatory clearing timing, (5) pension scheme clearing exemption, (6) 
reporting obligations – immediate provisions, (7) reporting obligations – 
delayed provisions, (8) suspension of clearing obligation, (9) initial margin 
information, (10) insolvency law provision, (11) risk-management RTS, (12) 
accessibility of clearing services.  
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This thesis will not cover more of the new regulation since it is still under 
consultation and the potentially relevant parts are not in force yet.  
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IV. The default waterfall system setup 
“The law of property determines who owns something, 
 but the market determined how it will be used” – Ronal Coase  
Since the Lehman crisis, many scholars have researched this field, targeting 
every aspect of central clearing. The default waterfall is an essential part of a 
CCP, so its layers were and are analyzed by many. In order to give more space 
to recent academic publications and to present research more closely related 
to empirical research in a systematic way, I will follow the five questions 
systematically outlined by Berndsen (2020). 
Before 2007, there were slightly few studies on CCPs, but especially in the 
past five years, CCPs gained blooming literature that focuses on the following 
(Berndsen, 2020): 
The first perspective considers the effects of a CCP’s introduction in the 
system that replaces bilateral clearing.  To Clear Centrally or not to Clear 
Centrally?  The literature approached answering the question in three 
different ways, on a qualitative and theoretical model-based concept, but on 
a study-specific approach as well. One approach is the effect on netting 
efficiency, which reduces the amount of aggregate counterparty risk exposure 
compared to the gross amount. A second perspective approaches it from the 
side of the amount of collateral posted on the initial margin and/or variation 
margin level based on aggregate counterparty risk exposures. Articles based 
on a study-specific approach provide more detail and sharper conclusions but 
are limited since the given specifics of the analyzed circumstances.  Overall, 
results show that central clearing is beneficial, but it has its conditions to work 
as expected. The specifics of the markets can affect how sound central 
clearing is (i.e., the number of clearing members – preferably high, the 
number of asset classes – preferably low, high bilateral margin requirements, 
relatively low number of SIFIs outside the CCP, or a combination of those 
factors). 
The second question addressed is If there is a CCP, what is the optimal 
number? Articles on this topic analyze CCPs interoperability. There are more 
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than one CCPs on the market; they co-exist and are interconnected.  From a 
systemic risk perspective, it can be interpreted as a move towards the 
optimum of one CCP. Proof in the literature for permitting interoperability is 
blended. Since more than one CCP creates competition – one CCP is not 
optimal from this point of view. According to Zhu’s (2011) findings, clearing 
expenses decrease substantially with three CCPs on the market, yet there is 
no proof regarding lax risk management. In sum, from a systemic risk view, 
the optimal number of CCPs is one. If multiple CCPs clear the same products, 
it is recommended to reduce the number of infrastructures. Certain conditions 
can lower systemic risk if connecting multiple equity-clearing CCPs through 
interoperability links. 
The third area is related to the default waterfall and the CCP’s risk 
management practices. This question outlines a historical look-back on the 
1987 crisis, methodology of setting margins, procyclicality, stress-testing, 
and improvements in the default management process.  My research also 
contributes to this area as well, where the focal question is: Is the size of the 
prefunded waterfall sufficient? Berndsen (2020) answers this question from 
three different aspects. The first answer provides a relative answer by 
recommending improvements in the prefunded waterfall, but it does not use 
a  benchmark. These results lead to or imply an increase in financial 
resources. The articles using a normative benchmark provided by the 
regulator or by law show that financial resources are adequate in complying 
with the rules. From a third perspective, the answer is retrospective: financial 
resources were adequate as long as no CCP has gone into resolution after 
several member defaults.  
The third answer is only complete if we answer another one: What happens 
at the end of the prefunded waterfall? The literature, in this aspect, is more 
of a qualitative nature since the fail of a CCP is not an everyday event on 
markets. The academic answers to handle the negative impact of the total 
exhaustion of the default waterfall generally recommend variation margin 
gains haircutting, and cash calls are preferred. Initial margin haircutting is 
less preferred, while access to liquidity from the central bank based on 
eligible collateral can facilitate a CCP’s recovery process. 
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The fifth question is related to SITG, asking What is the role of Skin-in-the-
Game? In this area, the incentives are the main target since the primary goal 
is to assure financial stability rather than the private goal of profit 
maximization. In this case, the CCP’s own capital is incorporated in the 
waterfall, is under debate. Academics recommend pursuing a prudent risk 
management strategy that aligns with the public policy expectations, and 
CCPs will continue to operate in even the most extreme market events. It is 
highlighted that the SITG’s primary aim is not loss-absorbing. However, 
there is a trade-off between increasing the level of SITG and the cost of 
clearing. 
All in all, this reasearch area is blooming, and it contributes to the soundness 
of CCPs’ activity since they are crucial pillars of the financial system, so its 
prudential regulation is indispensable. The prudential requirements provided 
by EMIR imposes the regulatory framework for the European CCPs. Its goal 
aligns with market participants’ and stakeholders’ expectations, which is the 
viability of the CCP and, nonetheless, the stability of the financial system. 
The measures detail the requirements regarding the financial resources 
available for managing default events and how the CCP should handle these 
resources to fulfill its role.  
To understand the requirements and the reasoning behind the imposed 
framework, the current chapter details the rules CCPs must comply with 
according to EMIR and the concerns raised by researchers and CCP experts 
in this regard.  
Murphy (2017) explains how the default waterfall system is built up and 
details its origin. The first area waterfalls became common was the capital 
markets. They were commonly used in mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). 
“In early tranched structures, the risk that flowed down was prepayment risk: 
the top tranche was typically prepaid first. Latterly, private-label MBSs were 
developed where default risk flowed in the other direction, i.e., with defaults 
eroding tranches from the bottom up.” (Murphy, 2017, p. 58.). This concept 
is the base on the default waterfall CCPs currently use. A general default 
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waterfall setup used by the European CCPs adhering to the EMIR 







Source: Edited based on EMIR (2012), Article 48., own edition 
The exhaustion of the above-listed resources is far from random. Regulations 
require using the available balances in a preordered sequence, margin 
requirements being the first resources available. According to Figure 5, a 
CCP can only use the margin to cover the defaulting member’s losses, but 
not the margins provided by surviving members. EMIR (2012) Article 41 and 
chapter VI. of the regulatory technical standards (2013) set the margin 
requirements level, which stipulates that it shall cover potential market losses 
in the clearing members’ positions in normal market conditions based on the 
calculation of a statistical model. The parameters of the statistical model must 
comply with the following criteria in case of non-OTC financial assets: 
confidence level at least 99%; lookback period is 250 days that includes a 
stressed period, liquidation period is at least two days – since the settlement 
on the stock exchanges is T+2 days. Procyclicality shall also be taken into 
consideration (Illés et al., 2019). 
The second layer of protection is the default fund contributions from the 
clearing members (EMIR (2012) Article 48). Regulators ask CCPs to 
implement an internal policy framework for defining the types of “extreme 
but plausible” market conditions that could expose it to the most significant 
risk. As Figure 5 shows, this layer of the default waterfall is to cover losses 
to extreme market turbulence and a cross-guarantee between clearing 
members. 
Default fund contribution of non‐defaulting member
Dedicated own resources of CCP
Default fund contribution of defaulting member
Initial margin of defaulting member
Figure 5: Default waterfall of a CCP 
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The third layer is the own funds of the CCPs, also called skin-in-the-game, 
which will be the next to be exhausted if all the defaulting members’ 
resources are not enough. Afterward, non-defaulting members’ assets within 
the default fund will be used, too, in order to protect the whole system. There 
is a second skin-in-the-game as a resource if the resources are not enough 
to cover the losses. This second skin-in-the-game is not part of Figure 7, as 
the regulator does not impose its existence. However, as mentioned earlier, 
during the EMIR regulatory overview in chapter 3.2.2, there are CCPs, which 
include their own additional resources in the default waterfall11. Recovery 
and resolution regimes will be triggered if the default waterfall resources do 
not cover the occurred losses (Cont, 2015).  
The default waterfall has a vital role in identifying liquidity risk as well 
regarding the default of the clearing members. Principle 7 CPSS-IOSCO 
(2012) and the EMIR regulation (2012) states if a CCP has a complex risk 
profile or if its function is systemically important, the CCP should consider 
meeting more stringent rules regarding its liquidity to be able to manage 
simultaneous member defaults (Parkinson, 2014).  
Further, I will present the main drawn up by researchers and professionals 
related to the default waterfall resources by focusing on the above shown 
general default waterfall elements: the different margin requirements, the 
CCP’s capital, the skin-in-the-game, and the default fund related 
contributions. Afterward, the tools and possibilities available for the CCPs 
will be presented in detail. 
4.1. The first layer of the default waterfall: margins  
Clearing members are obligated to pay for the services the CCP provides and 
to maintain the resilience, margin requirements arise. In the form of 
collateral, clearing members shall meet their expectations. Cox and 
Steigerwald (2017) make the distinction between the initial margin and 
collateral. The initial margin is a requirement set by CCP based on rigorous 
 
11 The Hungarian KELER CCP’s default waterfall setup: 
https://english.kelerkszf.hu/Risk%20Management/Derivatives/Default%20waterfall/ 
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calculation methodologies. The amount depends on the member’s obligations 
and the changes in the value of positions held. Collateral is the underlying 
instrument provided by the clearing member to the CCP to meet the initial 
margin requirements. CCPs announce the high-quality liquid securities 
and/or currencies that are acceptable. Market risk considerations 
fundamentally determine the initial margin requirements, including price 
volatility, concentration, and market liquidity. Besides the initial margin, 
another type of margin can be posed, namely, the variation margin. It is “paid 
with cash, and reflects changes in the position values based on new mark-to-
market. Collected from those who have lost due to the new marks, variation 
margin is in turn paid by the CCP with finality to those who have won.” (Cox 
and Steigerwald, 2017, p. 8.). If there is an unfavorable price movement in 
the underlying asset in which the market participants have open positions, it 
is collected. The calculations are performed daily. On T, it is the difference 
between the trade price and the same day closing price; on the following days, 
it is the difference between the closing prices of the previous settlement day 
and the actual settlement day (KELER CCP, 2021). 
As presented during the fails of the CCPs in history, the failure to meet the 
variation margin requirements is most likely caused by the member’s default. 
Variation margins are not part of the CCPs’ default waterfall. Intraday 
variation margins may accumulate, but these are only available for a limited 
timeframe.  
The regulators’ primary objective is that market participants’ margins 
determined by the CCP shall be prudent, stable, and reproducible. PFMI’s 
Principle 6 (2012) details the most critical features of the initial margin: 
- the exposure must be fully covered by collateral on a daily basis; 
- market liquidity and any risks associated with the product needs to be 
considered; 
- liquidation period: five business days for OTC derivatives, for other 
products two working days; 
- significance level: 99,5 percent shall be applied for OTC derivatives, 
and 99 percent in all other cases; 
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-  a portfolio-based basic security definition, with a discount (spread), 
may be given in duly substantiated cases, which may be based on an 
appropriate correlation and economic justification; 
- the lookback period must be at least 12 months that includes stress 
events too; 
Figlewski (1984), Fenn and Kupiec (1993), and Koeppl et al. (2012) 
examined the margining methodologies for a single asset under a given price 
process. Lam et al. (2004) investigated the margining procedures from a 
prudential and opportunity cost point of view, comparing three 
methodologies. Barker et al. (2016) modeled credit and liquidity risk 
considering a feedback mechanism between the clearing members’ default 
and market turbulences.  Béli and Váradi (2017) present a methodology for 
determining the initial margin requirement based on a value-at-risk model, 
fully complying with EMIR requirements. It is important to note that the 
regulatory requirements do not exclude the use of other risk-based calculation 
methodologies, i.e., expected shortfall is another accepted approach. 
Berlinger et al. (2019) analyze risk-sensitive and anti-cyclical margin 
strategies. Lopez and Saeidinezhad (2017) form their point of view based on 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and show that margin requirements may 
have destabilizing feedback effects in times of market distress. The argument 
is that “under these conditions, meeting margin requirements implies raising 
more collateral at a time when market conditions are already illiquid. This 
induces a pro-cyclical excess demand for liquid funds at a time when liquidity 
is scarce” (Lopez and Saeidinezhad, 2017, p. 5.). Huang and Takáts (2020b) 
show how the Covid19 affected the margin requirements, leading to large 
margin calls, highlighting that CCPs remain resilient. The high margin is not 
a surprise during high market volatility, but the extent of the procyclicality of 
margining depends on the design the CCP chooses.  
Margining methodology is supplemented with further additional elements. 
Procyclicality is required to be implemented to strengthen the resilience of 
the system. Procyclicality is defined as the tendency of any financial variable 
to move with the economic cycles. This is a troublesome property when it 
intensifies financial stress (FSB, 2009; Szanyi et al., 2017). High procyclical 
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movements harm market liquidity resulting in difficulties for market 
participants concerning funding (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Heller 
and Vause (2012)).  
Authorities designated under Article 22 of EMIR (2012) CCPs apply the 
margining requirements to limit procyclicality under Article 41 of EMIR 
(2012) and Article 28 of the Regulatory Technical Standards (2013) as 
follows: 
a) Applying a margin buffer at least equal to 25% of the calculated 
margins allows for temporary exhaustion in periods where calculated 
margin requirements are rising significantly (RTS, Article 28.1a, 
2013). 
b) Assigning at least 25 % weight to stressed observations in the 
lookback period calculated by Article 26 (RTS, Article 28.1b, 2013). 
c) Ensuring that its margin requirements are not lower than those that 
would be calculated using volatility estimated over a ten-year 
historical lookback period (RTS, Article 28.1c, 2013). 
Szanyi et al. (2017), Murphy et al. (2016), point out that the relevant articles 
for CCPs’ referring to procyclicality may be imprecise; consequently, its 
application lies on several presumptions. Due to the high level of uncertainty 
regarding the proper application of the propositions, there is a chance that the 
calculations can lead to a procyclical margin or unreasonably high margin 
requirement without any further assumptions. Szanyi et al. (2017) also define 
the discrepancies. For instance, the definition of stress, the timeframes of 
exhaustion, and the re-building of buffers are crucial to be defined. If 
stabilization is the primary goal, it should be carried out on the margin level, 
not on the risk measure level. If point a) is applicable, the method of 
exhausting the margin buffer should be defined: in one step, gradually, 
because the main point of finishing the buffer should be to stabilize the 
margin, not to decrease it. This is an essential shortage of the regulation for 
two reasons: on the one hand, it threatens the financial stability of a CCP; on 
the other hand, in case of stress, if a CCP decreases margin would cause an 
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increase in the value of the default fund, especially in stress periods. From 
the market participants’ perspective, this is not necessarily a favorable 
scenario because the default fund contribution can be used to cover losses of 
another clearing member, while margins are used in case of the market 
participants’ own default. This contribution can be “taken away” by the CCP. 
Moreover, it would be beneficial if the regulation would state that “the buffer 
can be exhausted when the risk is increasing – when the volatility is 
increasing – not when the margin would increase notably” (Szanyi et al., 
2017, p 7.). While handling the effect, the focus is on the margin increase. 
Szanyi et al. (2017) recommend that the change in the margin value should 
be on the stability. This would fend off dramatic increase and decrease too. 
The second point misses the definition as well. According to Szanyi et al. 
(2017) and Murphy et al. (2016), a certain percentile of the last ten years’ 
data is advised to be considered; otherwise, the floor would always be the 
margin value. Although the initial margin follows the market cycles, it turned 
out to be ‘too’ stable in percentage terms. 
The third option is no different. To handle this, the authors suggest applying 
a certain percentile, and, according to Szanyi et al. (2017), a uniformly 
applied percentile should be set by the regulator. This method has a less 
flexible nature, therefore different tools shall be introduced to avoid over and 
under margining. 
Gurolla Perez (2020) analyzes the performance of standard initial margin 
models during the Covid19 events and quantifies the different trade-offs. 
Results show that margin calls are driven mainly by variation margin, not 
initial margin, and analyzes the inherent risk sensitivity of margin models 
Overall, the regulatory background is highly specific for margining 
methodologies, but there is still space for researchers and experts to develop 
the most suitable one for a CCP. However, as highlighted above, some 
aspects of the framework raise the need for further clarification to avoid over- 
or undermargining the market. 
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4.2. The second layer of the default waterfall: default fund 
The default fund’s primary goal is that as members contribute to it, there is 
loss-mutualization among them. If the loss exceeds the initial margin of the 
defaulting member, its fund contribution will be exhausted to be used to 
outweigh the additional losses. 
As mentioned before, a member’s default losses that exceed its initial margins 
and default fund contribution are absorbed first by the CCP’s equity capital 
and then by the default fund contributions of surviving members on a pro-
rata basis. In other words, the default fund contribution is calculated on a pro-
rata basis, so stress is hitting the system that requires further liquidity 
members are needed to increase their obligations towards the clearinghouse. 
For additional liquidity, the CCP may be forced to request a contribution from 
selective members, for example, based on the proportion of open position or 
volume (Capponi et al., 2018). Although France and Kahn (2016) point out 
that the clearing member is not legally obligated to provide these additional 
amounts. The default fund size is calculated by the CCP, considering its 
exposure to each clearing member’s default by evaluating the potential 
liquidation cost of the member’s portfolio across a range of plausible stress 
scenarios. 
The regulatory framework (EMIR, 2012 and RTS, 2013) details the most 
critical features of the default fund: 
- A CCP shall set the minimum size of contributions to the default fund 
(Article 42 of EMIR, 2012); 
- Must comply with EMIR max (1;2+3) concept, detailed below 
- CCPs must identify the “extreme but plausible” scenarios as per 
Article 30 of RTS (2013) by customizing it to reflect the risk profile 
of the CCP. The conditions shall be based: 
o Historical scenarios containing extreme market movements 
o The lookback period is 30 years or the availability of reliable 
data 
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o Hypothetical future scenarios shall be included that contain 
presumptions with respect to showcasing market volatility and 
price correlation across markets and financial instruments 
o Qualitative and quantitative criteria must be set. 
- The scenarios must be reviewed regularly, at least annually, and its 
adequacy, too,  should be subject to monitoring.  
Definition of Cover II 
Article 43 of EMIR (2012) stipulates that a CCP shall maintain sufficient 
financial resources to cover potential losses even after exhausting the 
defaulting member’s available margins. These pre-funded financial resources 
shall be freely available for the CCP, provided as part of the default fund 
contribution. In the second paragraph of the mentioned article, the regulator 
states that the default fund contribution and other financial resources shall “at 
all times enable the CCP to withstand the default of at least the two clearing 
members to which it has the largest exposures under extreme but plausible 
market conditions.” Researchers call this rule Cover II.  
Capponi et al. (2018) point out in their research that the system cleared by a 
clearinghouse with a sufficiently large number of clearing members can 
calibrate an optimal level of default fund that could cover potential losses, 
and at the same time, it provides its services at a not too high price. This level 
of safety will over fulfill the requirements of the Cover 2 rule, but it would 
incentivize traders to “choose safer investments and avert negative 
externalities on each other” 
Definition of EMIR max (1;2+3) 
The extent of the default fund has another rule set in EMIR, which shall not 
be confused with rule Cover II. Article 42 of EMIR (2012) sets the minimum 
of the default fund at the level where its size enables “the CCP to withstand, 
under extreme but plausible market conditions, the default of the clearing 
member to which it has the largest exposures or of the second and third 
largest clearing members, if the sum of their exposures is larger.” In this 
dissertation, this will be referred to as EMIR max(1,2+3).  
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Murphy et al. (2014), Capponi et al. (2018), Poce et al. (2018) argue that the 
Cover 2 standard is not prudent enough. In line with other studies, they point 
out if the cost of funding collateral is too high, it requires a default fund that 
could be too expensive for members, and while members risk-taking 
incentives increase, the clearinghouse will be in a vulnerable position 
Capponi et al. (2018) provides a new approach for the optimal default fund 
requirement that mitigates inefficiency. 
Researchers also examined the loss mutualization role of the default fund, 
which has some disadvantages that shall not be neglected. The dependency 
among members may have negative consequences when members take 
excessive risk in the hope of higher returns. The effect of this risk-taking by 
the members affects the size of the default fund. The trade-off regulators face 
while collecting the default fund contributions. The goal is to prevent 
members from unreasonable risk-taking, but at the same time, though aiming 
to keep low funding costs, they direct the incentives towards safer 
investments (Capponi et al., 2018). 
As noted before, the default fund is a mutualized guarantee fund that aims to 
cover market risks not covered by the margins, assuming that one or more 
clearing members cannot meet its obligations. The default fund is determined 
through regularly performed stress tests that should demonstrate that the CCP 
has sufficient resources to withstand extreme but plausible market conditions. 
The calibration of the stress test is a focal point of quantifying the default 
fund and the contributions in the following chapters, I will present the most 
important aspects of stress testing in central clearing activities. However, I 
will also compare the methodologies, groupings, or practices banks use in the 
upcoming chapters. Some features and approaches of the two institutions’ 
stress testing are similar, therefore it is worth presenting it from both 
perspectives. Moreover, one chapter is dedicated to the stress test 
methodologies applied in the USA, imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. The 
thesis’ priority topic is the assessment of stress testing, the own research is 
built on stress testing, so the results of the equally strict but slightly different 
regulation of EMIR, the United State’s framework, deserves a short, high-
level presentation. 
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4.2.1 Stress testing 
Researchers have defined stress and systemic stress in several ways. Systemic 
stress is a set of circumstances that leads to the failure of a significant part of 
the financial sector, resulting in a reduction of credit availability that has the 
potential to affect the real economy adversely (Acharya et al., 2010). The 
toolkit of financial institutions has its own limits, but with the benefits of 
stress tests, rarely occurring events can be measured that the basic toolkits 
usually cannot  (Madar, 2010). By defining an independent event system, 
traditionally made by institutions or regulators – risk factors can be outlined. 
As a result, the extent of losses suffered in different scenarios gives a holistic 
overview of the stress-tested entity or industry. The empirical literature has 
aimed to capture systemic stress and risk more generally. In some views, 
systemic stress is from the perspective of interdependence between individual 
institutions. 
Before current regulations were adopted, empirical studies focused more on 
banking activities. The interdependencies between banks, resulting from 
credit claims, were the researchers’ primary area. Elsinger et al. (2006) build 
a matrix of interbank connections for the Austrian banking system and 
conclude that the probabilities of contagious default from interbank 
relationships are tiny. Iori et al. (2006) simulate potential contagion within 
theoretical banking systems and conclude that the vulnerability to systemic 
instability stemming from the interbank market is greater when banks are 
more interdependent. Having a too secure connection, failing riskier banks 
can drag safer banks down (Naceur, 2018). Nagy et al. (2016) measure 
systemic risk across the Romanian financial system, considering the foreign 
exchange market, bond market, money market, equity market, and banking 
sector to assure a holistic representation of the whole system. 
The effect of bank capital on bank-lending activities has been widely debated 
since the 1988 Basel accord. Since the sub-prime financial crisis, the Basel 
Committee has suggested tightening capital requirements and implementing 
a simple lever-activity on all fronts. Additional capital requirements have 
been introduced under the Basel III regulatory framework regarding the 
capital base’s quality. Tier 1 capital aims at better quality capital, and it is 
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expected to lead banks toward managing the components of their regulatory 
capital differently (Faruqui, 2018).  
In the case of central counterparties, positions are stressed in order to estimate 
losses arising under “extreme but plausible” market conditions, represented 
by historical or simulated yield scenarios that are more conservative than 
those covered by ordinary margins. The magnitude of the shock is set to a 
situation, which rescales the stress due to the increase of margins to values 
comparable to clearing members’ equities (Poce et al., 2016) 
The great benefit of stress tests is that they are able to promote the services 
of providers through a standard risk management toolbox and thus provide a 
financial-institution-wide coverage of possible shock effects. However, the 
relevance of the results can only be maintained if we create extreme but still 
conceivable scenarios that could jeopardize the solvency or liquidity of the 
financial institution. Such scenarios could be historical shocks from the past.  
The downside to this is that it is unable to keep pace with fast-growing 
financial markets, technology development, so it ignores specific contexts 
and may underestimate or, the opposite, exacerbate certain risks. According 
to Hull (2018), a multiplication of risk factors can be used in the historical 
approach to producing more severe effects. However, this results in the loss 
of the correlation between risk factors, and in the event of shocks, the role of 
co-movements in financial markets increases (Hull, 2018). 
Hypothetical scenarios are set up to resolve the retrospective view. Creating 
a single fictitious market scenario requires a variety of approaches and 
creativity, meaning that appropriate institutional risk profiles need to be 
explored based on management (BCBS, 2009a). Both quantitative and 
qualitative criteria can be used in the assessments.  
Financial institutions facilitate the calculation of all risk factors so that stress 
test models can be built if the hazards are fully taken into account. As I 
mentioned earlier, stress tests also need to be focused on risks that are not 
directly related to them to detect the institution’s weaknesses. These risks can 
only be taken into account indirectly or made with simplistic assumptions but 
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not strayed away from reality. This limitation is both an advantage and a 
disadvantage, as it retains the focus of the test (Bella et al., 2018). On the 
other hand, systemic events that are far from reality create an artificial 
environment, and their plausibility cannot be defended (Cox and Steigerwald, 
2017). 
The assumption, which further simplifies reality but is often used, refers to 
the static nature of balance sheets and positions. Simply put, this means that 
the composition of the balance sheet at baseline remains unchanged over the 
time horizon of the stress period. No further risk management measures to 
reduce exposures should be reflected during the test on the balance sheet in 
the same form and will remain there. New instruments cannot be involved 
either. Deteriorating capital positions tend to provoke a reaction from 
institutions, which can mostly manifest in raising capital. No such measures 
are possible along the stress trajectory. Although this approach is far from 
reality, a system-wide stress test can better guarantee comparability between 
individual institutions (Bella et al., 2018) 
There are still many simplifying assumptions in practice, but they have in 
common that they push stress tests into a framework isolated from reality. 
However, due to their excessive complexity and impracticability, they are 
needed. In addition to the many disadvantages, stress tests are a useful tool 
for the risk management practices of both banks and CCPs in the case of an 
appropriate framework, an appropriately consistent stress scenario, and 
correctly interpreted results. 
4.2.2 Stress test grouping 
Stress tests can be grouped according to their complexity, that is, the number 
of risk factors subject to shock (BCBS, 2009). These are mostly defined for 
banks, but the methodology can be applied for CCPs as well. 
The most standard test to perform is the sensitivity test. Only one risk variable 
becomes stressed during this method, ceteris paribus, so the other factors 
remain unchanged. The advantages of this method are straightforward: the 
implementation and the interpretation of results are transparent. (Frey and 
Patil, 2002) 
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At the same time, financial institutions have much more complex profiles and 
activities, so many risk factors play a role in their profitability and liquidity 
situation, and these factors are closely related, strongly correlated. It is, 
therefore, unrealistic to assume that a change in a factor does not cause the 
other factors to change. The solution to this problem, for stress tests based on 
classical scenario analysis, have been developed, which try to model the 
reality as much as possible, taking into account correlations and synergies 
between risk factors (Buch and Duges, 2018). 
The other dimension along which grouping of stress tests can be achieved is 
the source of the scenarios. Not just in the case of banks, but CCP regulators 
require historical events as input for testing. Examples of such a shock 
include the 2008 global economic crisis, the Dotcom crisis, or any event 
where changes in risk factors built into the model are well observable and 
clearly describe the relationships between them (Hull, 2018). This historical 
approach also raises some problems. Firstly, past events rarely recur, as 
market players and regulators strive to learn from past mistakes. 
Furthermore, market conditions are continually changing. In this particular 
case, the CCPs’ role and current regulatory efforts are just one example. Only 
in over a decade, several elements of the economic environment from 2008 
are not applicable anymore. Secondly, market products and actors are 
constantly changing, too. Financial innovations and the expansion of fintech 
companies can generate new approaches and relationships that may not yet 
appear appropriately in a historical scenario (Buch and Dages, 2018).  
Due to this uncertainty regarding the past, pessimistic events are 
implemented in the systems. Under current market conditions, past events 
can be a threat to the solvency and liquidity of financial institutions. These 
are called hypothetical scenarios, the preparation of which requires serious 
creativity, analysis, and a wide-ranging approach (Hull, 2018). EMIR’s 
“extreme but plausible scenarios” can be listed here. 
Stress tests can focus on only one risk, such as market risk, credit risk, or 
liquidity risk, but there may be more risks at the same time during distress. 
The Central Bank of Hungary presented its stress testing practice in 2013 
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(Banai et al., 2013), in which two different scenarios examined the resilience 
of the Hungarian banking system. Liquidity stress testing and market risk, 
credit risk stress testing segregation were carried out because the two risks 
cause problems in banks’ lives with different effects and different time 
horizons. Differentiation is not only about risks but also about the products 
being tested. Stress tests can only be carried out on a few asset categories, 
such as mortgage loans, but can either be the portfolio of a particular 
institution or the system as a whole. Its purpose always determines the way 
the test is performed (Banai et al., 2013). 
Stress tests may also differ from each other in terms of the time horizon being 
studied. One of the most important aspects of selecting a test period is the 
length of the mechanism of exposure to the financial institution. For example, 
in the case of liquidity risk, it is common that the time horizon is only a few 
days. This timeframe is sufficient to test the resistance to losses from the 
liquidity source markets and the difficulties in selling liquid assets (BIS, 
2019). For example, in the case of credit risks, the rise in the default rate of 
loans is a long process; these problems may not be reflected in the financial 
institutions’ balance sheet and profit and loss accounts over one week. The 
time horizon of direct market risk losses also depends on how fast the asset 
is repurchased on the market, but the mechanism of its effect can also be 
realized quickly as market prices fall. In banking practice, testing the capital 
position usually takes 2-3 years, while the testing of liquidity is typically one 
week or one month Bella et al., (2018). CCPs are required to complete stress 
testing daily. For example, KELER CCP performs the tests at the level of the 
clearing entity for the pre-defined scenarios. The results are consolidated at 
the clearing member and group level without netting, and the open risks are 
considered two days (KELER CCP, 2019). 
Stress tests can be made with a so-called bottom-up and top-down approach, 
both of which have advantages and disadvantages. The two methodologies 
are primarily relevant to stress tests prepared and prescribed by the regulator. 
The main difference is that in the bottom-up case, the scenario created by the 
regulator is run individually by the banks on the model used in their risk 
management tools, and the results are communicated to the authorities. In 
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contrast, in the top-down approach, the regulator checks the banks’ resilience 
in its framework (DNB, 2017).  
Financial institutions are familiar with the composition of their portfolio and 
the parameters of their contracts, so they can more efficiently model their 
expected losses from changes in risk factors. The bottom-up approach thus 
takes better account of the specificities of individual institutions, whether it 
is possible to incorporate a difference in their future strategy or business 
model into the system. However, the comparison of the results becomes much 
more difficult for the regulator, and for this type of test, there are often certain 
constraints, such as the assumption of static balanced composition. Another 
problem is that auditing the models also takes up a lot of time and effort on 
the part of the authorities, as they must also make sure that the results 
obtained are relevant and plausible. That is why bottom-up stress tests only 
take place with the participation of the most important banks (Banai et al., 
2013). 
In the top-down approach, there is no or only limited possibility for the 
regulator to be acquainted with the portfolio of the investigated institutions. 
Of course, the necessary data can be retrieved from the data services, but their 
detail is far from being such that individual, institutional features can be 
considered in the modeling. However, it has the advantage of a bottom-up 
approach. (Cihák, 2007). 
As opposed to low-resource demand, testing can be performed on the entire 
banking system, so besides individual banking effects, the financial system’s 
vulnerability as a whole can be measured. Contrary to the bottom-up 
methodology, this can be done quickly so that institutions can respond more 
flexibly to changes in the economic environment, and the potential effects of 
new risk factors can be rapidly measured. Therefore, stress tests are suitable 
for examining vulnerabilities in both individual institutions and entire 
financial systems (Cihák, 2007). 
Váradi (2018) points out the weaknesses of the stress test performed in 
adherence with EMIR for CCPs. The purpose of the stress test is to identify 
exceptional but realistic market situations by examining historical and 
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hypothetical scenarios and consolidating the Guarantee Fund’s definition 
under Articles 42 and 49 of the EMIR and Section 4 of the RTS. Hull (2018) 
emphasizes that the 2007/2008 crisis has highlighted the need for much less 
emphasis on VaR models in risk management and much higher stress testing, 
as VaR look backs, while looking at the future in risk management is 
essential. However, many CCPs, instead of realistic tests, build a hypothetical 
scenario that is inconceivable from many economic perspectives and 
performs stress calculations based on these scenarios (Szanyi et al., 2017).  
The excess stress testing is also harmful, as Váradi (2018) argues. As stress 
does not need to be taken into account in the calculation of underlying 
collateral, it is also necessary to avoid creating unrealistic scenarios in 
practice. Backstress tests are used to test them where they look at the market 
circumstances in which the full recovery of certain items in the guarantee 
scheme could occur.  
4.2.3 Applying stress test – methods for central counterparties 
Regulators, researchers, and experts have developed a wide variety of models 
to determine the adequate stress testing methodology. At first, I will briefly 
present the current findings in this field, followed by the general view of 
stress test methods and their types. 
The default fund adequacy can be tested from several aspects, one of which 
is from a network-based stress test point of view, as analyzed by Poce et al. 
(2018) tested the adequacy of the default fund, where they explored the 
network of clearing members on the fixed income market. Their analysis 
focused on the fixed income market, and the main results showed that 
calibrating the default fund to comply with the Cover 2 rule and not more, 
may not be satisfactory. Only very conservative default funds, covering 
several clearing members’ losses from the default, can face the costs resulting 
from distress spillovers. It was also proven that “financial distress spreads 
among financial institutions through direct exposures and indirect exposures 
through common assets ownership” (Poce et al., 2018, p. 1.). Battiston et al. 
(2016) and Iori et al. (2006) also analyzed the interconnectedness of the 
financial markets. Capponi et al. (2018) provide evidence about studies that 
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aim to analyze the framework’s effectiveness regarding its loss-absorbing 
capacity during stressed market scenarios and highlight the equilibrium and 
socially optimal risk-taking choice. Paddrik and Young (2017) also prove that 
the simultaneous failure of two members could cause network contagion, 
leading to the exhaustion of the CCP’s available resources, which may be 
insufficient. Menkveld (2017) points to the fact that crowded trades of dealers 
could amplify losses of CCPs in stressed scenarios. Campbell and Ivanov 
(2016) indicate that the losses could be more substantial if the exposures of 
large CCP members are positively correlated than if they are independent.  
Ghamami and Glasserman (2017) found that lower default fund requirements 
reduce the cost of clearing but make CCPs less resilient.  
Baker et al. (2016) analyze the distribution of losses to default fund 
contributions and contingent liquidity requirements for each clearing member 
identifying wrong-way risks among defaulting parties. Their main conclusion 
suggests that liquidity is the most important for members assessing the risks 
and costs. 
Paddrik and Zhang (2020) analyze the variation margin calls following a 
shock and conclude that CCPs do not amplify the propagation of shocks in 
networks but instead limit them.  
Menkveld and Vuillemey (2020) summarize current CCP researches, and by 
discussing multilateral netting, the insurance against counterparty risk, the 
effect of CCPs on asset prices and fire sales, margins setting, the default 
waterfall, and CCP governance, they conclude that CCPs may potentially be 
a source of additional risks, which are still to be comprehended.  
4.2.4. EU wide stress test 
Both banks and CCPs are considered systematically important financial 
institutions and based on this, regulators regularly carry out EU-wide stress 
tests for both types of institutions. Compared to banks, the “specialties” of 
CCPs are presented by Berlinger et al. (2016b). It requires a particular setup 
in its risk management system. This includes considering a high degree of 
specialization, symmetric exposures, balanced position, cross-guarantee 
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system, deposit dependency, and dynamic risk management. Although the 
two methodologies are similar in many ways, there are also significant 
differences, mainly due to the risk characteristics of the institutions. In the 
EU-wide stress test of CCPs, the focus is on counterparty risk and liquidity 
risk. In contrast, the stress test coordinated by the European Banking 
Authority for banks, the effects of almost all threats, such as credit risk, 
operational risk, or even market risk, were also measured against the bank’s 
result and capital adequacy. 
One of the objectives of EMIR is to promote central clearing and ensure safe 
and resilient CCPs. For CCPs, the European Securities Market Authority 
(ESMA) initiates and coordinates EU-wide stress tests at least annually. 
ESMA released the fourth CCP stress testing framework in June 2021 
(ESMA 2021), while the last stress test results were published in 2020 
(ESMA 2020). Together with local authorities, ESMA applies standard 
methodologies for assessing the effect of different stress scenarios and 
identifying the shortcomings in the resilience of the institutions. 
The stress tests include credit-, operational-, concentration risk, and reverse 
credit stress. The results published in 2020 communicated by ESMA show 
the resilience of the system. Overall, since the first stress test, the 
performance of CCPs has improved during the second stress testing period; 
the third had even more promising results. The latest report highlights that 
the credit stress test pointed out differences in resilience between CCPs, but 
no systemic risk has been identified. The liquidity stress test enforced this 
and showed that EU CCPs are resilient under the defined scenarios and, more 
importantly, did not reveal any systemic risk. The framework included a new 
concentration component and highlighted the need for EU CCPs to account 
for liquidation costs within their risk frameworks accurately. The report also 
mentions the additional environmental situation during the testing, namely 
the COVID19, a significant and unprecedented crisis. In coordination with 
the NCAs, ESMA “closely monitored the impact on EU CCPs, which 
remained resilient through the crisis, despite the increased market volatility 
and operational risk. ESMA’s stress scenarios were found to be overall of 
comparable severity with the most recent stress events.” (ESMA, 2020) 
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4.2.4.1 Scope and components of ESMA’s CCP stress tests 
ESMA performs the stress test in cooperation with National Competent 
Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The test 
scenarios comprise of ‘extreme but plausible market conditions’ to achieve 
the purpose of the stress tests for CCPs in participating in the event. CCPs’ 
resilience will be determined by using a combination of multiple participant 
defaults and simultaneous market price shocks. The purpose of the stress test 
looks beyond compliance with minimum regulatory requirements. The most 
crucial objective is to assess CCPs’ resilience to macro-economic scenarios 
involving the whole European Union. 
The scope of the whole exercise developed over the years. During the first 
exercise,  counterparty credit risk was the main focus, testing the effects of a 
clearing member default and simultaneous market price shocks. The second 
stress test introduced methodological improvements, incorporating an 
assessment of liquidity risk. The third exercise included a concentration risk 
component that was used to adjust the losses arising from the credit stress test 
to account for the costs of liquidating concentrated positions. This fourth 
exercise will pause the liquidity risk assessment, whereas the scope will 
include operational risk as a new component. Also, the integration of 
concentration with credit is an important new development in this fourth 
exercise that will further improve the detection of vulnerabilities in the EU 
system of CCPs. (ESMA, 2021) 
The next stress test exercise comprises of the following components: 
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Figure 5: ESMA stress test components 
Source: ESMA, 2021, own edition 
4.2.4.2 Credit stress 
The credit stress comprises of member default scenarios and market stress 
scenarios. The member default scenarios define the conditions that are 
utilized to choose the entities that are viewed to be in default. The credit risk 
scenarios differ in the methodology for determining defaulting members. 
Two scenarios will be applied for the Member Default Scenario exercise, a 
Full scope Cover-2 groups and Cover-2 groups per CCP. In the first one, the 
scope is to identify the two clearing member groups with the highest 
aggregate exposure under a particular market stress scenario. All clearing 
members that belong to an identified corporate group are assumed to default 
across all CCPs. Because this scenario will not test every CCP, the second 
scenario is introduced. Cover-2 groups per CCP will work with the defaulting 
clearing members as the members belonging to the top-2 groups of clearing 
members for each CCP. The defaulting clearing member groups are selected 
per CCP, and they may be (and in most cases will be) different for each CCP, 
and they are not considered to be in default in other CCPs. (ESMA, 2021). 
•Losses under a combination of market price shocks and member default 
scenarios
Credit stress
•Identifying and analying the CCPs' external operational dependencies 
that are needed to provide their critical services
Operational risk
•Increase the number of defaulting entities and level of shocks to identify 
at which point resources are exhausted.
Reverse Credit Stress
•Assess the impact of liquidation costs derived from concentrated 
positions
Concentration Risk
•Clearing member knock-on analysis (impact of loss sharing)
•HHI contentracion analysis (on the CCP’s credit and liquidity exposures)




The market stress scenario contains a methodology that considers the joint 
empirical distribution of historical observations of the risk factors deemed 
relevant to CCP. “The scenario has been obtained by choosing the mean 
response for each conditioned variable in an adverse scenario where the 
triggering variables are stressed over a two or five day horizon depending on 
the asset class. The sample chosen for the calibration spans the period from 
January 2005 to December 2020.” (ESMA, 2021). 
Other components were introduced to assure the coverage of every impacted 
element of a stress situation. These aspects are presented in the third stress 
testing:  
 Account-level reporting: CCPs will report data at a more granular 
level. The stress P&L and corresponding collateral will need to be 
reported at the clearing member and account level and the 
concentrated positions only at an account level.   
 Intraday Exposures: the default event will be modeled as a weekend 
default, allowing the testing of the intraday risk management 
procedures of the CCPs, including margining and settlement 
procedures 
 The wrong-way risk for cleared positions where the issuer is the 
clearing member or an affiliate: in order to identify wrong-way risk, 
CCPs must incorporate in the P&L calculations for each member of 
this specific clearing member or its affiliates issue the instruments. 
4.2.4.3 Operational risk 
The primary goal of this exercise is to identify risks from operational risk 
events affecting third-party entities on which CCPs rely. The objectives cover 
external third-party entities or systems, which may cause disastrous 
aftermaths if they have some disruption. It also aims to identify risks in case 
of an operational risk event that may affect the third-party service provider. 
The exercise shall assess the risk management tools that CCPs use to manage 
risks from these external third-party entities. Due to their high level of 
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interconnectedness, an analysis this network must be assessed to avoid 
business disruption or system failure of a potentially systemic nature.  
The operational risk analysis will cover risk identification processes, 
assessments, risk mitigation and monitoring steps, and the interconnectedness 
analysis mentioned above. 
4.2.4.4 Reverse Stress Test 
CCPs will are required to recalculate losses after sizing the shocks and cannot 
mount to P&L directly. The reverse stress analysis is limited to the credit 
stress component. It does not cover liquidity risk to limit the effort required, 
as the data to be used can be very complex and demanding. The report 
suggests considering expanding the scope to liquidity risk. 
This type of analysis aims to determine the likely combinations of market 
stress scenarios and members’ non-performance scenarios that involve 
systematic risk. The study focuses on systemic risk rather than individual 
CCPs. The results of each CCP shall be analyzed only when necessary for the 
source of events that may be of systemic importance. This is also a sensitivity 
test. A twodimensional analysis will be performed depending on the 
absorption capacity of the system of CCPs. This is achieved by stepwise 
increasing the quantity of defaulting entities and the severity of the market 
movements. 
4.2.4.5 Concentration risk 
The regulatory framework suppresses concentration risk. Under Article 53(3) 
of the RTS (Commission Delegated Regulation EU No 153/2013), it is 
required that the potential losses stemming from the clearing member 
positions shall be thoroughly assessed. This analysis also includes the impact, 
and the risks that liquidating concentrated positions could have on the market 
and the CCP’s margin coverage level. CCPs must include a so-called 
Concentration component that will model the expansion at the expense of 
liquidating an enormous position in a short period of time in the market. The 
80 
CPMI- IOSCO (2017) stipulates that a CCP’s margin model assumptions 
incorporate estimates of market liquidation costs, including bid-ask spreads.  
The price at which the CCP sells off the defaulting member’s portfolio can 
be worse since an extended position is spilled on the market, resulting in the 
movement of prices. The CCPs would incur transaction costs. This should be 
taken into consideration by implementing the market scenario described in 
the Credit Component. The inability to perform market transactions without 
price movements the Market illiquidity risk component is to be used by 
considering the size of the position and the depth of the market. 
Market illiquidity can appear as an exogenous factor: the relative size of the 
bid-ask spread, a cost that would be incurred even for small positions. The 
endogenous factor represents the fact that when positions are excessively 
large, they cause the market to move against them. The market impact 
depends on comparing the size of the position and the market depth, which is 
the ability of the market to absorb a substantial amount without materially 
impacting the mid-price. 
CCPs take the aggregated positions and compare them to specific thresholds 
to determine which ones are categorized as concentrated positions. 
Liquidation costs should be estimated as the asset classes they clear. A 
liquidation activity will have an impact on the market, so the liquidation cost 
should reflect its effects. 
 
Menkveld and Vuillemey (2020) note that the design of stress testing 
exercises is not the same as those used for the banking sector, it must capture 
the specificities of CCPs, and policymakers should take this into account. 
Regarding the potential recovery and resolution of CCPs, the consequences 
are still largely unexplored. 
4.2.5. Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 
As discussed above, the Dodd-Frank Act regulates central counterparties in 
the United States. After the financial crisis in 2008, Congress enacted the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which, among others, requires the Federal Reserve to 
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perform an annual stress test on the system. This provision includes the stress 
testing of clearinghouses as well. Besides banks and clearinghouses, the 
supervisory test also applies to LISCC firms, large and complex firms, and 
large and noncomplex firms. 
In 2012, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System adopted rules 
implementing frameworks and programs. These supervisory frameworks and 
programs are assessed to measure if the institutions subject to the regulation 
are sufficiently capitalized to absorb losses during stressful conditions. The 
aim is to reveal discrepancies in the system to assure that obligations to 
partners and creditors are met. Moreover, they should be able to continue 
lending to households and businesses. The methodology is a forward-looking 
quantitative evaluation of the impact of stressful economic and financial 
market conditions on firms’ capital. The Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 
(DFAST) besides identifying the weaknesses of the system, it serves to 
inform regulators and all participant, and the public too of how the stressed 
entities perform under a hypothetical set of stressful economic conditions and 
how their capital ratios may change. The other part of the test is the 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). This includes a 
quantitative assessment for all firms subject to the supervisory stress test. The 
CCAR is a quantitative assessment as well that uses supervisory stress test 
results to evaluate the entities’ capital adequacy and planned capital 
distributions. Compared to the previous exercises, projected provisions for 
loan losses are smaller since firms included large allowances in response to 
the COVID19 event and due to changes to accounting rules. 
The latest stress test consisted of two supervisory scenarios, one called 
baseline and the other called severely adverse. The baseline scenarios are the 
unstressed scenarios, while the others are hypothetical ones designed to 
assess the strength of the banking system, especially their own individual 
performance and their resilience during stressed conditions. The scenarios 
include trajectories for 28 variables, including “16 variables that capture 
economic activity, asset prices, and interest rates in the U.S. economy and 
financial mar- kets, and an additional three variables (real GDP growth, 
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inflation, and the U.S./foreign currency exchange rate) for each of four 
foreign country blocs. (DFAST, 2021, p. 13.) 
The severely adverse scenario is based on the deterioration of the global 
economic conditions, which is supplemented by a period of heightened stress 
in commercial real estate loans and the corporate debt market. The scenario 
contains additional essential features, assuming that the corporate loan 
market will be more intense for lower-rated nonfinancial firms. Regions with 
rapid house price gains should be assumed to be concentrated. The 
commercial real estate prices should be assumed to be affected by the 
COVID19 event. 
Besides, albeit the shortcoming in euro-region financial conditions mirrors a 
broad-based contraction in euro area demand, this compression ought to be 
more extended in nations with less capacity to utilize fiscal policy to incline 
toward the stoppage in the economic activity. Conditions across Latin 
American economies should be considered tantamount to the abrupt stoppage 
in the United States. The growth slowdown in emerging Asia should be 
assumed to be illustrative of conditions across many developing economies.  
The stress test is performed on firms with large trading and private equity 
exposures, a total of 23. A counterparty default scenario component was 
applied in case of 12 firms also having substantial trading, processing, or 
custodial operations. The market shock being global.  
The Federal Reserve has a separate scenario pack for the largest counterparty 
default (LCPD) called Global Market Shock and Counterparty Default 
Components. This component assumes massive market distress and the 
default of a firm’s largest counterparty. It considers the system’s 
interconnectedness by default of the CCP to the same ten firms and two other 
firms with substantial trading, processing, or custodial operations. These 
components are additional factors to the scenarios specified in the adverse 
and severely adverse scenarios. 
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The global market shock also consists of hypothetical scenarios using a large 
set of risk factors that accurately reflects general market distress and 
increased uncertainty. The risk factors are triggered at a given time.  
Risk shocks are calibrated to the time within stressed market events, which 
vary depending on the expected liquidity of the various types of risk but are 
applicable to the situation of the companies at a given time. Every year, 
companies with significant trading activity are required to apply global 
market shocks prescribed by the stressed scenarios. They are also required to 
recognize trading and counterparty mark-to-market losses in the first quarter 
of the planning horizon. The company that “is subject to the supervisory 
stress test and has aggregate trading assets and liabilities of $50 billion or 
more, or aggregate trading assets and liabilities equal to 10 percent or more 
of total consolidated assets, and is not a large and noncomplex firm under 
the Board’s capital plan rule” (DFAST, 2021, 12 CFR 225.), must apply the 
global market shock and counterparty default component. These institutions 
are most highly exposed to a potential failure of a CCP, and most importantly, 
they can amplify the stress on the markets. In order to cover the most at-risk 
firms, certain large and highly interconnected firms had to implement the 
LCPD component in their stress-testing framework. 
The 2021 global market shock component has a sharp shortening in the global 
economic activity as financial conditions are declining. Specifically, with 
rating agencies downgrading enormous areas of outstanding obligation, 
corporate bond spreads enlarge forcefully as ratings-sensitive financial 
backers sell their assets. 
Moreover, suppose a company has some characteristics that may be somehow 
outstanding, for instance, its financial condition, size, complexity, risk 
profile, the scope of operations, or activities, or bears risks to the economy. 
In that case, the Board may require to include one or more additional 
components in the severely adverse scenario. This component can involve the 
prompt and unexpected default of the firm’s largest counterparty12.  
 
12 The report also mentions that some entities are excluded from the selection of a firm’s largest counterparty, 
including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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Firms are also required to estimate potential losses and effects on the capital 
associated with implementing the component. If a firm has a connection with 
more than one counterparties, the largest is determined by net stressed losses. 
The estimation is calculated based on the global market shock. Non-cash 
securities financing activity assets posted or received are revalued. The shock 
is also applied to the value of the trade position and non-cash collateral 
exchanged for derivatives. 
From a US perspective, the risk of the global market shock component for 
the severely adverse scenario stems from a significant weakening of the 
European economy and its adverse effects spillover to the home markets that 
lead to sell-offs in financial assets more broadly to global market 
disturbances. Due to the spillover risk will negatively affect the U.S. and 
developing Asian and other emerging markets. The stress is based on the 
sudden increase in implied volatility, a substantial drop in industrial and 
energy commodity prices, and a reduction in market liquidity. This latter 
factor has the most severe and broad effect on the whole system. Having a 
stress test designed on major macroeconomic movements, the occurrence of 
flight-to-quality capital is inevitable. Therefore, affected countries 
experience currency appreciation, while European and emerging market 
currencies experience currency depreciation against the U.S. dollar. 
Results project that the firms as a group would experience $474 billion in 
losses on loans and other positions. The following losses are included: 
• $353 billion in accrual loan portfolio losses;  
• $4 billion in securities losses; 
• $86 billion in trading and counterparty losses at the 12 firms 
with substantial trading, processing, or custodial operations; 
and  
• $31 billion in additional losses  
The two largest losses stem from accrual loan portfolios and the trading and 
counterparty positions subject to the global market shock and counterparty 
default component. Ninety-three percent of the losses originate from these 
two types of losses.  
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Figure 6: Projected losses of DFAST 2021 
Source: DFAST, 2021 
The $86 billion in trading and counterparty losses generated from the global 
market shock and LCPD components for the 12 firms subject to one or both 
components losses ranged from $0.5 billion to $21.1 billion. The values may 
vary depending on the specific risk characteristics of each firm’s trading 
positions. Given that the stress is performed on a specific day, the results may 
be different for another day since the basis of the stress test are the trading 
positions they had on the 9th October 2020.  
It is worth highlighting that results show how the default of a central 
counterparty could affect the market. It would have a severe impact, resulting 
in the second-highest loss in distressed conditions. It is instructive for 
regulators and firms as well, since the transparency, proper management, and 
resilience of CCPs play a significant role in strengthening the financial 
system.  
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4.3 The third layer of the default waterfall: skin-in-the-game 
The central concept of CCPs, as discussed so far, the primary goal is to 
protect clearing members and the whole system from a potential domino 
effect that could crack financial markets. Central counterparties’ capital, 
therefore, also plays a significant role. The third layer of the default waterfall 
system is the CCPs’ own capital, the so-called skin-in-the-game.  
Due to the inadequacy of the defaulting member’s contributions, the CCP 
jumps in the game with the junior tranche of its own resources before 
exhausting the non-defaulting member’s financial resources.  
The current regulatory framework requires a considerable fraction of the 
CCP’s equity at 25 percent, according to Article 35 of EMIR (2012), to 
provide as skin-in-the-game in the default waterfall system. It is related to 
incentives too that the CCP management and not just the shareholders should 
bear the consequences if it is inevitable to reach out for the CCP’s capital 
buffer (Cont, 2015). Cont (2015), Murphy (2017), and McPartland and Lewis 
(2017) point out that in case the waterfall is exhausted, both contributions of 
faulty and non-faulty members’ contributions are proven to be inadequate, 
and before entering the recovery phase of the CCP, there should be another 
tranche, which is known in the literature as another part of the skin-in-the-
game, the senior tranche. The senior tranche is not mandatory, but several 
CCPs opt to avoid using more drastic recovery tools. (Muratov-Szabó et al., 
2019) They suggest that regulators are the ones who can answer by asking 
“what level of skin-in-the-game would be sufficient to generate the amount of 
clearing they consider necessary, were market participants free to choose 
whether or not to clear any particular trade” (Murphy, 2016, p. 69.) Cox 
(2015) suggests that supervising authorities are the ones who should have the 
responsibility in reaching an objective and favorable decision, and he does 
not give a precise answer to the question. The junior one is serving as “an 
auction inducement and a nuisance-avoidance deductible” (McPartland and 
Lewis, 2017, p. 3.). The senior tranche has the “ability to replenish the junior 
tranche immediately with resources from its senior tranche should help the 
CCP to maintain public confidence” (McPartland and Lewis, 2017, p. 4.). 
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The amount of skin-in-the-game can be harmful if its scale does not fit the 
risk profile of the CCP by being too high or too low. Murphy (2017) 
highlights the cases of the CCP’s capital contribution: if this is too small, the 
system participants will identify high risk in the clearing activity, so instead 
of joining the system, they would rather seek to engage in OTC trades that 
are not subject to clearing. Carter and Garner (2015) also maintain that the 
CCP’s skin-in-the-game value determining factor, because “the CCP’s 
incentives for prudent risk management are likely to be optimized by 
requiring its skin in the game to be a material portion of its own capital – and 
this would be true irrespective of the size of the CCP’s skin in the game 
relative to the size of its total default waterfall.” (Carter and Garner, 2015, p. 
85). Huang and Takáts (2020a) analyze the SITG from a model risk 
perspective, asking if the SITG is a game-changer?  They conclude that the 
CCP’s SITG bears a low model risk, and the capital not linked to credit risk 
does not reduce model risk.  
Overall, the studies point out how the amount of skin-in-the-game can 
indicate the risk profile and the incentives of the CCP, and its purpose is not 
limited to a loss-absorption function. This way, the layers may alter the 
incentives and risk perception of clearing members. 
4.3.1. Debate against high skin-in-the-game 
High skin-in-the-game has an uncertain impact on clearing activity. 
Collateral is costly, and a higher level of capital requirement means that 
traders must bear higher collateral costs, but an adequately capitalized CCP 
is more resilient, so it gives higher certainty for surviving traders, and it 
imposes lower or nil loss for them (CPMI-IOSCO, 2012). This leads us to the 
next topic: there is a constant debate between regulators and CCP 
practitioners on the amount of skin-in-the-game.  
Regulators impose strict rules for CCPs regarding the amount of skin-in-the-
game with the purpose of loss-absorption and loss-mutualization. Let us not 
forget, this layer also motivates the CCP to apply proper risk management in 
order to protect the system it clears. Including their own financial resources 
can discipline the CCP to avoid lax risk management and to prevent the pile-
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up of risky positions without proper collateral security. Transparent processes 
and policies can only achieve a resilient and resistant system.  
CCP experts show their dissenting opinion to the regulator regarding the 
amount of the skint-in-the-game. CME highlights that “Skin in the game 
doesn’t protect end client.” The high skin-in-the-game can encourage moral 
hazard among clearing members if the CCPs contribute more substantial 
financial resources to the default fund. They highlight that concentration 
risk is the most prominent fear CCPs can have. To deal with concentration 
risk, Surprise (2015) and CPMI-IOSCO (2019) proposes to handle the most 
significant exposures by requesting the clearing member causing it to pay 
additional collaterals for the risk it generates, so if the worst happens and it 
fails to meet its obligations, the extra fund will serve to cover the losses it 
caused (Surprise, 2015). Otherwise, if this were not handled, the end clients, 
even other market participants, would also suffer from the CCP’s financial 
resources collapse. This would benefit neither the CCP nor the end clients in 
the long run, especially if the default events accumulate. In the CME’s point 
of view, the protection of the end client is not assured by the investments in 
the guarantee fund by the CCP. It can “be used to close shortfalls in client 
account, thereby protecting non-defaulting end clients.” (Suprise, 2015). 
Experts explain their standpoint against high skin-in-the-game proportion 
with the high cost of capital and the incentives of clearing members they are 
willing to take. However, they agree on the necessity of the junior tranche 
because it indicates the first line of defense, and therefore is a strong incentive 
to promote adequate risk management conventions for clearing activity.  
The CCP12 13  also states that “SITG not a significant loss-absorbing 
resource.” Their justification points out that neither CCPs nor international 
standards expect it to be the essential loss-absorbing tool of the guarantee 
system. However, they agree on the previously presented concept; namely, a 
too high value of the SITG “will weaken market participants’ incentives to 
 
13 CCP12 is a global association of 37 members who operate more than 50 individual CCPs 
globally across EMEA, the Americas and the Asia-Pacific region. CCP12 aims to promote 
effective, practical and appropriate risk management and operational standards for CCPs to 
ensure the safety and efficiency of the financial markets it represents.  
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participate in the default management process, as they will consider CCP 
skin-in-the-game and the potential for their own mutualisation when 
constructing bids in a default management auction” (CCP12, 2019, p. 12.). 
Daly (2015) gave a reason that skin-in-the-game contributions are significant 
because a potential solution for CCPs to stop a considerable default from 
happening is to have access to ample resources, and “clearinghouse 
contributions would be a perfect place to start.” Based on the different 
markets and guarantee funds reported in 2014, the separately managed 
guaranty funds dedicated to cleared interest rate and credit-default swaps, 
CME Clearing, ICE Clear Credit, and LCH. Clearnet’s SwapClear US 
contributed $150 million, $50 million, and $2 million to their guaranty funds, 
representing 2.2%, 2%, and 0.3% of their guaranty fund’s total assets. In 
Europe, under EMIR, the minimum contribution is 25% of their own capital 
resources if they have a minimum capital requirement higher than 7.5 million 
euros. The difference is outstanding between the European and the US 
clearinghouses’ financial situation. According to CME, in 2018, in the UK, 
the clearinghouse contributed $75m, or 25% of its own capital, while in the 
US, the exchange contributed about $375m, or roughly 5.25% of its capital. 
Daly is on the opinion that “increased clearinghouse contributions may raise 
the morale of those suffering losses, but in actuality, it is as productive as 
trying to fill in the Grand Canyon with a garden trowel. It’s all about scale.” 
During an Online Workshop on CCP Risk Management that the European 
Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH) organized jointly with the 
Journal for Financial Market Infrastructures, EACH (2020) aimed to discuss 
the concept of SITG, its purpose, compare it to the purpose of other default 
management resources available at the CCP as part of the default waterfall. 
EACH believes that the current calibration of SITG as included in EMIR is 
adequate. Their empirical assessment concludes that overall, increasing the 
SIG would not make much difference. Statistics show that in 2019 the SITG 
of EU and UK CCPs represents, on average, less than 0.15% of the total 
resources of CCPs (i.e. initial margins, SITG, default fund, assessment 
powers). The SITG is not explicitly designed for loss absorption. Regarding 
the small percentage of the SITG EACH admits, that it is not a big number, 
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but „it is high enough to ensure that CCPs are well incentivised to perform 
robust risk management because, as we have already seen, exhausting the 
SIG would mean on average burning 1.6 years of profits for European CCPs” 
(EACH 2021, pp. 10).  
According to David Murphy (Lisney, 2021) the increase of SITG creates an 
imbalance between the impact on small and large institutions, "If you're going 
to ask clearing members to replenish their deposits in the guarantee 
fund…the probability of being successful at doing so would be increased if 
the CCP were at risk to the same degree as the clearing members themselves 
are at risk." "It's not meant to be a large loss absorption resource, because 
that would shift the balance of the incentives for clearing members to not only 
manage the risks that they bring to the clearing house, but also to participate 
in things like default management” (Lisney, 2021.) 
Another related to the skin-in-the-game is “Where is it?”. McPartland and 
Lewis (2017a, b) analyze the ownership and the related incentives of the 
design of the default waterfall and its components. They get to the conclusion 
that no matter what the ownership structure of the CCP is the „skin-in-the-
game should be pre-funded and on deposit with the appropriate central bank.” 
(McPartland and Lewis, 2017b, p. 4.) They explain that this gives relief to 
every participant in the system: to prudential authorities, clearing members 
and other, market participants because, in this way, the financial commitment 
from the CCP is in a pre-funded form, and it is available immediately under 
the most adverse of circumstances. 
 The collaterals and contribution amounts that shall be provided has an impact 
on the incentives of every character on the market. Based on McPartland and 
Lewis (2017b) research, the incentives and the size of the default waterfall 
components adjust to it as follows: 
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Figure 7: Default waterfall funding 
Source: McPartland and Lewis (2017b), own edition 
The CCP’s ownership and contribution to the guarantee system also impact 
the incentives of members.  
 
Default waterfall funding
No mutualization of risk
•Fully funded by the CCP
•Moral hazard: clearing members, 
having no real financial risk 
associated with the CCP, would 
have little incentive to monitor the 
quality of the CCP’s risk 
management or observe the conduct 
of other clearing members.
•Fee structure: expensive, it would 
discourage the use of the relevant 
derivative products
•Confidence in CCP’s margining 
method
•Clearing member’s involvement in 
auctions of the defaulted positions, 
because any default shortfall would 
be borne solely by the CCP
Full mutualization of risk
•Fully funded by members
•Conflict over the power and 
composition of the CCP’s risk 
committee as all of the financial risk 
of clearing would fall upon the 
clearing members.
•Rigurous clearing membership 
criteria, deterring the entrance on 
the market.
•Agressive bidding for defaulted 
positions.
•Fee structure: favorable enough to 
attract end-user market participants 




Figure 8: Ownership structures and their effects 
Source: McPartland and Lewis (2017b), own edition 
Huang (2019) also analyzes the theoretical and regulatory background of the 
skin-in-the-game. Proving the effects of the different skin-in-the-game in the 
default waterfall of a CCP, he uses actual data from the clearing industry, a 
total of 16 CCPs at the group level and 44 CCPs at the entity level, numbers 
enough to cover most of the field. His results suggest that a CCP with more 
capital requires more collateral from its clearing members. As mentioned 
before, this gives higher certainty for the system by lowering the number of 
defaults and losses arising from a potential default of a clearing member. 
However, this certainly has its price because it causes profitable trades to be 
•Most commonly in emerging economies
•Public confidence
•Junior tranche is large enough to absorb
losses
•Senior tranche at the bottom of the default 
waterfall funded by the public sector
The quasi-
national CCP
•For-profit corporation and is designed to 
pursue profit
•Governance is typically shared between CCP 
management, CM representatives, and 
independent industry experts.
•Senior tranche: readily available funding to
recapitalize the junior tranche




•CCP is owned and governed by its clearing 
membership and has little to no profit 
motivation
•The senior tranche ultimately come from
clearing members, would primarily serve to
prefund necessary replenishments of the
junior tranche were the junior tranche ever
partially or wholly depleted.
Mutualized CCP
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relinquished, resulting in reduced fee income. From the CCP’s point of view, 
the higher capital included raises concerns originating from a clearing 
member’s losses. This also explains why a higher collateral requirement is 
set, aiming to disincentivize defaults. His results show a significant 
correlation between the CCP skin-in-the-game and the required initial 
margin. A 1% increase in the skin-in-the-game results increased by more than 
0.6% in the required initial margin. It must be noted that the ownership of the 
CCP has a significant impact on the skin-in-the-game amount a CCP is 
willing to add to its default waterfall. This is why in the following, I will 
present the two cases of CCP incentives: first, the incentives regarding for-
profit CCPs, and secondly, the CCP that is owned entirely by its clearing 
members. Huang and Takáts (2020a) take a step forward from Huang’s 
(2019) approach, and their focus shifts from analyzing the role of STG, 
including its association with the aggregate amount of collateral or initial 
margin, to explicitly focusing on the model risk of CCP. Their results suggest 
that higher SITG does not reduce the model risk of CCPs. 
4.3.2. Incentives regarding for-profit CCPs  
The amount of CCP capital contributions is a focal point of the system. The 
owners and users differ and so have responsibilities toward one another, and 
their interests certainly pole apart. The for-profit CCP’s key intention is to 
maximize its own expected utility. A for-profit CCP’s default waterfall can 
have two sources: it can either be funded solely by the clearing members or 
by the CCP. It does not matter which ownership does it have, and it will affect 
the incentives of every market participant while both involving benefits and 
drawbacks. (Huang, 2019; McPartland and Lewis, 2017a, Cox, 2015) 
A completely clearing member-funded waterfall’s danger is that it favors a 
better yield on value rather than safety, conceivably prompting limited 
exposure to default risk, resulting in sloppy risk management practices. The 
inappropriate management concusses and limits the credibility of the CCP, 
prompting skepticism in its function in satisfying robust risk management 
obligations McPartland and Lewis (2017b). 
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The other setup of the waterfall contribution, when the CCP entirely funds it, 
raises several concerns that can alter incentives. As the clearing members also 
compose the Risk Committee (regulated by Article 28 of EMIR, 2012), they 
have an essential role in the risk management of the CCP and their policies 
as well. If a clearing member had no contribution to the default waterfall, 
their interest in the proper risk management of the CCP would be limited, and 
monitoring its risks would not be a prime aspect. Generally, the CCP 
liquidates the defaulter’s positions in case of a default and seeks clearing 
members to accept them. (CPMI-IOSCO, 2019). This liquidation process is 
beneficial for the CCP due to its prompt action for loss absorption. If the CCP 
were responsible for absorbing all default losses, clearing members would be 
more hesitant to accept clients or support in liquidation. In this case, the 
clearing members would accept clients or bid for positions they would likely 
require terms undesirable to the CCP. The no capital added scenario would 
also induce lower margining models. The less creditworthy clearing members 
could also quickly join the clearing system, “since unless a default were large 
enough to lead to the failure of the entire CCP, they would not bear any of its 
cost” (Lewis and McPartland, 2017a, p. 64). Coeuré (2015) reasons that this 
model does not fit with the role and character of a CCP because they “are 
risk poolers, not insurance providers.” 
From a financial point of view, as noted before, fees posed by the CCP have 
a significant role in the incentives of the clearing members. Huang (2019) 
analyses the fee structure from a social point of view, and he concludes that 
a “for-profit CCP needs to take into account the per-unit clearing fee” 
(Huang, 2019, p. 3.). While a higher fee increases the temptation to increase 
trading volume, he points out the level of the fee threshold effects in two 
ways: if it is too high, the collateral requirements will be lower, resulting in 
a boost of the trading volumes.  In this case, the capital requirement serves as 
a loss-absorbing layer. The lower fees expect higher capital requirements. 
The trading volume will drop because the amount of collateral due to the CCP 
will increase.  This is a practical ex-ante step in pushing the CCP to abolish 
the counterparty credit risk it is exposed to. Cox (2015), too, discusses the 
effect of CCP skin-in-the-game on the incentives, and he also points out that 
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increases in the size of CCP skin-in-the-game could lead to increases in 
clearing fees and harming the liquidity of the cleared markets. However, as 
Murphy (2017) evaluates, a CCP can achieve the optimal balance between 
the components of the default waterfall, leading to maximizing the return on 
equity.  
To sum up, a for-profit CCP must focus on the return on equity if the 
contribution of the default waterfall is large. This will bring expanding 
clearing activity expenses, creating a disincentive to clear transactions, 
expanding systemic risk. Besides, as Cox (2015) clarifies, the too-high 
commitment of skin-in-the-game included in the waterfall could jeopardize 
the CCP’s drawn-out presence if there should arise an occurrence of an 
extraordinary default occasion. Since the lesser junior tranch absorbs losses, 
clearing members would be urged to abstain from helping a default member’s 
management. The higher the junior tranche, the likelihood of funds collected 
from the non-defaulting members declines, also decreasing incentives to be 
part of the default management (Lewis and McPartland (2017a). 
4.3.3. Incentives regarding clearing member-owned (user-
owned) CCPs 
Huang (2019), Cox and Steigerwald (2017), and Lewis and McPartland 
(2017a, 2017b) study the different ownership structures of CCP, and they 
point out another type of ownership structure worth analyzing is the 
mutualized CCPs: This type of ownership structure implies that the clearing 
members and exchanges own them, which are the same that use their services. 
Following their use of concepts, mainly owned by a few large clearing 
members, collectively call them user-owned CCPs. From this structure, 
there could be misaligned motivating forces between members, as the smaller 
ones would have less impact on the choice of the approach the CCP would 
apply. (Lewis and McPartland (2017a, 2017b) 
Compared to the for-profit model, the CCP aims to maximize the total welfare 
surplus. Another distinction the two specialists call attention to is how these 
CCPs hold extra capital, and the necessary collateral amount is low. 
Nevertheless, because the proprietors are equivalent to the clients, the money 
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related assets in the default waterfall system have the same financial source: 
market participants’ capital (Huang, 2019; Lewis and McPartland, 2017a). 
Lewis and McPartland (2017a, 2017b) draw attention to one exception why 
the mutualized CCPs should include skin-in-the-game in the system – not 
only margins –because of the role it serves. Including a junior tranche can 
prevent some default losses from reaching the mutualized part of the 
guarantee system, and this way, the refill of the clearing member contribution 
could be avoided. This being beneficial for all members of the system. 
Because the resources are coming from the members’ capital, they can decide 
whether to refill the junior tranche after a default that exhausted it or reach 
out for the retained earnings of the CCP. This latter option can take a longer 
time, so for regulatory compliance, a CCP would instead call capital through 
its clearing members during the replenishment of the default waterfall (Carter 
and Garner, 2015) 
User-owned CCPs have different policies on capital contributions to the 
default waterfalls. For instance, the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) 
does not include any capital in its default waterfall, but the retained earnings 
“are discretionary at any stage of the default” (Options Clearing 
Corporation, 2016). Another example is EuroCCP, not including capital 
contribution in its waterfall. Nevertheless, it has an equity capital layer that 
can be used once the default fund is exhausted; however, the scheme is 
designed not to call upon that layer (Cox and Steigerwald, 2017). 
As seen above, the amount of skin-in-the-game has a remarkable overall 
impact on the default waterfall system. The for-profit CCPs tend to have 
significantly lower skin-in-the-game than the user-owned ones. 
The size does not serve only as protection for the fail of the system, however, 
it likewise creates incentives for both CCPs and its clearing members. Each 
party’s capital contribution to the fund creates incentives to seek prudent risk 
management practices, so every member bears a portion of the loss caused 
by default. Carter and Gardner (2015) acknowledge the presence of free-rider 
in the system, but problems created can be mitigated with loss-mutualization 
and prudent risk management incentives. The free-rider, in this case, would 
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be the lack of participation in risk-bearing by not contributing the costs their 
associated positions generate. 
The potential for less stringent risk management would also make it difficult 
for the CCP to credibly demonstrate to its clearing members that it was 
fulfilling its risk management responsibilities. Information asymmetries can 
also lead to heightened risk because the CCP does not have ample 
information about all the trading activities of its clearing members outside the 
CCP; therefore, it will be unable to assess the probability of the participant’s 
risk profile to measure the risks associated. On the other hand, if the 
participants lack information about the CCP’s risk management frameworks, 
incentives can alter emerging to degrade the CCP’s credibility (Menkveld et 
al., 2016). 
Despite the different opinions on the components of the default waterfall, 
CCPs apply the waterfall similar to the one presented in chapter IV. Figure 
5: margins being the first line of defense, followed by the defaulting 
members’ default fund contributions. Finally, the remaining losses would be 
covered from the CCP’s contribution. The mutualized contributions of the 
surviving clearing participants being the ultimate source to be exhausted. Any 
remaining losses would be covered using the CCP’s recovery tools, discussed 
in the next chapter. Many CCPs, including Chicago Mercantile Exchange 




Figure 9: Example of DFW with an only junior trench of SITG for several 
markets 
Source: LCH, 2021  
 
Figure 10: Example of DFW with an only junior trench of SITG 
Source: CME, 2021  
However, the default waterfall presented above is not applied universally. 
Several CCPs build on the typical waterfall, but they apply additional layers, 
mostly a second skin-in-the game tranche. For example, both KELER CCP 
and ECC (Figure 14) include another layer of own funds after all member 
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contributions, including non-defaulting member default fund resources, were 
exhausted and proven to be inadequate.  
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Figure 11: Example of DFW with junior and senior tranches of SITG: (left: KELER CCP, right ECC) 
                    Source: KELER CCP (2021), ECC(2021) 
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Until 2019 the ASX Clear (Futures) had more than two layers of own 
resources: it divides participant contributions to the default fund into two 
tranches; it applies additional rounds of own capital after each tranche was 
exhausted, but from 2020 this changed and the own resources (consisting of 
the restricted capital reserve, equity and recovery assessments) are exhausted 
in the shown below: 
                               
Figure 12: Example of DFW with more than two SITG 
     Source: ASX, 2019 and 2020 
Depending on the nature of the market a CCP clears, the default waterfall 
setup can also differ. ISDA (2014) reported a default on the Korean Exchange 
(KRX) in December 2013, which resulted in losses that exceeded the 
defaulter’s collateral. At the time, KRX’s rules stipulated that the remaining 
losses should be absorbed by the default fund contributions of the surviving 
members. As discussed above, the inclusion of own capital can modify 
incentives and prevent non-faulty members’ contributions. This event 
triggered the Korean Financial Services Commission to make changes to 
legislation to ordain that CCP capital would be introduced in the waterfall 




V. The inadequacy of the default waterfall: resolution 
and recovery  
“Money’s only something you need in case you don’t die tomorrow.”  
 Carl Fox (Martin Sheen) Wall Street 
The market, regulators, and stakeholders all expect CCPs to withstand 
extreme market conditions, but the shock event may be so immense that the 
CCP’s prefunded and callable resources are exhausted and still not enough to 
cover the losses. In this case, the CCP could have no other option but to enter 
into resolution and fail. As pointed out earlier, the failure of a central 
counterparty may have system-wide effects, so clearing participants might 
face difficulties in managing their positions afterward. A substitute solution 
for market participants would be to search for alternative ways of closing 
their open positions. This extreme situation would trigger immense 
uncertainty, altering the underlying exposures’ value, heightening the 
associated market and counterparty risk for the whole system (Domanski et 
al., 2015). The general framework is laid down in Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD) (BRRD, 2014) 
The advancement of a particular framework for the resolution of failing is 
still advancing. Many European jurisdictions, notably the United Kingdom, 
have been adopting autonomous legislation governing the recovery and 
resolution. The main goal is to introduce a fully harmonized European regime 
that was released in 2016 has been formally adopted in December 2020, 
named CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation (Binder, 2021). 
The newly developed approaches for the banking sector can serve as a model 
for CCPs, but CCPs’ specifics shall be considered, so significant 
modifications must be made to match their business models and risk profiles. 
The model provided by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of 2014, 
EU law, in the form of a Regulation adopted in 2020, now provides a separate 
comprehensive framework for treating failing CCPs (Binder, 2021).  
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5.1. Recovery planning 
Another critical component the regulation has addressed other than the sound 
risk management practices is the recovery and resolution regimes for CCPs. 
Both are to assure consistency of the clearing services to achieve systemic 
stability and to give guidance for an orderly resolution of the CCP (CPSS-
IOSCO (2012), CPMI-IOSCO (2014), FSB (2014a)).  
Peters and Wollny (2018) bring up the significance of preparation. A 
recovery plan is a pivotal tool for both CCPs and regulators to be set up to 
distinguish the critical services; the stress scenarios in case of default and 
non-default events prevent the CCP from offering its core services. The 
measures to be distinguished are both quantitative and qualitative, which 
could activate all or part of the recovery plan; and would require the use of 
recovery tools in case of diverse events. The plan should indicate conceivable 
outcomes the CCP has in different circumstances. The relevant supervising 
authority must periodically review the plan and assess its adequacy. In case 
of significant change on the market or in the regulatory background, the 
deficiencies caused should be considered implementing. This requires a 
flexible implementation of the plan (Peer and Lewis, 2018). However, the set 
of supervisory intervention is limited; the execution of the plan is solely the 
responsibility of the CCP. To facilitate the quantification of potential 
exposure to the CCP, regulators endeavors to enhance transparency by 
elaborating the impact in the recovery plan for clearing members. (Priem, 
2018) 
The general framework of recovery tools provided by the regulator refers to 
tools to be used in case of a defaulting member and tools to allocate losses 
not caused by a participant default  (CPMI-IOSCO, 2014). The following 
table contains the type of tools to be used in different events and their 
characteristics.  
Type of tool Characteristics 
Tools for uncovered losses caused by participant default 
Cash calls (Assessment 
powers) 
In a going concern, CCPs can require non-defaulting 
clearing members to provide additional financial, but 
only for covering losses due to default. These calls to 
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clearing members should be proportionate to the pre-
paid default resources or the market-to-market value of 
the positions the clearing members bring to the CCP on 
a given day. In order to enhance transparency while 
mitigating uncertainty of the callable cash amount, the 
European Parliament opts for the possibility of several 
cash calls, maximized by the resolution authority.  
The aim is to reduce the maximum loss that would fall 
on any individual non-defaulting clearing member by 
mutualizing the loss in proportion to the risk that the 
clearing member brings to the CCP. Even more, this 
approach would provide ex-ante incentives for clearing 
members to limit the risk they bring to the CCP. (Peter 
and Wollny, 2018). 
Variation margin haircutting 
by the CCP 
This is a limited-time tool that involves reducing 
haircutting - in any variation margin gains/profits due 
to the non-defaulting members. All claims, either gross 
or net or only marked to market gains, can be subject to 
haircutting. The most significant disadvantage is that 
over time, participants will be unwilling to provide the 
required initial margin. If the CCP cannot reestablish its 
clearing activity promptly, further steps should be 
taken.  
Use of initial margin 
As discussion over the initial margin usage in the 
previous sections stated, it is used to cover the 
obligations of the provider, and it cannot be used for 
loss-mutualization purposes. Generally, the initial 
margin is remote from the insolvency of the CCP, and 
it is not subject to a reduction in either recovery or 
insolvency. However, in some jurisdictions, this 
enormous pool of pre-funded resources may, in the 
event of the CCP’s insolvency, be exhausted to fulfill 
creditors’ claims, thus becoming a tool in recovery. If 
the initial margin of the surviving members is used, 
they are required to replenish the initial margin, and to 
decrease their exposure at the CCP to the level that their 
remaining initial margin provides adequate coverage or 
a combination of both. This recovery tool being 
implemented could further undermine confidence in the 
CCP. It would also generate procyclicality in the 
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system. The willingness of the clearing members to 
meet the margin calls imposed by the CCP will 
plummet drastically.  
The regulator draws precautions to the use of this tool! 
Other tools that involve 
collateral and capital 
These tools are the use of the CCP’s own capital and, if 
necessary, raising additional capital. The purpose is to 
cover losses of a default. This tool can be part of the 
ordinary default waterfall, or it can appear among 
recovery or both. 
Tools to address uncovered liquidity shortfalls 
Obtain liquidity from third-
party institutions  
A CCP can have arrangements in place with third-party 
institutions. These tools are useful in case of less 
stressed market conditions. They are less reliable forms 
of liquidity, but if included in the recovery plan, 
additional tools should be used to manage liquidity 
shortfalls in highly stressed events as well. 
Obtain liquidity from 
participants  
Two option play here: Requiring participants who are 
owed funds by the CCP, to the extent of those 
obligations to provide a collateralized loan, a repo, or a 
swap transaction. The second option is the application 
of ex-ante rules that permit the CCP to obtain liquidity 
more broadly from all participants. While the first 
option has the benefit of incentivizing participants to 
follow up on the CCP’s risk management, the second 
option could lead to performance risk, and participants 
could “be exposed to payment obligations that they 
might not be sufficiently able to control “( CPMI-
IOSCO, 2014, p. 23) 
Tools to replenish financial resources 
Cash calls  Ex-ante assessment rights, as discussed above. 
Recapitalization  Raise additional equity capital, as discussed above. 
Tools for CCPs to re-establish a matched book following participant default 
Forced allocation of contracts  The CCP would first try to reach out to voluntary and 
mandatory tools to achieve a matched book. A CCP can 
sell the positions to direct or indirect participants the 
outstanding obligations of the defaulter; it can also buy-
in any assets a defaulter has sold but failed to deliver, 
or the CCP can sell any assets a defaulter has bought 
but failed to pay. During a forced allocation process, the 
CCP fully allocates unmatched positions of the 
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defaulter’s contracts to participants that have not 
defaulted. They can also be compensated, as far as 
resources allow, for acquiring these contracts. 
Contract termination: tear-up 
(complete, partial, and 
voluntary)  
During complete tear-up, all positions - matched or 
unmatched positions – are terminated. There is a 
possibility to tear-up just some of the positions, or 
participants can be invited to nominate contracts to 
terminate them. By reducing some of the contracts, the 
CCP will reduce the exposure towards the concerned 
clearing members and, therefore, it can re-establish a 
matched book. 
Tools to allocate losses not caused by participant default 
Capital and recapitalization  Raise additional equity capital, as discussed above. 
Insurance or indemnity 
agreements  
Insurance or indemnity agreements may be an effective 
way of addressing the impact of specific business losses 
Other tools  Cash calls, as discussed above. 
Table 1: Recovery tools 
Source: CPMI-IOSCO, 2014, own edition 
Most demanding and challenging is to define the tools that can be assessed to 
serve as a recovery tool. The challenge in choosing these tools is to fit the 
business model, the liability structure of the CCP, but it is vital to notice that 
some safety tools are already built into CCPs’ risk management. Domanski 
et al. (2015) bring a third important feature in analyzing the clearinghouses: 
the diversity of CCPs’ organizational structures, functions, and designs. 
Moreover, besides the specific and detailed quantitative stipulations, the 
CCP’s governance and oversight arrangements are introduced with broad 
international principles. TThe CPMI-IOSCO decided to execute these norms 
across jurisdictions, such as the compliance and consistency results of 
existing “CCP stress testing, margin frameworks, prefunded loss-absorption 
capacities, and recovery planning” (Domanski et al.,2015, p. 71). 
The regulators endeavor to establish the interaction between CCPs and the 
whole financial system as stable as possible. The steps taken are vital in every 
area, and the progress since the financial crisis of 2007–09 is remarkable from 
the evolution of the central clearing activity point of view. However, the need 
for recovery and resolution tools must have objective and prudent regulation 
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as well. The fail of a CCP would imply that procedures, risk management 
policies, and safeguard tools, were not prudent enough, or at least they have 
failed to fulfill their loss-absorbing objective.  
Binder (2021) concludes regarding the CCP recovery that “the CCPs’ 
discretion to implement recovery measures at the expense of the soundness 
of non-defaulting clearing members and, ultimately, systemic stability is thus 
balanced by corresponding supervisory powers. Still, whether or not the 
proposed Regulation offers sufficient guidance to CCPs and supervisory 
authorities in this respect is not free from doubt” (Binder, 2021, p. 17). 
5.2. Resolution planning 
The growing network of CCPs and the expansion of transactions guided 
under these market infrastructures; nevertheless, the horizontal integration in 
products and geographical levels have substantially changed systemic risk 
and crisis propagation mechanisms. The implications of a central clearing 
have also affected the financial system’s response and behavior in normal and 
stressed conditions. In knowing the effect of these responses, authorities have 
a tool in their hand that may help establish a macroprudential perspective on 
the regulation and supervision of financial systems that rely on central 
clearing (Peters and Wollny, 2018). 
Improving resilience is the most critical aspect. A primary tool is 
incorporating liquidity and concentration risk factors in margin calculation 
methodologies and applying appropriate procyclical buffers. Complying with 
the Cover 2 standard to calibrate the default fund, using extreme but plausible 
scenarios, prepares CCPs to withstand market stress. Increasing CCP 
contributions to the default waterfall to meaningful levels of skin-in-the-
game is particularly critical concerning for-profit institutions. Central 
counterparties must have effective default management processes (ISDA, 
FIA, IIF, 2019). 
Nonetheless, enhancing transparency by publishing valuable, standardized, 
and audited disclosures on CCP risk methodologies, backtesting, and stress 
testing. Non-default loss event management is also essential; therefore, its 
manifestation should be supported by appropriately sized regulatory capital 
108 
requirements. Besides the robust setup of the default waterfall, central 
counterparties also apply mechanisms, they set rigorous membership criteria, 
and systematic assessment of members, collateral eligibility, and investment 
restrictions are also tools that help in achieving resilience (JPM, 2020). 
The recovery plan is highly dependent on the design of the default waterfall 
the CCPs uses. A general approach of a recovery plan is to facilitate the 
process itself, and it is recommended to use the tools listed above. This list 
includes the pre-defined assessment rights, more capital of pre-funded CCP 
resources, variation margin gains haircutting, tear-up of contracts (Plata, 
2017). 
Authorities intervene in case the resolution plan fails to achieve the desired 
recovery level to assure continuity of the service providence. The resolution 
can reach out for tools like ex-ante resources of CCPs that authorities require 
to set aside. 
On 4 December 2019, the European Council adopted a position on recovery 
and resolution. The proposed framework keeps in mind the role of central 
counterparties and their systemic nature. Hence, the Council sets out a 3-step 
approach to coordinate national authorities in the framework of resolution 
colleges. The three steps include (European Comission, 2019): 
 Prevention and preparation. As in the case of recovery, planning is 
a fundamental element. CCPs and resolution authorities are required 
to be prepared for extreme conditions. This explains why they must 
have an arranged recovery and resolution plans on how to handle 
financial distress at the right time. The preparation process is an 
excellent opportunity for authorities to identify obstacles to 
resolvability, and they can take steps by requiring the CCP to respond 
appropriately. 
 Timing and intervention. Supervisory authorities can intervene at an 
early stage, even before the problems become critical, and the 
financial situation deteriorates irreparably. Moreover, authorities can 
require the CCP to undertake specific actions in its recovery plan. 
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They can even mandate to make changes to their business strategy or 
legal or operational structure. 
 Resolution tools. Authorities have tools in their hands in the unlikely 
event of a failure. These tools include the use of ownership instrument 
write-downs, a cash-call to clearing members, the sale of the CCP or 
parts of its business, or the creation of a bridge CCP. The goal is to 
avoid public support, but authorities can apply for it as a last resort 
but ensure that shareholders take an appropriate part of the losses. 
Plata (2017) analyzes the protection the recovery and resolution plans provide 
for CCPs, and he suggests four principles that an active CCP recovery and 
resolution regime should take into account.  
Principle 1 is named Extremeness of this potential event. It is highly unlikely 
the default of a CCP would eventually happen, leading to systemic disaster. 
However, as mentioned before, CCPs must be prepared for such events.  
The second “Principle 2: Importance of restoring a matched book”: A 
clearing member default would lead to an unbalanced book. The CCP’s 
primary objective in default management is to restore the matched book to 
avoid exacerbating risk or stress on the market it clears.  
The third principle is “Principle 3: Importance of incentives” Plata (2017), to 
emphasizes the role and the design of the CCP, namely, that they are risk 
management and mutualization systems based on incentives.  
The last principle is Principle 4: Balance between certainty and flexibility: 
The events for what the plans are dedicated to managing are extreme and rare; 
however, they should keep a way to ensure the right balance between 
certainty regarding the tools to be used and the flexibility of its extent. 
In a close parallel to the corresponding provisions in Arts. 15-18 BRRD, Arts. 
15-17 of CCP RRR require the resolution authorities to analyze the degree to 
which a CCP is resolvable without assuming any extraordinary public 
financial support, central bank emergency liquidity assistance, or central 
bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralization tenor 
and interest rate terms.  
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Art. 16 CCP RRR provides accommodates a slow arrangement of designated 
managerial forces, which, beginning with simple proposals to the applicable 
CCP, eventually brings about the ability to require the CCP to make at least 
one explicit strides to cure the issues, including both organizational measures 
and changes to the legal structure of the CCP. Binder (2021) highlights that 
it is uncertain how these powers will be activated in the case of CCPs, and 
the frameworks shall be designed and appropriately calibrated. Specifically, 
the arrangements of action for financing goal activities comparable to CCPs 
are currently under review. 
 
The chapter raises the importance of adequately planned recovery and 
resolution for CCPs. Even though these market infrastructures are prepared 
for stressful situations, beyond extreme circumstances should be handled 




VI. Own research 
There are two important aims a CCP must keep in mind when designing the 
default waterfall. One is to protect the non-defaulting parties from being 
involved in loss-covering of the defaulting ones, and second, to avoid the 
implementation of resolution and recovery and, therefore, assuring the 
system's resilience. 
Besides setting the risk profile of the CCP, which can depend on the 
ownership or the market, it is also crucial to construct the default waterfall 
that is suitable for the main stakeholders, e.g., the owners, the regulators, and 
the clearing members. The main concern these stakeholders have is to balance 
between liquidity risk and systematic risk. Namely, minimizing liquidity 
taken away from the clearing members by decreasing the level of the required 
collateral while maximizing the loss-absorption effect of the default waterfall 
by increasing the available collaterals’ level to decrease systemic risk. In this 
thesis, I will present the risk mitigation effects if the CCP can choose the 
structure of the default waterfall from the viewpoint of mutualizing risk 
between different markets and market segments by handling the default fund 
in different ways. The research points out how the handling of the markets 
can change the requirements of the CCP from its members and how sensitive 
the value of SITG is if the CCP aims to avoid the exhaustion of non-defaulted 
members’s contributions and, ultimately, the implementation of the recovery 
plan.  
While first I analyze the benefits of cross-guarantee from both the CCP and 
the market participants’ perspectives, another approach will also be part of 
the research. This latter one shows what benefits and dangers the different 
operations have from the CCP’s own capital viewpoint, highlighting the issue 
from a managerial perspective. 
Introducing a model representing a simplified reality will capture the 
calibration effects of the stress tests and the, and the results will be analyzed 
accordingly. The hypothesis I raise are the following: 
H1: Cross-financing takes place in the merged setup of spot and 
derivative markets. 
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H2: The clearing of several markets by a merged guarantee fund affects 
the structure and size of the guarantee system. 
H3: In the merged clearing of spot and derivative markets, a CCP needs 
a higher skin-in-the-game amount to remain liquid, avoiding 
implementing recovery and resolution plans. 
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6.1. Baseline model 
As already mentioned, regulators set out a framework of stress test 
methodology, called the “EU wide stress test” performed by the European 
Securities Market Authority at least biannually. The results of the fourth 
stress test show that CCPs m ust quantify the impact of sudden losses on their 
guarantee system. The primary purpose of my research is to apply the stress 
test under different scenarios to see how the guarantee system changes if a 
CCP clears markets separately, jointly, or partially separated – on the initial 
margin and default fund level. The stress scenarios will be the basis of the 
default fund values. This question is essential because risk-sharing and their 
sizes are always a trade-off between the margin requirements and the default 
fund. (Capponi et al., 2018). When analyzing this share proportion, I 
disregard the size of the skin in the game in the analysis. Its size will be 
examined from a different point of view, detailed above. 
A model will be built to show how the stress test parameters affect the default 
fund and the contribution members are required to meet. At first, the 
theoretical framework will be established and tested. Sensitivity tests will 
also be the subject of the research. 
The model and results presented in the following were published recently 
(August 2021) in the special issue of Risks, a Q2 ranked journal. 
In this study, our main question is how the default waterfall's size and 
structure changes regarding the initial margin and default fund size if we clear 
two markets separately or jointly and how it affects risk mitigation. We 
choose two markets: the spot market for securities and the derivative market 
for these securities. It is vital to select two markets that have a connection 
with each other because we want to show how the risk mitigation of the 
hedged positions between the spot and derivative assets changes the riskiness 
of the positions of the clearing members, and through this, the guarantees the 
clearing members have to pay after their positions. We build up a theoretical 
model using a Monte Carlo simulation (MCS). During our analysis, we do 
not simulate or include the value of the SITG. Our model has one CCP, four 
different clearing members, three different financial assets: a stock, a bond, 
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and a currency. The stock can be traded on the options, futures, and spot 
markets, while the bond can be traded only on the futures and spot markets, 
and the currency can be traded only on the options and futures markets. For 
the MCS, we had to assume the financial assets' price evolution since we need 
a time series for initial margin calculation and estimating the default fund. 
We choose the arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM) to simulate the daily 
logreturns of the stock and the currency, while we choose the Vasicek model 
(Vasicek, 1977) to simulate the instantaneous rate in the case of the bond. 
Based on this, Equation 1 shows the ABM we use for the stock and the 
currency, 
𝑑𝑌 𝛼 ∙ 𝑑𝑡 𝜎 ∙ √𝑑𝑡 ∙ 𝑁 0,1   (1)
where 'dY' is the change in the logreturn during 'dt' period, 'α' is the expected 
value of the logreturn, 'σ' is the standard deviation for the logreturn, and 
'N(0,1)' is a standard normal random variable. The price is determined by 
Equation 2, where 't' stands for time, and 'S' stands for the asset's price, 
𝑆 𝑆 ∙ 𝑒   (2)
In our simulation, the stress test has a central role. We simulate 30 years – 
since this is the look-back period for defining historical scenarios within the 
EMIR regulation – for both financial assets. To simulate the stock price and 
the currency, we set the value of the parameters needed to run the simulation. 
Moreover, to use "realistic" values in the simulation, which represent the 
European stock market and currency market, we estimate the expected value 
of the logreturn () and standard deviation () – between 12th January 1991 
and 11th January 2021 – of the DAX index, and – between 1st December 
2003 and 11th January 2021 – for the EUR/USD (finance.yahoo.com, 2021a, 
2021b). Unfortunately, the time series for the EUR/USD was not available 
for 30 years since the EUR does not exist for 30 years. The first day's price 
in the simulation is the price of DAX on 12th January 1991 and the price of 




Parameter Stock Currency 
α 7.71% 0.09% 
σ 22.37% 11.85% 
S0 1345.26 1.1965 
dt 1 day 1 day 
Table 2: The parameters of the price simulation in the case of the stock and 
the currency 
In the case of the bond, we apply the Vasicek model (Vasicek, 1977) 
determined in Equation 3:  
𝑑𝑦 𝑎 ∙ 𝑏 𝑦 𝑑𝑡 𝜎 ∗ √𝑑𝑡 ∙ 𝑁 0,1    (3) 
where 'dy' is the change in the instantaneous interest rate 'y', 'a' is the speed 
of reversion to 'b', which is the long term mean level, 'σ' is the instantaneous 
volatility of 'y'. Based on the model, the bond price ('P') is the following 
according to Equations 4-6, where 'T' is the bond's maturity (Mamon, 2004). 
𝐴 𝑡, 𝑇    (4)
𝐷 𝑡, 𝑇 𝑏
𝜎
2𝑎
𝐴 𝑡, 𝑇 𝑇 𝑡




𝑃 𝑡, 𝑇, 𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝐴 𝑡, 𝑇 𝑦 𝐷 𝑡, 𝑇   (6)
The applied parameters for the bond price simulation can be seen in Table 3. 
The parameter estimation basis is the monthly time-series data of the term 
structure of interest rates on listed Federal securities with a residual maturity 
of 0.5 years between the time period of January 1991 and December 2020, 
also for 30 years as for the stock and the currency. 







dt 1 day 
Face value 100 
Table 3: The parameters of the price simulation in the case of the bonds 
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Besides the price evolution for the financial assets, we also assume a 
correlation between the three financial assets' returns. They do not evolve 
independently from each other. The correlation is considered through the 
N(0,1) standard normally distributed random number in all three processes. 
We apply the Cholesky decomposition, which means that the relation 
between the random variables is the following, based on Equation 7-9 
(Medvegyev and Száz, 2010), where 'ϵ' will be a random number used in case 
of the three assets, and '' is the correlation coefficient. 
𝜖 𝑁 0,1    (7)
𝜖 𝜌 ∙ 𝑁 0,1 1 𝜌 ∙ 𝑁 0,1    (8)







∙ 𝑁 0,1    
(9)
The correlation between the assets is 0.2 in normal market conditions. 
However, in our price simulation, it is not enough to capture the normal 
market conditions since we also need stress/shocks in the simulated time 
series. As we stated before, the initial margin covers possible losses in normal 
market conditions, while the default fund should cover the losses in extreme 
but plausible market conditions, which we estimate with stressed market 
events. As a result, we modify the simulation of the logreturns of the three 
assets by simulating stresses in the time series of assets' returns as well, so 
the ABM and Vasicek are not enough for us as we presented before. The 
stress/shock occurrence is modeled with a Poisson process, while the extent 
of the shock is modeled with a lognormal distribution. The correlation at the 
time of the shock – in the case of any of the assets – is increased to 0.95, 
decreasing by 0.95 every day. The applied parameters for the model are the 
following according to Table 4, while a realization of the stock price and one 




Shock parameter affecting the value of the shock 
 Stock Currency Bond 
 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 
 2.25 2.25 2.25 
decrease of shock 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Shock parameters affecting the date of the shock 
 0.005 0.0045 0.004 

















Figure 13 (a) Realization of the stock price; (b) Realization of the 
shocks 
Four clearing members (CM) are present on the market, with different 
positions according to Table 5. The positions of the clearing members are 
built in order to be able to analyze how the merged and separated default 
funds affect the margin and default fund contributions of the markets. CM4 
has positions only on the spot market, while the other clearing members have 
risky positions, like short straddles, and also positions that handle risk, like a 
protective put or covered call positions. This is important because if the 
markets are cleared separately, this risk hedging cannot be used by the 
clearing members regarding initial margin and default fund payment, while 
on the merged market, they can hedge the risk. CM3 takes the riskiest position 
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since it has large unhedged short futures positions and also unhedged short 




Clearing member 1 Clearing member 2 Clearing member 3 
Clearing member 
4 
Stock Bond Currency Stock Bond Currency Stock Bond Currency Stock Bond Currency 
Long Put 3  5 2         
Short Put       5  5    
Long Call 3  5          
Short Call       3  5    
Long 
Futures  5   5 5       
Short 
Futures   5     10     
Long 
Underlyin
g    2   3   6 5  
Short 
Underlyin






























Spot Spot --- 
Table 5: Number of positions of clearing members 
The following shows how we estimate the initial margin and the default funds 
from the simulated times series data and the clearing members' positions. The 
margin of the underlying assets (stock, bond, currency) is calculated by Béli 
and Váradi's (2016) method. This model uses different standard deviations to 
quantify the VaR value based on delta-normal Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
calculation. Namely, we have to calculate the equally weighted standard 
deviation (𝜎  and the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) 
standard deviation (𝜎  of the time series of the simulated logreturns 
(from Equation 1) in the case of the stock and the currency, while in case of 
the bond the standard deviations should be calculated for the change of the 
simulated returns from the Vasicek model. Always that type of standard 
deviation is applied, which has a lower value, according to Equation 10-11, 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜎 ∙ 𝑁 99% ; 𝜎 ∙ 𝑁 99%    (10)
𝑉𝑎𝑅 , 𝐷
∗ ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜎 ∆𝑦 ∙ 𝑁 99% ; 𝜎 ∆𝑦




where N-1(99%) is the inverse of the normal distribution's cumulative 
distribution function at the 99% probability, D* is the modified duration of 
the bond, while 𝑉𝑎𝑅  is the Value-at-Risk at day t for the logreturn (y) in 
case of the stock and the currency, while 𝑉𝑎𝑅 ,  is the Value-at-Risk for 
the bond's logreturn. The Value-at-Risk expressed for the price instead of the 
logreturn is based on Equation 12-13, where S is coming from the ABM 
(Equation 1-2), while P is coming from the Vasicek model (Equation 3-6), 
and T is the liquidaton period, that is being set to 2 days, based on the 
regulation (EMIR 2012, RTS 2013), 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 𝑆 𝑆 ∙ 𝑒√ ∙    (12) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 , 𝑎𝑏𝑠 𝑃 ∙ 𝑉𝑎𝑅 ,    (13) 
Also, a 25% procyclicality buffer is used as well. It is exhausted and built 
back based on the two standard deviations, and it works the same way for all 
of the three products, so we will not highlight the bond separately as in 
Equations 10-13. If the EWMA standard deviation is greater, then the buffer 
is exhausted gradually. If the equally weighted standard deviation is greater, 
it is gradually built back, according to Equation 14-16, where  stands for the 
procyclicality buffer  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑅 ∙ 1 𝜋    (14)
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛  max 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ; 𝑉𝑎𝑅    (15)
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛   min 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛  ; 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛    (16)
Finally, the margin at time t is defined by Equation 17-21 for all the three 
products by calculating a so-called margin band with a minimum and 
maximum margin value in Equation 17-18.  
 
𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝜎 ∙ max
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛
𝑉𝑎𝑅
; 1 𝜎 ; 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛   ; 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛    
(17) 
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𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ∙ 1 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑   (18)
Till the calculated margin in Equation 10-16 does not reach this minimum 
and maximum value, the margin requirement will not change, according to 
Equation 19-21. The main goal of this calculation is to stabilize the value of 
the margin, not to have to change it on a daily basis, which is essential in 
practice from the clearing members' liquidity management point of view. 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ; 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛   (19)
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ; 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛   (20)
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛
𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ; 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛  
(21)
After defining the margin on the individual asset level, we have to quantify 
the portfolio level margin. We carry it out using the SPAN (Standard 
Portfolio Analysis of Risk) method by applying simplification. The SPAN is 
a complex method, according to Figure 15 (CME Group, 2019). 
 
 
Figure 14: SPAN methodology 
For simplicity, we assume that there is only a risk array and Short Option 
Minimum (SOM), which will be 10% of the underlying asset's margin, except 
in the case of the bond, since there are no options, so SOM is not needed 
either. The risk array contains scenarios for the portfolio, according to Table 
6. This means that the positions are revalued with the new underlying asset 
prices and new standard deviations. The scenario that gives the most 
significant loss is considered the margin (will be the MarginCMt in Equation 
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22) of a particular CM portfolio. One unit of change in the spot price will be 
the value of the asset's actual margin calculated in Equation 10-21, while one 
unit of change in the standard deviation will be 90% of the actual daily 
standard deviation.  
Scenario 
The change in spot price will 
be multiplied by this amount 
The change in the standard 
deviation will be multiplied by 
this amount 
1 0.00 1 
2 0.00 -1 
3 0.33 1 
4 0.33 -1 
5 -0.33 1 
6 -0.33 -1 
7 0.67 1 
8 0.67 -1 
9 -0.67 1 
10 -0.67 -1 
11 1.00 1 
12 1.00 -1 
13 -1.00 1 
14 -1.00 -1 
15 2.00 0 
16 -2.00 0 
Table 6: SPAN scenario parameters 
During portfolio-based margining, we determine the price of the options with 
the Black-Sholes model (Black and Scholes, 1973). We assume the 
following: the options are ATM options, with a maturity of one year, the 
standard deviation is the actual daily standard deviation that is used in the 
margin model, the one-year risk-free return is calculated with the Vasicek 
model, in the case of the currency option, the counter currency's risk-free 
return is 0%. The futures positions have the same parameters as the options.  
We simulate the margins on a portfolio level in two different ways, once 
when the margin and default fund are calculated for the spot and derivative 
markets as merged markets and once when they are separated. This is 
important because during the portfolio margining with the SPAN method in 
the merged case to spot position could be hedged with the derivative position, 
hence the risk is lower, so the margin should be lower for the portfolio, while 
in the separated case, one portfolio is for the spot positions, and another 
portfolio is for the derivative positions, hence the risk should be higher, and 
the margin should be higher as well. In our analysis, we aim to show this 
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phenomenon, and also we want to show how it affects the value of the default 
fund, and as a final effect, how the size of the guarantees will change.  
We need to run the stress test based on the EMIR regulation (2012) and Hull 
(2018) to calculate the default fund. We estimate historical and hypothetical 
scenarios, as well. Altogether, we have eight stress scenarios: six historical 
and two hypothetical in our stress test. In every scenario, we have a stress 
parameter for all three financial assets, one for the stock, one for the currency, 
and one for the bond. We use the same stress scenarios on the spot and 
derivative markets. The focus of our stress test is to see that if we stress the 
current market price – which is the last simulated price in our price simulation 
with ABM and Vasicek, so the 7500th day – with every stress scenarios' stress 
parameters, would the margin be enough to cover the potential losses in case 
the CM would default. According to EMIR, the value of the default fund will 
be the scenario that has the highest loss of the max(1;2+3) exposures. We 
apply the following rule to define the historical scenarios: we take the 
simulated 30 years time series and search for the day where the stock had the 
lowest return. On this same day, we take the return of the bond and the 
currency as well. This is one scenario, and we name this as "min stock." The 
other five historical scenarios are based on the same method, summarized in 
the following the six historical scenarios can be seen:   
 Historical 1 – Min stock: lowest stock return during the 7500 days, and 
taking the currency returns and the bond yield change on the same day. 
 Historical 2 – Max stock: highest stock return during the 7500 days, and 
taking the currency returns and the bond yield change on the same day. 
 Historical 3 – Min bond: lowest yield change during the 7500 days, and 
taking the stock and currency returns the same day. 
 Historical 4 – Max bond: highest yield change during the 7500 days, and 
taking the stock and currency returns the same day. 
 Historical 5 – Min currency: lowest currency return during the 7500 
days, and taking the stock returns and bond yield change the same day. 
 Historical 6 – Max currency: highest currency return during the 7500 
days, and taking the stock returns and bond yield change the same day. 
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In hypothetical scenarios, we must consider the correlation between the 
different risk factors and risk parameters. To fulfill the regulator's 
requirements, we choose the stress parameters the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) put together during the EU-wide stress test for the central 
counterparties in 2019. The test's time horizon is five days, but we run our 
test only on a daily time horizon, so we convert the given parameters to daily 
ones. For the DAX index, -14% is given by the ESRB, so on a daily basis, it 
becomes -2.80%, the shortest government bond stress parameter belonged to 
the 1-year maturity bond, which was -36 basis points, so we apply -7.2 basis 
points. For the EUR/USD, the USD/EUR parameter is set at -5.8%, which 
means that the EUR/USD parameter would be 6,16%, and on a daily basis it 
is 1.23% (ESRB, 2019). We have two hypothetical scenarios, one with the 
parameters explained and another with the opposite of these numbers. An 
example of the eight stress scenarios based on our price simulation can be 
seen in Table 7.  





















































Number of day 
in the 
simulation 
6 839  179 3 380 915 5 897 5 576   
Table 7: An example of the stress scenarios 
Overall, we define the largest and the sum of the second and third largest 
exposure (loss not covered by the initial margin) in every historical and 
hypothetical scenario. That scenario will "win" that has the largest exposure, 
so the one that had the largest max(1;2+3) value. Moreover, this value will 
be the value of the default fund (DF). 
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As a final step, this DF is split up between the clearing members according 
to their ratio of margin payment within the total margin value on the market, 





We run the simulation 1 000 times within the model we have introduced in 
the previous chapter. Figure 4 shows the default funds' values in the cases of 
merged and separated markets for 1000 realizations. In the separated DF-s, 
the value shown in Figure 4 is the sum of the DF of the spot and the derivative 
market. We cleaned our database from eight outlier values in order to 
represent the results since, in these outlier cases, the size of the default fund 
is so high that one graph could not contain all of them at once. The outliers 
can be seen in the right upper corner of Figure 16. 
 
Figure 15: Size of the default funds in the two different cases 
A striking difference can be seen between the markets regarding the value of 
the default fund (DF), namely that the DF's value is always higher in the 
merged market, which means that in the merged case, the cross-guarantee 
taking between the CMs became larger. Moreover, in the separated market, 
the DF value is 0 in 649 times of the cases, while in the merged case, only 
once out of 1000. This is a vast difference, which is essential from a loss 
absorption point of view since zero DF value means that the value of the 
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initial margin is enough to cover the losses both on the derivative and on the 
spot market as well in the separated structure, while in the case of the merged 
market this could nearly never happen.  
In the cleared dataset, the minimum DF value is zero in both market 
structures. While the separated DF has its maximum at 561 914, the merged 
DF is much higher: 776 197. The difference between the average DF value is 
more significant since the merged DF values' average is more than three times 
as large, 7 618, while in the separated, it is only 2 419. 
One of our goals was to examine how the contribution to the default fund 
changes per each clearing member in the two different structures since we 
wanted to analyze how risk mutualization changes. To show this, we looked 
at how the default fund contribution – not in absolute terms, but the 
percentage of the total value of the DF – changed for each clearing member 
in the two cases. The result can be seen in Figure 17 for those cases when the 
DF was not 0 in the separated case. Figure 17 shows the difference between 
each CMs' DF contribution within the merged and separated market. If the 
value is positive, the CM has a larger share in the DF in the merged case than 
in the separated, while if it is negative, the CM's share became smaller.  
 
Figure 16: Difference between the DF contributions of each CMs 
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The results show the DF contribution for CM3 and CM4 has constantly 
increased, while CM1 and CM2 consistently decreased, except one occasion 
out of the 1 000 for CM1. CM3 only has net long positions in the stock and 
the bond, so it did not have any derivative positions. Merging the markets 
increases its share in the mutualized risk, so it has to face larger cross-
guarantee commitments because of the high risk those traders take, who also 
trade on the derivative markets. However, on the other hand, CM4, which 
had taken the most considerable risk since it has several unhedged short 
options and huge unhedged short futures positions, also has to increase its 
share in the default fund. So its positions' risk is mutualized, but at the same 
time, its guarantee payments had to be increased as well in relative terms 
compared to the other CMs. Interestingly, those two CMs –  
CM1 and CM2 –, who have several hedged positions and could use the 
derivative products' risk hedging effect, could decrease their DF payment 
contribution share.  
The DF structure is impressive, and the whole guarantee system, namely how 
the initial margin payment has changed and how the total value of the 
guarantees (IM + DF) changed. By analyzing the whole guarantee system, 
we can conclude that the total amount of guarantees is always higher in the 
separated markets, according to Figure 18. Figure 19 shows the difference 
between the two guarantee systems, showing that the guarantees' total value 
always decreases in the merged case.  
127 
 
Figure 17: Total value of the guarantees in the merged and the separated 
case 
 
Figure 18: Difference between the guarantee values of the separated and 
merged markets 
This difference can be the consequence of the portfolio margining on the 
merged markets since the risk of the spot and derivative markets' positions 
cancel out, reflected in the margin values. In every case, the margin is higher 
on the separated markets than on the merged ones. The difference is presented 




Figure 19: Difference between the margin values of the separated and the 
merged markets 
As a robustness check, we ran this 1 000 simulation a few times more, and 
the results always had the same patterns as the simulation we have shown. 
The open positions were built up to show how the cross-guarantee 
undertaking changes between them if the CCP merges or separates the 
guarantee system – the default waterfall – for the spot and derivative markets. 
One of the members had mainly open short derivative positions, so this 
clearing member's portfolio represented a perilous portfolio. Another one had 
only positions on the spot market, with this, we represented how the cross-
guarantee changes between markets. The remaining two had hedged open 
spot positions with derivative products, so they were active on both of the 
markets, so we could show how the hedged positions' advantage from a risk 
reduction point of view is reflected in the amount of guarantees the clearing 
members have to pay. We also showed in our paper how the total size and the 
structure of the guarantee system changes. 
The paper has pointed out why it is essential to carefully build a guarantee 
system and applying it jointly or separately for different markets. Besides 
complying with the regulatory background, it is also crucial to carefully set 
up the risk management framework for a CCP. The amount of the margin can 
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affect the amount of the default fund, which has different effects on the CCP 
and the CMs as well, not necessarily positively for both at the same time. Our 
model is a simplified reality, but the results show how much impact the 
merged and separated market has regarding cross-guarantee. Our primary 
goal was to examine how the contribution to the default fund and initial 
margin changes per each clearing member if we calculate on separated or 
merged markets and show how the total size of the guarantee system changes. 
The DF is higher on the merged market in all of the simulated cases. Although 
analyzing the whole guarantee system, we can conclude precisely the 
opposite. Namely, the total amounts of guarantees are higher in the case of 
the separated markets. The difference can result from the portfolio margining 
on the merged markets since the risk of the spot and derivative markets' 
positions cancel out, reflected in the margin values. We also found that the 
default fund contributions have increased on merged markets – compared to 
the separated markets – for the clearing members who trade only on the spot 
markets, so they have to take over some of the other clearing members' risks. 
Finally, from a financial stability viewpoint, we would recommend clearing 
the markets separately since the total value of the guarantees are larger in this 
case, so the loss-absorbing capacity of the CCP is larger. 
6.3. Conclusion of model I.	
This model showed how the guarantee system's size and structure change if 
a central counterparty applies it merged or separately for different markets. 
As a general conclusion, it can be stated that in the separated case, the overall 
guarantees that are available in the guarantee system is higher; however, the 
value of the default fund is always larger in the merged case, so the cross-
guarantee between the clearing members and markets are more notable. 
From the clearing members' perspective, this result makes the merged 
markets more favorable, since in this case, the trading is cheaper for them 
because less collateral is required to be posted. However, because the ratio of 
the cross-guarantee commitments changes, it is questionable if it is better 
from a risk-taking point of view for all of the clearing members or not. From 
the CCPs point of view, if it wants to increase its competitiveness by lowering 
the guarantees' value, the merged version should be chosen, but if it wants to 
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have a more prudent guarantee system, the markets should be separated. 
Finally, from a financial stability point of view, since in the separated case, 
in more than 60% of the cases, the initial margin was enough to cover 
potential future losses, the default fund value was 0, it can be stated that the 
separated markets are more stable, more stress-resistant, so it should be 
chosen if the financial stability of the CCP is in focus. 
From a regulatory perspective, our recommendation to policymakers, on the 
one hand, is to follow the more prudent path and specify the operation of the 
default funds to be handled separately. On the other hand, if the regulator's 
most important goal is to handle systemic risk, it must keep a balance between 
increasing the size of the initial margin and default fund and the liquidity risk 
it causes with it for the clearing members. So it is not evident that the higher 
initial margin and default fund value is adequate from a systemic risk point 
of view.  
The proposed model’s limitation is that we had one CCP with four clearing 
members with small open positions, and we did not consider the third layer 
of the default waterfall, the SITG. Researches focusing on the SITG highlight 
that incentives of the CCP and its clearing members should be aligned to 
increase efficiency. During this research, the goal was to build a model that 
offers a solid basis to address future improving policies regarding CCPs. 
However, the model is built in Microsoft Excel, and the program can handle 
a limited set and complexity of data.  
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6.4. Model for sensitivity testing of the SITG 
In order to increase efficiency and to analyze and align the incentives of the 
CCP and its clearing members, I decided to use the model presented above to 
shows how the CCP’s own contribution in the default waterfall is affected in 
different market structures. The model needed to be simplified to perform a 
sensitivity test on the SITG. Overall, the model is improved, and all three 
layers are part of the stress testing so results are based on the whole default 
waterfall rather than just a part of it and therefore reached more sophisticated 
conclusions.  
Using the same model and pricing principles, the following assumptions and 
methods were applied: the economy still has two hypothetical markets 
cleared by one CCP, one of the markets is a spot market with one single stock, 
the other market is a derivative market, on which the market participants can 
trade with options and futures contracts. In this scenario, the number of 
assets was reduced to stock and currency. The underlying asset can be the 
stock traded on the spot market, and it can be a currency as well, not traded 
on the spot market. The clearing members can still mitigate their risk and 
benefit from the hedged positions between the spot and derivative markets. 
The number of clearing members remains four. The positions of the four 
members are pre-defined to see how the contributions behave if one of the 
members has positions only on the spot market (clearing member 4), while 
the other members have on both markets. One of them (clearing member 3) 
has highly risky positions built up mainly from short straddle positions, and 
the remaining two clearing members have risky positions, but also positions 
that handle risk (protective put or covered call) according to the following:  
1. Clearing member 1:  
a. Stock: long straddle + short spot 
b. Currency: long straddle + short forward 
2. Clearing member 2: 
a. Stock: protective put 
b. Currency: long forward 
3. Clearing member 3: 
a. Stock: covered call + short straddle 
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b. Currency: short straddle 
4. Clearing member 4: 
a. Stock: long stock 
7500 trading days were simulated in every trajectory since the stress testing 
methodology should cover a lookback period of thirty years, which is 
assumed to be 7500 trading days. Based on this 7500 days’ simulated price 
evolution, the initial margin and the default fund contributions were defined 
for each clearing member on their position on the 7500th day. The following 
day, the stock price changes and the currency were not simulated but ranged 
from +30% to -30%, with steps of 7%. So altogether, a 7x7 combination of 
price changes is considered in the analysis, resulting in 49 different cases. 
The additional one day was needed because the primary goal is to show how 
large the skin-in-the-game should be to cover losses caused by these price 
change combinations, so authors have analyzed the adequacy of the default 
waterfall in these 49 cases. In comparison, the simulation’s mean and 
standard deviation value of the stock was 7% and 22%, while 1% and 12% 
for the currency. The values are based on the time series of the DAX index 
(30 years) and the EUR/USD currency rates (all available historical data).  
In this model, four types of operations were simulated: besides the merged 
and separated setup, I introduced two more: partially separated on margin and 
partially separated on the default fund contribution level. In the scenario 
where the separation is on margin level, the default fund contribution remains 
merged, while in the other setup, the margin is merged, but the default fund 
contribution is separated. Separated markets mean defining the value of the 
initial margins and the default fund separately for the spot and derivative 
markets. If there is a loss, e.g., on the derivative market, which cannot be 
covered totally by the default waterfall of the derivative market, the 
remaining losses cannot be covered from the spot market default fund, and 
the recovery and resolution will start. Partially separated on margin level 
means that the initial margin is being defined separately for the two markets. 
However, there is only one default fund for the two markets, so if losses occur 
on the derivative market, the merged default fund can be applied, so the 
default fund contribution of a market participant may have to be used, who is 
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not even active on the derivative market. Based on the simulation, the 
expectation is that a larger default fund will be available to cover losses 
compared to the fully separated case. Partially separated on the default fund 
level is the case, when a clearing members benefits of netting on the initial 
margin level, but the default fund contribution is handled separately, so if 
stress hits the market, the only default fund contribution that is used is the 
one where the default happened. From a CCP’s point of view, a smaller 
amount of initial margin bears more risks, so the threat of reaching the SITG 
level is heightened.  In the case of a merged market, the initial margins and 
the default funds will be defined as the two markets are cleared together, 
meaning that the risk-mitigating effect of having spot and derivative contracts 
as well would decrease the risk associated with the positions, causing smaller 
initial margins, all else being equal. This can happen since traders benefit 
from spot positions’ hedging with the derivative ones by applying the SPAN 
methodology. From their perspective, the risk is lower, so the margin 
requirements will be lower on the portfolio, too.  The benefit from hedging 
disappears in the separated market model, resulting in higher potential risks, 
so traders must include more collateral in the system. 
Based on the +/-30% price changes on day 7501, the clearing members’ 
positions, initial margin accounts, and default fund contributions, I analyzed 
whether the clearing members’ guarantees would have been enough to cover 
losses if they defaulted on day 7501. The assumption is that the default 
happens on a max(1;2+3) basis, so there is at least one non-defaulting 
member.  
Figure 21 contains the result of the 1000 trajectories. The average total value 
of the initial margins can be seen (total value of the initial margins on the spot 
and derivative market for all the four clearing members together), the average 
total size of the default fund, and the average size of the SITG if the price 
change on the 7501st day is -30% for both the stock and the currency. The 
value of the SITG was analyzed in two cases; once when the value of the 
SITG (signed as „SITG (non-defaulting)” in Figure 18 was defined to avoid 
exhaustion of the non-defaulting clearing members’ default fund 
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contributions, namely the CCP applies the first three levels of the default 
waterfall totally to cover the losses. The other case contains the value of the 
SITG (signed as „SITG (R&R)” in Figure 21 when the CCP applies all four 
levels of the default waterfall totally and would start the recovery and 
resolution process if other defaults would occur.  
 
Figure 20: Average value of the initial margin, default fund, and SITG in 
the 1000 trajectories 
The most important conclusion drawn from the results is that a partially 
separated market - IM is superior to the other three markets from the skin-in-
the-game perspective. Based on Figure 21, it can be seen that the least SITG 
is needed when a CCP applies a partially separated structure on initial 
marging level, and most in the case of the partially separated on default fund 
level structure in both cases: if focusing on the non-defaulting clearing 
member’s protection, and also if “only” the recovery and resolution 
prevention is the main goal. Analyzing this from the CCP’s point of view, the 
smaller the value of the needed SITG is, the better since less own capital is 
being risked and motivation for a robust risk management method on the first 
layer is also strong. Also, from the regulator’s point of view, the smaller SITG 
is needed better since it means that in case of an immense default, the CCP’s 
losses can be more easily covered from the defaulting member’s resources, 
and the probability of contagion of losses between clearing members would 
be more negligible. The use of taxpayers’ money for an expected bailout is 
less probable. So from a systemic risk point of view, the partially separated 
on IM level structure is the best. A robustness check has been run as well, 
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other price change combinations were analyzed in the range of +/-30%, and 
overall, the same pattern could have been seen.  
It is also important to note, based on Figure 21, that the structure of the default 
waterfall changes notably between the structures. When applying the default 
waterfall separately for the two markets (fully or partially), the initial margin 
results in a higher value than in the merged case since the clearing member 
cannot take advantage of the derivative positions’ risk mitigation effect from 
the margining point of view. This is supported by Figure 22, where the ratio 
can be seen of the total initial margins a certain clearing member has to pay 
and the total value of all of the initial margins provided to the CCP. In the 
case of CM1 and CM2  - who had uncovered risky positions but also had 
positions where the risk was mitigated (e.g., protective put) or it was limited 
(e.g., long straddle) – it can be seen that they have to pay less margin if the 
markets are merged compared to the case when it was separated. Compared 
to CM3, who had notable uncovered losses through short straddles, and CM4, 
who had an open, uncovered risky position on the spot market, the ratio of 
the total initial margins has increased for them.   
 
 
Figure 21:Average value of the initial margin of the clearing members 
In the case of the default fund contributions on the clearing member level, the 
same patterns can be seen for the initial margins based on Figure 22. It is also 
important to note that the total value of the default fund was the highest in 
the case of the fully separated market, while the lowest in the case of the 
partially separated, based on Figure 21. The reason can be the relatively high 
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margin requirement resulting from the separation of markets and the loss 
mitigation effect of calculating the default fund jointly. 
 
Figure 22:Average value of the default fund contributions of the clearing 
members 
So from a liquidity point of view, the merged setup is the best for the clearing 
members, but for the CCP, the separated solution would be the best. Since 
from the viewpoint of the CCP, the absolute total value of the whole 
guarantee system is important, the higher it is, the more liquidity it will take 
away from the market, but it provides a more secure operation of the CCP 
and liquidity for it in case of default(s). Table 8 contains the average, 
minimum and maximum value of the total default waterfall (initial margin, 
default fund, and SITG). In all cases, the fully separated market offers the 
highest default waterfall value, the partially separated is the second, and the 
merged market offers the lowest value. It depends on the goal of the CCP, 
which suits better for it, whether the security is the most important, or the 
























Average 55,827 62,192 58,010 58,293 
Minimum 123 168 168 123 
















Average 39,371 50,000 39,153 41,808 
Minimum 123 168 168 123 
Maximum 1,308,494 1,574,901 1,564,149 1,309,106 
Table 8: Total size of the default waterfall 
*The initial securities values were $ 1,000 and $ 1,000 for stock and currency before the 
7,500 days, while the price change on the 7501st day is -30% for both of the underlying 
assets 
Regarding how sensitive the SITG is to the price changes of the traded assets 
prices, I summarize the simulation results for the 49 cases (7x7 price change 
combinations for the stock and currency in the price range of +/-30%) in 
Figure 24. It can be seen how the SITG ratio within the total value of the 
default waterfall changes if the CCP exhausts the first three levels of the 










H2: The clearing of several markets by a merged guarantee fund 
affects the structure and size of the guarantee system. 
The difference between the operations is remarkable. It can be stated that 
merging the default waterfalls has its effects and the structure and the size 
depend on it. 
6.5. Defining the risk profile of the CCP 
As seen in the literature, it is an important aspect of what shareholders expect 
from the CCP. The models presented are a simplified reality of a general CCP 
and its activity with the potential types of clearing members. Apart from the 
ownership structure, the operation can, too, send a message to the market. 
The handling of markets separately gives the CCP additional security by 
asking for more substantial collateral, which is optimal from a pure risk 
management perspective of the CCP. Moreover, the own contribution, as 
SITG, could be lower than in the merged case. 
Nevertheless, it has its shortcomings as well. First, the risk of liquidity „pile-
up” at the CCP can affect traders negatively, and it can cause a shortage in 
the market. Second, in practice, brokers can ask for a security margin with a 
multiplier of the CCP’s requirement, and thus burdening the participants. 
Finally, from the trader’s point of view, this operation is favorable if it is 
active only on one of the cleared markets, therefore not missing the benefit 
of hedging. 
However, cross-mutualization is lower, so members active in one market will 
not be affected by the default from the other market. On the other hand, risk-
taking members must have the proper collateral to sustain their trading 
behavior. Overall, the separated setup requires more collateral compared to 
the merged setup on the clearing member level. From a SITG perspective, the 
partially separated setup is the best, benefiting the other two. The margin 
requirement is the same as in the case of the separated, covering the arising 
losses. The contribution will be lower than merged markets with a common 
default fund, resulting in lower SITG needs. So the margin requirements are 
higher, the risk-mutualization appears at the default fund level, where 
members can enjoy the advantages of hedging.  
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Table 9 compares the four different market settings by ordering them on a 1-
4 scale (1 is the worst, 4 is the best). These values are summed up in Table 9, 















High amount of 
initial margin 
1 2 2 1 
SITG amount 2 3 4 1 
Protection 1 4 3 2 
Clearing members’ perspective 
Lower level of 
guarantees 
4 1 3 2 
Risk-
mutualization 
4 1 3 2 
Hedging 
benefits 
4 1 3 2 
Total score 16 12 18 10 
Table 9: Order of the four methods 
Results show that the most favorable set up for both parties is the partially 
separated markets – IM, meaning that while the CCP has higher IMs, so from 
a safety perspective is advantageous. Clearing members can enjoy the 
benefits of hedging on a DF level. 
Suppose the ownership structure follows the historical setup, where clearing 
members are also the owners of the clearinghouse. The risk-taking member 
benefits from the cross-guarantee phenomenon but burdens the other traders. 
Such a massive difference between the risk-taking willingness among 
members would shift the incentives: the more minor risk-taking parties’ 
membership will become too costly, and funding would originate from its 
own members, so the dependence between them would increase. The model 
of this analysis shows that the concentration is a potential threat because the 
defaulting clearing member’s contribution to the fund can be enormous, even 
about on average 45% in this model setting, according to Figures 19 and 20. 
This means that this particular member may have opposed purposes with the 
other members regarding the contribution and may encourage sloppy risk 
management practices or even enforce its will on the other members. This 
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could result in a power imbalance among members, the risk-averse ones can 
be burdened with higher financial requirements, although their trading 
activity is significantly less risky, as ultimately, the responsibility of losses 
resulting from default is split between them. It is important to note that the 
heightened concentration is on one side due to the small number of clearing 
members. However, if one or more members are causing increased 
concentration in real life, it is recommended to be handled, especially if the 
CCP is user-owned. 
A for-profit CCP profile in this model should address the issue of 
concentration. A wide-ranged type of clearing member immersion must be 
managed, especially the ones taking excessive risks. Because maximizing 
profit is the main goal in this risk profile, a robust margining methodology 
and default fund calculation methodology is a must. In the for-profit CCP 
world, the profit originated from trading; therefore, the goal is to increase the 
market’s turnover and have as many clearing members as possible. This 
requires the market to be liquid and fast-flowing, avoiding the liquidity being 
tied up in collaterals. Respectively, they would prefer to push down the 
margin and default fund because they can be cheaper than other CCPs, and 
thus, they are in a better competitive position. If the default funds are 
managed separately, the CCP will have more collateral to use in default 
events, but it will be a burden for members, primarily if they trade on both 
markets. The merged market design, in this case, gives expanded risk for the 
CCP, so the incentives of the CCP will be to set an even more stringent 
margin methodology compared to the separated calibration in order to avoid 
the exhaustion of the SITG. This will also increase participants’ burden, 
motivating them to trade outside the cleared market. An extreme risk-taker 
can create the illusion of hedged positions with cleared and non-cleared 
trades.  
H3: In the merged clearing of spot and derivative markets, a CCP needs 
a higher skin-in-the-game amount to remain liquid, avoiding 
implementing recovery and resolution plans. 
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The merged market is the most unfavorable from a CCP’s perspective, and 
more SITG is needed to cover the losses. However, as Murphy (2020), EACH 
(2021), Linsey (2020) mentioned, the SITG’s primary purpose is not loss-
absorption. 
6.6. Conclusion of model II. 
The proposed model shows how the CCP’s own contribution in the default 
waterfall is affected in different market structures. It is an important question 
since this own contribution is being financed from the capital of the CCP. So 
the larger this contribution is, the larger the stake of the CCPs’ capital is 
risked. The merged market scenario is risky for the CCP since it offers the 
lowest value for the overall default waterfall, and also, the CCP has to provide 
the largest SITG value compared to the fully or partially separated structures. 
This setup is favorable for some members engaging in risky trading and also 
affects clearing members’ liquidity the least. In the long run, the CCP would 
need a tremendous amount of capital to support the system, mainly if it aims 
to protect non-defaulting members. Overall, this setup would not increase the 
resilience of the CCP. However, to avoid resolution, the CCP relies on the 
fund provided by the non-defaulting members. Due to the heightened level of 
loss-mutualization, this setup is disadvantageous for members active only on 
one of the cleared markets. 
In contrast, the separated design gives an advantage to the CCP from this 
perspective, it can be stated that it is more resilient, but ultimately it can phase 
out more minor participants from the market because the clearing activity can 
become too costly. The partially separated on IM level was proven to be the 
most suitable for all stakeholders. It brings the benefits of a higher margin 
requirement and smaller SITG for the CCP, but members can profit from 
hedging and risk-mutualization on a default fund level, ultimately, this being 
the best compromise between parties. 
Although the model is a simplified reality, this has its limitations, too. First 
of all, on an actual market, the positions are not predefined. In this model, 
there are preset for every clearing member, so the reality is slightly different. 
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The connection between the parties can also be much more complicated and 
based on their positions, and the interconnectedness can increase. The model 
cannot handle this. It is important to note that the presented model has the 
limitation that the resulting SITG value is compared only to the total value of 
the default waterfall and not to the own capital of the CCP; however, e.g., the 
EMIR regulation defines its value in the ratio of the own capital. Further 
research could analyze actual data of a specific market to compare how the 
ratio of the SITG within the default waterfall and the ratio of the SITG to the 
own capital relate to each other. It could answer if the 25% of the EMIR 
regulation is enough or a smaller/larger proportion would be adequate. 
Meanwhile, it could confirm the current SITG’s level is satisfactory or 
encourage the system to heighten the ratio where currently represents a more 
humble proportion of the system, i.e., in the US. 
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6.7. Possible policy recommendations  
The operations presented in the models prove that the management of the 
default waterfall is indispensable. The actual resistance of the CCP will show 
in stressed conditions, so when defining the setup, the proper scenarios to be 
defined are a must. From a policy perspective, I recommend that policy-
makers consider a framework that regulates the handling of guarantee 
systems, allowing the different setups according to the local market types. If 
one of the markets cleared by the CCP is more pronounced, this should be 
considered, as clearing members that trade on only one market will benefit 
from a segregated guarantee fund, as cross-guarantee may be to their 
disadvantage. The CCP will also have a higher level of collateral. Clearing 
members active on more markets can take advantage of the hedging benefits, 
as results show partially separated on margin level setup being the best for 
every market participant. In my opinion, a fully merged setup, although it 
may be charming for clearing members, it is the riskiest among all: it can take 
liquidity away if the contributions are too high, or the CCP will not fulfill its 
role and fail due to intense market movements. Therefore, the regulatory 
framework shall be strict and limit the merging of markets. Under limitations, 
I understand that not all products can be hedged. For instance, commodity 
and exchange markets shall not be merged since there is no hedging 
possibility on a product level, commodity markets can be more volatile, and 
the risk levels may differ. 
Nonetheless, a CCP’s long-term viability can be assured if the risk profile is 
defined and the incentives of the CCP and clearing members can be aligned. 
In the long term, it is advised for policy-makers to set up rules for the 
possibility of handling the guarantee systems as presented in the current 
thesis. The framework for the proposed operation can differ between markets, 
so not every environment is compatible with it. The hedging principles must 




In my thesis, I highlighted the importance of central clearing and the path this 
field has reached since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. This research 
area is a young one. As shown, there were only a few articles and studies 
regarding central clearing and the importance of the CCP on the market 
before 2007. As a first step, I explained the difference between CCPS and 
clearinghouses, namely that they have the same goal, while a significant 
difference appears on an operational level. To understand the importance of 
the topic, I dedicated a large space to analyze the history of central clearing 
and the regulatory framework that shapes the daily operation for CCPs. 
In Chapter I. I presented the evolution of central clearing, beginning from the 
manual check clearing processes to the automated systems. This is followed 
by the presentation of how CCPs reduce exposure and manage counterparty 
risks. CCP clearing concentrates on trade management, position 
management, collateral and risk management, and delivery management. 
There are two forms of CCP inclusions: first, the CCP becomes the original 
buyer and seller’s counterparty. Second, the CCP is a facilitator, in which 
case the original buyer and seller remain legal counterparties to each other. 
The CCP will validate and match the delivery instructions, the result of which 
is forwarded to settlement. The clearing is performed first by the CCP, then 
the CSD’s turn is to perform the settlement. The process when the CCP 
imposes itself a “central” party between traders and, therefore, “becoming a 
buyer to the seller, and a seller to the buyer” is called novation. The CCP will 
provide insurance against the bilateral default risk for the two parties. They 
are no longer exposed to each other but only to the CCP. First, the CCP takes 
market participants’ trading exposures onto its balance sheet, relieving 
multilateral risk exposures’ counterparties. This action reduces counterparty 
risks among market participants, and multilateral netting gives further 
benefits to the members.  
The most important message of this chapter is the lessons learned from the 
past events, where CCPs failed or almost failed to perform their activity, 
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given the heightened volatility on the markets, lax risk management, and the 
lack of transparency and cooperation from clearing members.  
The second chapter emphasized how banks and CCPs differ since it is a 
common mistake to view CCPs as banks. Their risk profiles, operation, and 
function differ, so it was important to show that CCPs act as risk managers – 
therefore subject to credit and liquidity risk of clearing members default - 
while banks are risk-takers. 
Regulators have implemented several frameworks since CCPs became the 
center of attention, so in the third chapter, I summarize the regulatory 
framework for the EU and the USA, capturing the milestones both had on an 
international level. In sum, no matter which markets a trader chooses, CCPs 
and clearinghouses are designed to ensure that they will break contagion 
among their members and mitigate systemic risk across markets and 
economies. The two frameworks mutually accept non-local CCPs under their 
supervision with the condition to have an as prudent and robust applied 
operation as the local one. The EU had more challenges to take during the 
stabilization of the regulatory background. Since the United States system is 
more or less homogeneous and uniform, the EU had to deal with the very 
different interests of the 28 Member States. Researchers point out that due to 
this diversity, the EU experienced a slowing down in the legislative 
processes, and it also made the outcome more fragmented. Since in this thesis 
I use the conditions set by EMIR, I analyze it thoroughly. 
The fourth chapter contains the presentation of the default waterfall by 
showing how the implementation of the regulations for CCPs works. I present 
the main findings by researchers and professionals related to the default 
waterfall resources by focusing on the general elements: the different margin 
requirements, procyclicality issues, the CCP’s capital - the skin-in-the-game, 
and the default fund related contributions. Since the resilience of the CCP is 
tested during extreme stress, I analyzed the literature from this perspective as 
well: researchers have defined stress and systemic stress in several ways. 
Systemic stress is a set of circumstances that leads to the failure of a 
significant part of the financial sector, resulting in a reduction of credit 
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availability that can affect the real economy adversely. The subchapters 
contain the most important finding by researchers, who point out the potential 
weaknesses of the regulation or draw attention and endorse the CCP’s 
advantages. Moving forward, I presented the EU-wide CCP and DFA latest 
stress test, both showing the systems’ resilience. They even cover the effects 
of Covid19, so overall, according to the results. The chapter also contains the 
opinions of researchers and experts regarding the SITG. CCP experts show 
their dissenting opinion to the regulator regarding the amount of the SITG. 
CME highlights that “Skin in the game doesn’t protect end client.” The high 
skin-in-the-game can encourage moral hazard among clearing members if the 
CCPs contribute more substantial financial resources. The overall conclusion 
is that by defining the risk profile of a CCP, incentives of stakeholders and 
the market participants shall be aligned to avoid tension between the CCP 
and its clearing members. 
The fifth chapter aimed to show what possibilities does a CCP has if the 
default waterfall is proven to be inadequate to cover the losses of one or 
multiple members. The fail of a CCP would imply that procedures, risk 
management policies, and safeguard tools, were not prudent enough, or at 
least they have failed to fulfill their loss-absorbing objective. The regulators 
endeavor to establish the interaction between CCPs and the whole financial 
system as stable as possible. The steps taken are vital in every area, and the 
progress since the financial crisis of 2007–09 is remarkable from the 
evolution of the central clearing activity point of view. 
In my research, I focused on how the CCP survives extreme market distress 
if it operates its default waterfall in different ways and how sensitive the SITG 
is if the default waterfall is managed differently. The main concern of 
stakeholders is to balance between liquidity risk and systematic risk. Namely, 
minimizing liquidity taken away from the clearing members by decreasing 
the level of the required collateral while maximizing the loss-absorption 
effect of the default waterfall by increasing the available collaterals’ level to 
decrease systemic risk. In this thesis, I present the risk mitigation effects if 
the CCP can choose the structure of the default waterfall from the viewpoint 
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of mutualizing risk between different markets and market segments by 
handling the default fund in four different ways. The research points out how 
the handling of the markets can change the requirements of the CCP from its 
members and how sensitive the value of SITG is if the CCP aims to avoid the 
exhaustion of non-defaulted members and, ultimately, the implementation of 
the recovery plan. 
To analyze the cross-guarantee phenomenon, we choose two markets with 
my co-authors: the spot market for securities and the derivative market for 
these securities. It is vital to select two markets that have a connection with 
each other because we want to show how the risk mitigation of the hedged 
positions between the spot and derivative assets changes the riskiness of the 
positions of the clearing members, and through this, the guarantees the 
clearing members have to pay after their positions. Our model has one CCP, 
four different clearing members, three different financial assets: a stock, a 
bond, and a currency. The stock can be traded on the options, futures, and 
spot markets, while the bond can be traded only on the futures and spot 
markets, and the currency can be traded only on the options and futures 
markets. We had to assume the financial assets' price evolution since we need 
a time series for initial margin calculation and estimating the default fund.  
Introducing the model representing a simplified reality captures the 
calibration effects of the stress tests, and the results are analyzed accordingly. 
The hypothesis I raised are the following: 
H1: Cross-financing takes place in the merged setup of spot and 
derivative markets. 
As a general conclusion based on the results is that in the separated case, the 
overall guarantees that are available in the guarantee system are higher; 
however, the value of the default fund is always larger in the merged case, so 
the cross-guarantee between the clearing members and markets are more 
notable.  
H2: The clearing of several markets by a merged guarantee fund affects 
the structure and size of the guarantee system. 
149 
In order to increase efficiency and to analyze and align the incentives of the 
CCP and its clearing members, I decided to use the model presented above to 
shows how the CCP’s own contribution in the default waterfall is affected in 
different market structures. The model needed to be simplified to perform a 
sensitivity test on the SITG. Using the same model and pricing principles, the 
following assumptions and methods were applied: the economy still has two 
hypothetical markets cleared by one CCP, one of the markets is a spot market 
with one single stock, the other market is a derivative market, on which the 
market participants can trade with options and futures contracts. In this 
scenario, the number of assets was reduced to stock and currency. The 
underlying asset can be the stock traded on the spot market, and it can be a 
currency as well, not traded on the spot market. The clearing members can 
still mitigate their risk and benefit from the hedged positions between the spot 
and derivative markets. The number of clearing members remains four. The 
positions of the members are pre-defined to see how the contributions behave. 
Both models showed how the guarantee system's size and structure change if 
a CCP applies it merged or separately for different markets. From the clearing 
members' perspective, this result makes the merged markets more favorable, 
since in this case, the trading is cheaper for them because less collateral is 
required to be posted. A CCP’s resilience, in this case, may decline since less 
collateral is available for loss-absorption. 
H3: In the merged clearing of spot and derivative markets, a CCP needs 
a higher skin-in-the-game amount to remain liquid, avoiding 
implementing recovery and resolution plans. 
The merged market operation requires higher SITG from the CCP, so in the 
long term, a series of defaults can shake the system's stability since the 
resources of the CCP are finite. The separated setup can shake the stability 
from a CM side since if there is a high level of liquidity tied up at the CCP, 
members will run out of resources, and the stress will be triggered from this 
side. The initial margin being the first layer of defense, it is strongly 
recommended not to merge the contributions on this level. This explains why 
partially separated – DF setup is a disadvantageous setup: it requires more 
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SITG since the margins run out faster and the DF contributions are lower. 
The default fund level merged setup, where the margins are calculated 
separately, benefits both parties: while it motivates the CCP for solid risk 
management, it does not burden parties from a total contribution perspective. 
The CCP can include less SITG, therefore in the long term, a series of defaults 
will not exhaust the CCP’s resources at a high pace.  
Although the models are a simplified reality, they have their disadvantages. 
First of all, on an actual market, the positions are not predefined. In this 
model, there are preset for every clearing member, so the reality is slightly 
different. The connection between the parties can also be much more 
complicated and based on their positions, and the interconnectedness can 
increase. The model cannot handle this. It is important to note that the 
presented model has the limitation that the resulting SITG value is compared 
only to the total value of the default waterfall and not to the own capital of 
the CCP; however, e.g., the EMIR regulation defines its value in the ratio of 
the own capital. Further research could analyze actual data of a specific 
market to compare how the ratio of the SITG within the default waterfall and 
the ratio of the SITG to the own capital relate to each other. It could answer 
if the 25% of the EMIR regulation is enough or a smaller/larger proportion 
would be adequate. Meanwhile, it could confirm the current SITG’s level as 
satisfactory or encourage the system to heighten the ratio where currently 
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